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Abstract
 This dissertation explores the connections between martial arts training, rhetorical 
theory, and composition pedagogy. The central focus of this project is the common 
understanding of an argument as a “fight,” and by investigating the training practices of 
fighting arts, this project expands and complicates what an agonistic orientation can offer 
argument, teaching, and writing. This inquiry has two parts. Part one explores the 
importance and influence of ancient Greek martial arts practices in Platonic, Aristotelian, 
and Sophistic argumentation. By focusing on the “mixed” martial art of pankration, I 
challenge the pervasive binary of “open hand” and “closed fist” as a way to categorize 
and characterize arguments that conflates their technical and ethical differences. Part two 
turns to Japanese martial arts training for approaches to foundational problems in writing 
instruction: basics of grammar and syntax, form of writing assignments, and the practice 
of peer critique. By using the threefold method of kihon, kata, and kumite, I defamiliarize 
and provide a different orientation for discarded current-traditional rhetoric approaches. 
By investigating martial arts training practices as an approach to rhetoric and 
composition, I offer a theory and pedagogy of affirmative contention that challenges 
problematically reductive views of conflict and argument, provides skills and tactics for 
rhetorical self-defense, and encourages an ethical orientation to language-work that 
challenges injustices both inside the classroom and “on the street.”
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Introduction 
Mixed Martial Arts Rhetoric: Striking, Grappling, and Pankration
Courses of training in the martial arts often constitute exemplary educational programs, 
and…we might learn something of value for the liberal arts by examining them closely.  
Donald Levine, “the Liberal Arts and the Martial Arts” 1  
 
An original part of the earliest Olympic Games, pankration has influenced modern 
combat competition throughout the world to a degree that few of today’s practitioners are 
aware of. The popular Ultimate Fighting Championships and other similar mixed-martial 
arts events are modeled after the ancient Greek combat sport. 
Grandmaster Jim Arvanitis, Pankration 1 
 
I. Argumentation is/as Fighting 
We all know the commonplace metaphor “an argument is a fight” or Lakoff and 
Johnson’s related-yet-more extreme “Argument is War” (The Metaphors We Live By 4). 
The pervasiveness of this commonplace metaphor affects the way many students and 
teachers approach argument. For students, it might mean seeing argument as zero-sum, 
the goal being winning at any cost at the expense of someone else. Students might then 
engage in argument aggressively and viciously, or shy away from or reject argument 
altogether. Even if instructors might not share this perspective, we recognize the 
problems of having many students understand argument in this way, and we seek to 
disabuse them of this misunderstanding. The majority opinion in rhetoric and 
composition seems to see this connection and conflation of argument and fighting as a 
problem to solve, a history to transcend, or simply an uncomfortable reality that we 
should just ignore. But rather than seeing this popular metaphor as an inherent problem, 
this project explores and affirms this metaphor, thinks through it seriously, and outlines 
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the possibilities it affords. That is, if an argument is a fight, then what kind of fight is it, 
and what then can the fighting arts teach us about articulating, practicing, and training 
argumentation? To answer this question, I turn to martial arts training for different ways 
to approach foundational problems in rhetoric, writing, and argumentation, and this 
introduction will therefore do four things.  
First, I outline the popular conception of Greek agonism, an ideology of 
contestation, through which rhetoric and all other arts were understood, practiced, and 
trained. By looking at Aristotle’s own articulation of rhetoric as a fighting art, we can see 
that he creates rules to govern such fighting to combat the influence of figures like the 
Sophists. However, there are challenges to this emphasis on “agonism” that argue 
promoting conflict leads to destruction and despair. Second, I then turn to other primary 
sources to show that this image of “agonism” is based on an image of war, while the 
Greeks saw it as something different, but related. To address these challenges, I connect 
Greek agonism to the larger, global tradition of “martial arts,” even though the term is 
usually understood to mean those of East Asia. By doing so, I complicate the notion of 
conflict as purely destructive by illustrating an affirmative orientation to conflict as 
generative of virtue, skill, and subjectivity. 
Third, I examine the specific fighting arts of the Greeks, the Olympic “heavy 
events” of boxing and wrestling, which form a dualistic model of violence. This dualism 
in turn creates a metaphor we use to distinguish and evaluate argument: the “open hand” 
and the “closed fist.”  Boxing as a closed fist striking art is understood to be bad, violent, 
and destructive, while wrestling as an open hand grappling art is understood to be good, 
gentle, and honorable. In turn, this mutually-exclusive binary informs contemporary 
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discussions about argument and violence; some arguments are aggressive and destructive, 
while others are deliberative and productive. However, looking at the fighting arts 
themselves complicates this otherwise simple binary. 
Fourth, to address these complications, I turn to a third and less well-known 
“heavy event” that combined both striking and grappling: pankration or “all powers.” 
Because it combines mutually exclusive modes of contest, pankration refuses the 
either/or choice of the dualistic model; it is neither wrestling nor boxing because it uses 
both striking and grappling. In so refusing, pankration is not reducible to the binary of 
boxing or wrestling nor the logic of the “open hand” and “closed fist,” even though 
pankration often can only be understood in terms of this binary, as “wrestling with some 
striking” or “boxing that has grappling”. By exploring a fighting style that troubles the 
binary, I offer an approach to argumentation based on pankration that accounts for both 
deliberative and expressive arguments, both “open hand” and “closed fist,” rather than a 
reductive choice between a “good” kind of fighting and a “bad” kind.  
Finally, I outline this project, which has two parts. In the first part, consisting of 
this Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2, I explore, perform, and unpack the concept of 
pankratic argumentation by reading a Platonic dialogue featuring pankration and 
exploring the structure and function of rules of argument. In the second part, consisting of 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I turn to some concepts from Japanese martial arts—kihon, kata, and 
kumite—to apply this agonistic framework to foundational problems in teaching 
composition: grammar, syntax, and the problematic of language difference, the form and 
function of the curricular writing assignment, and the challenges of peer critique. Finally, 
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in the conclusion I offer a few principles to develop a more agonistic orientation to 
conflict, what I term affirmative contention.  
 
II. Fighting (the) Sophists 
Before his more famous definition of “rhetoric” as “the ability to see in any given 
case the available means of persuasion,” Aristotle first notes that all people use the art—
and its counterpart (antistrophoi) dialectic—“to defend themselves and to attack others” 
(On Rhetoric 1.1, 2). Whether making cases or defending propositions, the engagement 
between people in these arts is agonistic, contestatory, in nature. But not only are rhetoric 
and dialectic connected by their contestatory nature, but they are also not limited to one 
specific discipline or area of study, but inherent in and applicable to any and all. That is, 
all inquiry and argumentation is a matter of contest and a manner of fighting.i Aristotle 
makes this quite clear when explaining his motivation: “it is absurd to hold that a man 
ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being 
unable to defend himself with rational speech, when the use of rational speech is more 
distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs” (On Rhetoric 1.1, 5). His work is a 
manual in how to fight better, fighting with words and proofs, fighting in a distinctly-
human way, but fighting nonetheless.  
In his attempt to “give some account of the systematic principles of rhetoric,” 
Aristotle is developing principles to help train future fighters in the arenas of rhetorical 
contention, the courts and the assembly, so that they might succeed through merit and 
skill, rather than through privilege, brute force, dishonest trickery, or simple luck (On 
Rhetoric 1.1, 1). While “things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, 
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practically always easier to prove and more persuasive,” Aristotle writes, this is not 
always or necessarily the case (On Rhetoric 1.1, 1). The techniques of the Sophists, called 
“wrangling,” or erizō, which is an “arousing of prejudice, pity, [and] anger” within a 
judge, audience, or interlocutor, was often more effective than factual evidence or solid 
reasoning, allowing for the “weaker” argument to be the “stronger” (On Rhetoric 1.1, 5). 
This accusation of “weaker over stronger,” Edward Schiappa explains, “allegedly 
represent[s] the worst aspirations of the sophistic movement and perhaps of the art of 
rhetoric itself” (Protagoras and Logos 103). This accusation presumes that the 
“naturally” better will inevitably prevail over the worse, unless the worse employs unfair 
trickery, fallacious argument, and dishonest deception.  
However, even though rhetoric can be used toward unsavory and destructive ends, 
Aristotle explains this danger of misuse “is a charge which may be made in common 
against all good things except excellence, and above all against the things that are most 
useful” (On Rhetoric. 1.1, 5). The problem isn’t rhetoric, or other “most useful things” 
like strength, health, and generalship, but rather how they’re used. Aristotle’s project 
then, which extends beyond the Rhetoric into his works on logic collectively called the 
Organon, is one of establishing the rules so that only the best will win and the worst will 
lose, or at least be disqualified. As Susan Jarratt explains “after the complete formulation 
of logic by Aristotle, rhetoric appears to employ distorted versions of that logic used in 
ethically questionable ways to sway ignorant audiences” (Rereading the Sophists 39). 
Indeed, Aristotle’s project asks us promote and practice proper argument, training people 
to be less ignorant and more able to counter these “ethically questionable” forms of 
persuasion when they are encountered.  
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However, Aristotle’s logic relies on a strict division between logical and illogical 
argument, meaning an argument cannot be both, and this binary also has a concomitant 
ethical charge. That is, an argument that follows Aristotle’s rules is a logical and moral 
argument, while one that rejects or flouts these rules is not only illogical, but immoral, 
even “absurd.” Because the rules for argument are established as universal, totalizing, 
and absolute, following them allows for the “naturally superior” to win out. But this 
singular and absolute model, assured of its natural superiority, is a form of wrangling too, 
a “one-sided, combative form of discourse: one that completely shuts out any opposing 
view” (Jarratt, “Feminism and Composition” 274.) That is, in establishing the rules of 
argument as unquestionable and unquestionably ethical, Aristotle creates a situation in 
which the rules are only questioned or questionable by those who would prey on the 
ignorance of others or those too ignorant to know otherwise.  
But the “superior” ideals that Aristotle argues by “nature” and “reason” are 
themselves the product of a time and place. We might see such ideals differently today: 
oligarchy over democracy, a patriarchy justified by nature, a slave economy, and a Greek 
sense of superiority that certainly resembles ethnocentrism.ii These cultural values have 
formed a large part of the Western intellectual tradition, but more recently they have been 
viewed with suspicion because they justify massive social injustices in the treatment of 
women, people of ethnic difference, and those outside the class of culture, wealth, and 
influence. This unquestionable ethicality of such logics is troubled when we question 
them on ethical grounds. Alongside this dominance of white male elites, the traditional 
agonistic orientation to questions of power, conflict, and inquiry is suspect as well.  
 7 
In Agōn Culture, Claudio Colaguori argues that Western agonism is the central 
cause of “global poverty, crime, material deprivation, murder, rape, self-abuse, suicide, 
self-cutting, depression, anxiety, psychosis, alcoholism, multiple hatreds including 
sexism, homophobia and racism, war and destruction, and all manner of human rights 
abuses” (30). In Argument Culture, Deborah Tannen also cites an overemphasis on 
agonism as a root of many cultural problems, defining it specifically as “automatic, knee-
jerk aggression” (58). The form of agonism that Tannen identifies pervades political 
discourse, news media, and academia, which sees “intellectual interchange as a 
metaphorical battle” pitched between two sides seeking to destroy one another (267). 
Indeed, Colaguori and Tannen both see agonism as an image of two warriors (or armies) 
aimed at mutual destruction, the result of a pervasive “habit of seeing issues and ideas as 
absolute and irreconcilable principles continually at war” (284). If this is agonism, then 
the best solution might be to reject it altogether as the central motivating force of the 
racist, sexist, and imperialist ideology and the motivating force behind the history of 
oppression inherited by those in the West.  
However, throughout her book, Tannen is clear that she is not anti-conflict, but 
rather against the particular kind of conflict that is binaristic and only interested in the 
destruction of opposition as a way of demonstrating superiority. Instead, she argues that 
“the point is to distinguish constructive ways of doing so from nonconstructive ones” 
(272). Furthermore, Tannen notes that constructive forms of conflict already exist, 
arguing that “Asian philosophy and culture suggest alternatives to the polarization that 
typifies Western culture: accommodating more than one religion, avoiding rigid 
dualisms, and subscribing to an ethic of victor without vanquished rather than winner 
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take all” (221). By looking outside the Western tradition, we might find alternative ways 
to conceive of conflict and argument outside our history of genocide, slavery, and 
oppression. 
 
III. “Martial Arts” and Agonism 
In his “The Liberal Arts and the Martial Arts,” Donald Levine argues that the 
liberal arts tradition of the West and the martial arts tradition of the East are corollary 
paidea, ideals for and forms of education. They focus on both individual and community 
well-being, and do not rely on religious dogma nor simply function as vocational or 
technocratic training, as well many curious parallel historical developments.iii Both 
traditions seek to provide a person with necessary skills and to help them develop an 
ethical comportment to others and the world. We might then look to the East Asian 
tradition for alternative approaches to the challenges of Western education, and different 
models of conflict, fighting, and argument. Even though these non-Western cultural 
practices offer an alternative view of conflict, they are still subject to the Western views 
of conflict that we inherit from antiquity. 
Western audiences have historically had trouble with the term “martial arts” 
because it combines two seemingly “opposed” concepts (Levine 2). The Latinate 
“martial” invokes Mars, a Romanization of Ares, the god of war and slaughter, and 
conversely the Latinate “art” connotes skill, training, and production of poetry, painting, 
sculpture as the trappings of civilizations, embodied in the goddess of wisdom, Athena-
become-Minerva. This term then combines destruction and creation, inhumane brutality 
and humane civility, making the term seem paradoxical or nonsensical. However, even 
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though there is a long-standing tradition of Western ars martiales, “martial arts” in 
common parlance is understood to refer to those from East Asia, and so the paradoxical 
nature of the term is not something inherent in the arts themselves, but rather a problem 
of translation. This contemporary sense of “martial arts” appears in 1909 as a translation 
of the Japanese bujitsu, “warrior art,” referring to practices in swordsmanship and 
unarmed combat derived from the training practices of the samurai (Etymonline).iv The 
Japanese warriors saw conflict philosophically and aesthetically through bushido, “the 
way of the warrior,” which emphasized discipline, respect, and honor as much as and as a 
necessary part of excellence in warfare. Even if the warrior had to kill an enemy in battle, 
it was not because of glory or pride or even hatred, but rather a solemn duty to serve and 
to perform that duty as excellently as possible. That is,  “martial arts” names an approach 
to conflict does not seek it out, nor does it shrink away, but affirms it as part of existence 
and how we create, know, and develop ourselves.  
However, even if we might cite bushido as an alternative to what we see as the 
fundamental violence of Western thought, the Greek agonistic training practices were not 
merely militaristic either, but aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual as well; “they were the 
vehicles of that supreme educational effort, the cultivation of the virtues, and of the 
journey to transcendence” (Levine 2). That is, an agonistic orientation to conflict is not 
primarily concerned with the destruction of an enemy nor the victory and acquisition of a 
prize, but the opportunity to contend, to either win or lose, but to do so excellently, 
honorably, and beautifully. That is, if we posit Greek agonism as the winner-take-all, 
warfare mentality that Colaguori and Tannen do, we risk fundamentally 
misunderstanding this important and influential cultural and spiritual practice.  
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According to Pindar, the agōn was established when “Heracles divided up the gift 
of war and offered the choicest part” (Olympian 10). The agōn was not identical to war, 
but a particular part removable from it. The agōn was the choicest part because it was the 
site of the Greek cultural ideal arête, excellence, which could only be acquired, exhibited, 
and maintained through agonistic conflict. While this was certainly possible in war, the 
material cost made it less accessible and viable for the training and generation of 
excellence in and of a society. In Bodily Arts, Debra Hawhee argues that rather than 
“virtue,” some static internal “goodness,” arête is more properly understood as 
“virtuosity” or “excellence” (17, 25). Virtue isn’t something gotten or possessed, but 
rather strived for, quested after, and sought without any certainty of success, so “what 
matters for arête then is not victory per se but rather the hunt for victory” (Hawhee 23). 
This questing allowed arête to move through a whole host of discourses.  
Originally, Homer uses arête to refer to Achilles’ beautiful body and skill in 
warfare, later it was applied to athletic contests and even “skill in political matters,” and 
then still later the term is applied metaphorically to an “interior” morality as an excellent 
soul (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 22, Wilcox 133). That is, the word for virtue 
in philosophical discourse does not begin in the Lyceum or the Academy, but on the 
battlefield and in the fighting ring. Because these martial training practices preceded 
training in other disciplines, “the Greeks produced themselves through active struggle; 
pedagogy [itself] depended on agonism,” and therefore, new types of training, like that in 
rhetoric and argumentation, were agonistic as well (Hawhee 16).  
However, Hawhee further distinguishes agōn from athilos, the root of athletics, as 
“the more explicit struggle for a prize” (15). The exclusive material benefit of the athilos 
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prize creates a binary outcome: one won or one lost. One only wins at the other’s 
expense. Victory is achieved through the negation of the other. This zero-sum, all-or-
nothing logic of athilos relies on the same zero-sum logic as war does. “Whereas athilos 
emphasizes the price and hence the victor,” Hawhee argues, the agōn emphasized the 
“contestive encounter rather than strictly the division between opposing sides,” and an 
excellent performance was valued more highly than victory (15, 16). That is, athilos is 
the more appropriate term for a war-mentality practiced outside of armed combat, that 
criticized by Tannen and rejected by Colaguori, while agōn seems to be something else.  
In sum, agonism is not warfare and it is not even sport, but something closer to the 
bushido espoused by Japanese samurai and the accompanying East Asian ideals to which 
Tannen and others look to as a solution to our destructive and violent native Western 
tradition. However, in light of Hawhee’s analysis, we can see that the common negative 
conceptions of agonism espoused by Colaguori and Tannen do not holistically reflect the 
ideals of the Greeks regarding war or contest. I argue that such attitudes are rather the result 
of later Roman, Christian, and Enlightenment ideologies, but that’s another line of inquiry 
altogether.v However, if we can look at the Greek agonism as “martial arts” in more detail, 
perhaps we can see the philosophical and ideological practices that developed alongside 
and are developed from such martial arts differently, and in so seeing we might dis- and 
re-articulate these ideologies of argument and conflict differently as well.vi  
 
IV. Two Heavy Events: Wrestling and Boxing, Open Hand and Closed Fist 
 In the West, the ancient Greeks adapted the techniques for fighting in war in the 
three Olympic “heavy events”: the striking art of boxing (pyxmachia), the grappling art of 
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wrestling (pale), and a third that combined the two: pankration. The Greek martial arts 
have a complex relationship to battlefield practices and fighting outside battle, with 
Plutarch and Philostratos advocating for the battle utility of the ‘heavy events’ and 
Alexander the Great, Plato, and Xenophon arguing that such training could not 
adequately prepare for real life-or-death situations (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial 
Art 46, Dervenis and Lykiardopoulos 19). Some saw agonistic training as preparation for 
war, while others saw it as something similar, but not sufficiently so.vii But beyond the 
tension between practice and application, the problem of transfer inherent in all 
education, these three heavy events have complex and difficult histories. 
One of the reasons for this difficulty is that “the precise origin of athletic 
competition in Greece is lost in time,” with the specific events and the Games themselves 
being “invented” by various mythological figures like Herakles, Theseus, and others 
(Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 34). However, we do have evidence of contests 
during the Mycenaean and Minoan periods (2600 BCE to 1100 BCE), which can be 
traced to earlier contests in Egypt. But following the establishment of the Panhellenic 
Games, of which the Olympics was simply the biggest, we have records of three heavy 
events and their progressive introduction and development as the central part of the 
Games: Wrestling was first in 708 BCE (18th Olympiad), boxing came next in 688 (23rd 
Olympiad), and pankration in 648 (33rd Olympiad) (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial 
Art 34, Pankration 3). All three of these arts are part of Greek culture by the time we 
reach the Classical period, and thus they would have influenced the ways people 
understood conflict. However, because these are the arts of the ancient Greeks, from 
whom we trace the rhetorical tradition and who have been cited as an exemplary 
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civilization in the history of the West, these martial arts have a deep, intertwined 
relationship with our notions of argument, violence, and education.  
Invented by Theseus, Herakles, Hermes or his daughter Palaistra, wrestling, pale, 
was introduced in the very first Olympics alongside the footrace in 708 BCE, and it was 
most specifically lauded as training for combat (Arvanitis, Pankration 4).viii Orikadmos 
the Sicilian established the rules of the contest: no striking, grabbing the groin, or biting, 
so matches consisted of arm-holds, shoulder-throws, foot-sweeps, among other 
techniques like the waistlock (mesolabe) throw. If the wresters went out of bounds, the 
referee stopped the match, returning them to the center and the hold they were in 
(Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 52). Pale “did not rank as brutal combat sport by 
the Greeks,” who emphasized grace and precision even over victory, and “few stories 
present an image of it as being particularly bloody and violent or having been the cause 
by numerous fatalities to athletes.” (Arvanitis, Pankration 8). As argued by Plato and 
others, wrestling was considered the honorable form of unarmed combat because 
wrestlers win by stretching, turning, and twisting each other in an intimate contest; they 
struggle together, rather than smash each other: contention, not conflict (Arvanitis, 
Pankration 56). Divinely created and humanely regulated, pale was the original form of 
noble contest of skill and technique with an equal opponent, all for the honor of the olive 
branch and the respect of peers. This form of fighting seems to reject violence altogether. 
Conversely, boxing, pyxmachia or simply pyx, “was initially introduced into the 
Olympic Games of 688” from the Cretans, and “the first victor was Onomastus of 
Smyrna, who was said to have drawn up the rules for the sport,” which banned throws, 
but allowed striking, even to the groin or a downed opponent (Arvanitis, Pankration 8). 
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Even though boxing emphasized “skill and strategy over brute force,” albeit to different 
degrees at different times, “boxing was considered by the Greeks to be the most 
hazardous [contest]…[as they said] ‘a boxers victory is gained in blood” (Arvanitis, 
Pankration 61). Unlike wrestling, successful fighters in pyx relied “more on their ability 
to withstand punishment and dish out more than their adversaries. Backing away from 
blows was considered a sign of cowardice. The victor of a match often emerged bruised 
and bloodied but in far better shape than his defeated rival” (Arvanitis, Pankration 8). 
Alternatively, boxers might agree to a klimax, with both fighters trading stationary blows 
until one fighter fell. In contrast to pale, pyx is brutal bloodsport, a knock-down drag-out 
fight that leaves participants bruised and broken. When Tannen and Colaguori reject 
conflict, they do so because of this image of the broken boxer, presuming that boxing can 
adequately represent all of “agonism.” 
These two contests, these two different ways of fighting have been extremely 
influential not only as martial arts practices native to the West that are still practiced 
today, but specifically, these ancient Greek arts inform the foundational metaphor that we 
have used to evaluate and justify particular kinds of argument. One example is Edward 
P.J. Corbett’s 1969 essay, in which he uses a metaphor for describing acceptable and 
unacceptable modes of argument: the “Open Hand” and the “Closed Fist”. The “closed 
fist” is a common symbol of conflict paired with the “open hand,” which is usually 
understood as non-conflictual. Here we can see the inheritance of the Greek heavy 
events: the “closed fist” is the style of arguing like a boxer and the “open hand” is 
arguing like a wrestler. “Closed fist” argument emphasizes expression and force, 
launching our claims out and onto our opponents, hitting them as hard as we can to make 
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them concede, while “open hand” argument emphasizes deliberation and control, 
incorporating the bodily systems of opponents, grappling them gently to see where they 
might bend or break.ix Alongside and intertwined with these different modes of 
engagement is an ethical tenor that values the “open hand” over the “closed fist,” in the 
way that the Greeks valued wrestling as more honorable and less violent than boxing.  
While Corbett himself practices “the open hand,” understood as accepting, 
rational, and non-violent argument, he contrasts this with the “closed fist” style practiced 
by Civil Rights protestors, which is seen as aggressive, irrational, and violent. He 
describes this conflict as one “between an older mode of discourse which was verbal, 
sequential, logical, monologist, and ingratiating and a newer style of communication 
which is often non-verbal, fragmentary, coercive, interlocutory, and alienating” (Corbett 
295). In this, Corbett doesn’t simply see the “closed fist” as a different style of fighting 
than the “open hand,” but rather that one as violence and the other as non-violence, the 
same logic by which Aristotle might disqualify all arguments that don’t follow his rules. 
“Fighting” is what “those people” with closed fists do, not what “we” do with our open 
hands, which cannot be fighting; “the open hand has at least the chance of being grasped 
cordially. The closed fist just prompts another closed fist to be raised” (295). This 
metaphor presents a simple, obvious, and value-laden choice: we should use the “open 
hand” rather than the “closed fist.” We need to use gentle discussion rather than forceful 
debate. We can also see this dualism function when scholars look outside the fighting arts 
of the Western tradition, a similar root as the trouble with the term “martial arts” itself.  
In his own development of “tactical communication,” a rhetoric for police 
officers, George Thompson uses the same logic as Corbett, even though he turns to 
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Japanese martial arts, calling the modes Verbal Karate and Verbal Judo. Verbal Karate is 
the form of argument that increases tension and the possibility of physical conflict, closed 
fist/boxing rhetoric, while Verbal Judo redirects aggression and succeeds through 
subtlety rather than outright force, open hand/wrestling rhetoric. That is, Thompson’s 
metaphor of Japanese martial arts sees them as Japanese versions of the existing Western 
arts, which move and orient to victory in similar ways. While it’s certainly problematic to 
see all other cultures in our own terms, importing our history and values into them, the 
connection between the “gentle way” ju-do and gentle wrestling and the connection 
between the Japanese hand te and the Greek hand pyx, illustrate that these modalities of 
fighting and senses around them are not merely Western, but perhaps something inherent 
in all traditions of martial arts, which must necessarily operate on the same 
commensurable basis: the human body and the limited ways it can move, suffer, and 
generate power.  
Building on Thompson, Barry Kroll in The Open Hand: Argument as an Art of 
Peace also turns to the Japanese grappling arts as a model for non-conflictual argument, 
but focuses on aikido rather than judo. However, Kroll explains that his project sees “an 
open hand not simply as a gesture of peaceful intent but also as an instrument of contact, 
a way to connect with an opposing force and, ultimately, control it. In a conflict, this 
open hand provides a way to establish a connection with an adversary in order to receive 
aggressive energy and redirect it” (The Open Hand 2). While he draws on Tannen and 
others who reject “conflict,” his “project is not about rejecting the closed fist but rather 
about recognizing the possibilities of the open hand that connects and controls” (5). That 
is, even though it does not fight in the way we normally think about fighting, because we 
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normally think about fighting in boxing terms, aikido is still an approach to adversative 
situations that intends to win, to survive, and to defeat an opponent as much as defeat the 
aggression in the self.  
While we might prefer wrestling as a comparatively gentle and productive mode 
of argument to boxing as forceful and destructive, both forms of engagement are equally 
forceful, but in different ways. While any fighting art would teach students to avoid 
needless conflict, the different modalities of particular arts are simply different ways of 
dealing with conflict. Boxing is concussive, striking surface with surface, doing more 
damage than suffering it, while wrestling is coercive, manipulating the structure, twisting 
it to a breaking point. At this point, we might ask whether a punch to the face is really 
more violent than a throw to the ground, but the particular ethical valence of these 
techniques requires seeing much more than just which technique was actually performed, 
and in the end will fall into the same problems as the initial binary of “open hand” and 
“closed fist.” This alignment of striking with violent conflict and grappling with ethical 
contention is certainly more complicated when we more closely attend to the physical 
practices, and this in turn might allow us to complicate our understanding of closed fist 
and open hand when concerning discourse and argumentation. 
We can use this metaphor to think through the contrast between an Aristotelian 
“open hand” rhetoric, motivated by rules of conduct and norms of civility, that allows for 
the true, right, and good to win the day, while the false, wrong, and evil Sophist must 
resort to “closed fist” techniques to succeed. Where Aristotle grapples with the logical 
connections between concepts, the Sophists strike with the affective force of words. But 
if we reject the ethical overtones of “closed fist” as evil and “open hand” as good, but see 
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them instead as different modalities appropriate for different situations, then we have a 
different way of articulating this division and practicing argument as we have inherited it. 
We don’t have argument and non-argument, violence and non-violence, but two different 
modes of engaging in argument: either expression or deliberation, making claims or 
asking after evidence.  
However, as Corbett notes, this metaphor has shifted from its original coinage by 
Zeno, who saw that “the closed fist symbolized the tight, spare, compressed discourse of 
the philosopher; [and] the open hand symbolized the relaxed, expansive, ingratiating 
discourse of the orator” (Corbett 288). While Corbett’s “open hand” emphasizes 
pacification, Zeno’s emphasizes movement. If we maintain the notion of expression as 
striking another with rhetorical force, we here have the open hand slap or palm strike, 
which can either be much less or far more dangerous, respectively, than striking with the 
closed fist.x Conversely, Corbett’s “closed fist” emphasizes the raised knuckles ready to 
strike the face of white supremacy, while Zeno’s focuses on the tightness and enclosure. 
If we maintain the notion of deliberation as grappling with another, then the fist of 
philosophy is closed in a submission hold: the tight fingers grasped around an airway or 
joint, torqueing the body position to its material breaking point, or forcing a reductive 
binaristic logic on a monism that resists easy division.  
An open hand can be used to strike as well as grab, and a closed fist can hold as 
well as punch, but striking and grappling still operate as distinct and mutually exclusive 
modes of argument, even if the binary oscillates ethically. If we simply express our 
views, then we are practicing a different kind of argument than asking questions. If we 
espouse certain logical rules, then not abiding by them would be illogical. But if such 
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illogic is more persuasive than the logical rules, then they are not as totalizing and 
universal as they claim to be. If there’s no firm ethical ground to stand on and a need for 
both modes, then we cannot simply stay within the binary. That is, if I am training my 
students in argument, I need to teach them how to account for and use both “open hand” 
and “closed fist” as needed. Indeed, the Greeks did have such an art that provides a 
model, called pankration or “all powers.” 
 
V. The Third Heavy Event: Pankration, Both and Neither 
Even though it was deemed “too violent” to be included in the modern Olympiad, 
in the ancient Games pankration was valued beyond all other contests as the highest 
expression of Greek arête (Arvanitis, Pankration 2). The pankration tournament 
happened last on the last day of the Games; it was the main event. We might understand 
pankration as a combination of boxing and wrestling, what we today call “mixed martial 
arts,” with fighters using a combination of punches, chops, kicks, knees, and elbows 
alongside throws, lifts, and holds, aiming for the highest form of victory with the 
submission.xi Unlike boxing and wrestling, pankration did not persist as a stable tradition, 
and it’s not until the mid-20th century that we see this “all powers” approach again.xii In 
the 1970’s, Grandmaster Jim Arvanitis created the “nucleus of modern pankration’s 
toolkit” by combining “Western boxing and Thai boxing’s stand-up fighting” with 
“wrestling and combat judo’s ground combat” and “studied anything that described the 
ancient art,” translating the movements described by Philostratos and Homer and 
analyzing “friezes, artwork, vases, and frescoes,” to incorporate extinct moves into his 
own vast bodily vocabulary (The First Mixed Martial Art 102-3).xiii  
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In contrast to his own expansive study, Arvanitis saw most martial arts 
practitioners as “incomplete fighters,” by having no ‘real world’ experience beyond 
sparring in a dojo, arguing which style was the strongest, and limited by the constraints of 
their specific styles and traditions. The martial arts world of the mid-20th century was 
dominated by the division between striking and grappling. Students in grappling styles, 
like judo and wrestling, could roll and throw, but were not trained to deal with striking 
because grapplers don’t strike. Likewise, students in striking styles like boxing or karate 
couldn’t deal with being thrown because strikers don’t grapple. From his years of 
experience street-fighting in Boston, Arvanitis knew that these limitations would leave 
even the most seasoned veteran unable to fight in situations where striking and grappling 
were all allowed. That is, when no holds nor strikes are barred, full-on, all-powers, street 
fighting was well beyond the ken of most martial arts students. Arvanitis designed his 
own style to bridge this division and filled in the gaps to produce the most effective and 
comprehensive form of unarmed combat that he could, whether the fight was in the dojo 
or on the street.  
However, while pankration used techniques from both boxing and wrestling—and 
some not part of either, like kicking—it was ultimately reducible to neither. Pankration is 
neither striking nor grappling because it is both striking and grappling. That is, each art is 
created by the exclusion of the other: boxing is a striking art that (and because it) forbids 
grappling and wrestling is a grappling art that (and because it) forbids striking. When 
someone breaks these constitutive rules, punching in a wrestling match or grabbing in a 
boxing match, they are not participating in wrestling or boxing anymore, respectively, but 
are either simply cheating or doing something else entirely. These modes of engagement 
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are mutually exclusive, but because they are two different approaches to the same 
problem of physical conflict, they are also mutually exploitative.  
That is, the boxer might punch a wrestler and the wrestler might throw a boxer, 
and because striking is forbidden in wrestling and grappling in boxing, neither have the 
training to account for or counter the other. In a sanctioned and regulated contest, we can 
certainly rely on these rules, but as Arvanitis argues, without them, our training for self-
defense that restricts us to one or the other leaves us even more vulnerable than we might 
be otherwise. We cannot simply be grapplers or strikers, Aristotelian dialecticians or 
Sophistic orators, we need to be both, and in being both, we become neither. That is, a 
pankratist rhetor might grapple the boxer or strike the wrestler as needed, and we can use 
this form of fighting as a way of practicing the art of finding and using all the available 
means of persuasion in a given case.  
However, in advocating for a “mixed” mode of argument, I am not calling for the 
abandonment of Aristotelian logic, even though mixing in illogic with logic is against its 
own rules. Instead, I am arguing that Aristotelian logic needs to be supplemented with a 
different mode of engagement, a Sophist “illogic,” even though the term only applies 
when we presume the Aristotelian perspective. Rather than Sophists being simply 
charlatans, they are instead rival thinkers advocating a philosophy and rhetoric different 
from Aristotle. We see this difference as deviance because Aristotle and others have 
become hegemonic and therefore legitimate in the subsequent philosophical tradition. 
Indeed, rearticulating the Sophists as offering positive contributions and unique ideas has 
been a project in rhetoric and composition over the last forty years.xiv If the Sophists are 
not simply villains, then the accusation of making the weaker argument the stronger 
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would be more than simply damning as well. Instead, Sophists adapt to the foundations 
upon which a particular argument stands and adopt the accepted premises of the 
interlocutor (and audience) in order to make their arguments effective. In so doing, they 
might be victorious over dominant ideals, making the weaker argument the stronger. The 
Sophistic “weaker over stronger” is a way of dealing with arguments without relying on 
established foundations and universal premises, which is what makes something 
“naturally stronger” in the first place. Indeed, if a “weaker” case defeats a “stronger,” 
then by the logic of the contest it would be the “stronger” instead. 
Furthermore, this practice of “weaker over stronger” is instead a valuable resource 
in the rejection of the negative fruits of the “agonism” criticized by Tannen and 
Colaguori. Such “agonism” is not actually the agōn, but the result of a history of 
oppression and violence that marks the Western tradition and motivates the logics in 
place to rationalize that violence. Indeed, when people of color demanded equal treatment 
under the law, proponents of slavery and segregation had a “stronger” case rooted in 
longstanding tradition and Holy Scripture. The case for equality of all people regardless 
of skin color was a “weaker” argument that was not supported by legitimate systems of 
power, but instead Civil Rights were achieved through the “closed fist” arguments 
described by Corbett. The case for gender equality too fights against the “stronger” 
conception of patriarchy, a long standing belief in not only the “natural” strict difference 
and division between men and women, but a divinely ordained superiority of men over 
women. We still see battles in these wars for equality today, and we still see the negative 
perspective of their tactics on the part of their opponents as well.  
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If we believe that everyone deserves the same respect and has the same value, 
regardless of whether the particular qualities of individual bodily subjectivity mark them 
as part of the “stronger” or “weaker” group in any given oppressive structure, then we 
should not simply rely on the “stronger” arguments that have become the dominant ways 
of thinking. Indeed, breaking the law is act with rhetorical import, a sophistic attention to 
the words is what allows it be either “criminal” as it is when people value the law more or 
“civil disobedience” when people reject such laws as unjust. Any identification and 
rejection of oppression relies on challenging the oppressive practices that are seen as 
natural, objective, and obvious by positing a “weaker” who has been subject to this 
oppression by the “stronger” and who must overcome these practices in the fight for 
greater justice and equality.  
With the election of Donald Trump and the dawn of our so-called “post-truth” era, 
we might not want to abandon traditional notions of logic and argumentation, but they’re 
not simply stable assumptions to work from, universal rules to follow, or unquestionable 
techniques anymore. We cannot let ourselves be limited by the metaphors we have 
inherited, a series of limits that prevent students from conceiving and practicing argument 
in an effective and ethical way. Rather, with the change to the ways that argumentation is 
seen, thought, and practiced, and with the suspicion of traditional forms of argumentation 
as biased and deceitful, we can’t simply train students in the old style any more. This 
project offers one possible new style of fighting which combines grappling with 
structures of logic and striking with the affective force of words, a combination like 
pankration, valued by the ancient Greeks, lost, and recreated by Arvanitis. To develop 
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this style, I have followed Arvanitis’s method as well: build on what we have, remember 
what we have forgotten, and look elsewhere to fill in the gaps. 
 
VI. Chapter Outline  
In the following two chapters, I extend and explore this concept of pankratic 
argument. In Chapter 1, I turn to an often ignored Platonic dialogue, Euthydemus, in 
which Socrates engages with and is ultimately “defeated” by two sophists. The titular 
Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus also happen to be skilled in all manner of 
fighting, “perfect pankratists” who see their skills in refutation as the “finest point” of 
their art. In my reading, I both outline the arguments in the dialogue as different types of 
fighting techniques and perform the kind of pankratic argument I have outlined here. In 
doing so, I trouble the strict division between Socratic Philosophy and Sophistic 
refutation, reading both against each other. Building on my reading of the Euthydemus, 
Chapter 2 explores the power of rules in agonistic contention as both absolutely 
necessary and yet impossibly fragile. That is, even though mutually agreed upon rules of 
conduct, space, and time are fundamental for any exchange to be productive, at any 
moment, in fighting or in argument, the rules might be broken or simply ignored, which 
means the rules of fallacy and how we deal with such fallacy are more important and 
complicated than we have traditionally understood. 
In the rest of this project, I turn to Japanese martial arts training practices to apply 
these theories of agonistic rhetoric and pankratic argument in pedagogical approaches, 
strategies, and exercises to address the foundational challenges of teaching writing. I 
make this move for two reasons. First, the training practices in martial arts are 
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surprisingly consistent across different traditions, meaning that the Greeks most likely 
trained their fighters using the same pedagogical structures as the Japanese did. Second, 
although these structures are consistent, the Greek practices are both difficult to research 
and their descendants are so overcoded by subsequent developments in the Western 
tradition that I need to look at them through the lens of the Japanese arts to see them 
differently, and perhaps closer to the ways the agonistic Greeks practiced them as well. 
Just like Arvanitis had to incorporate non-Western martial arts practices to fill in the gaps 
in resurrecting pankration, I too turn to Japanese pedagogy to fill in the gaps of my 
sophistic, agonistic approach to argument and writing. 
In Chapter 3, I begin with striking, giving students specific tools to use when 
using words, like etymology and basics of grammatical structure, and training such 
basics, kihon, through repetitive practice, as in pankration and other arts like karate or 
judo. We drill not so that students can learn “clear prose” or “correct grammar,” but so 
that can develop effective, precise expression and strong logical support. That is, I 
address the problems of classicism and ethnocentrism at work in traditional 
understandings of “error,” and offer an alternative approach that achieves the goals of 
“correctness” without uncritically promoting an exclusionary model of what “good 
writing” is and can be.  
In Chapter 4, I engage the question of the first-year writing assignment, in terms 
of authenticity and the development of student disposition. While it might be called 
formalist, I argue for writing assignments to be recursive practice sequences, kata in 
Japanese, which allow students gaining a sense of how their moves work in larger, more 
complex, and interconnected ways. To develop this recursive assignment, I modify the 
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classical argumentative form, supplementing it with subsequent forms. In training the 
essay as kata, students not only practice skills, but they develop different dispositions 
toward argument, writing, themselves, and others. 
Building on drilling in basics and practicing forms, in Chapter 5 I address how 
students learn by working with others in something we call peer critique or peer review, 
which I articulate as sparring, kumite in Japanese. While most scholars reject the conflict 
endemic to peer review, I build my pedagogy around it. In this sparring, students conflict 
not to try to destroy each other, but so that they might become mutually vulnerable, 
learning the pain our words can cause and the pain our words can feel, making others 
better and allowing others to help us better ourselves.  
Finally, in my conclusion, I offer some principles teachers might employ in their 
classes, scholarship, and practice that could help generate this agonistic orientation 
toward argument. That is, I do not embrace conflict nor glorify violence, but rather affirm 
it as a constitutive part of human experience and endeavor to provide my students and 
myself the best tools and strategies to encounter it productively, engage in it ethically, 
and use it as the ancient Greeks and medieval Japanese did in the generation of 
excellence.
i Furthermore, these arts are also counterparts regarding minor premises—what Stephen 
Toulmin more recently calls the Warrant—in that dialectic generates these premises, 
seeking the foundations on which to build other inquiry, while rhetoric works out from 
them. In this way, these two arts function through and with each other, dialectic builds 
the premises on which rhetoric depends, and this powerful dualism not only establishes a 
distinction that is borne out through the rhetorical tradition, but is also troubled, as when 
rhetoricians question commonplace assumptions or philosophers base their discussions 
on problematic assumptions. Roberts-Miller also complicates the binaries surrounding 
agōn in Deliberate Conflict by illustrating not only the difference between pro-conflict 
and anti-conflict, agonism and irenicism, in political spheres, but also by the ways they 
go about those arguments, either by expression and deliberation.  
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ii Indeed, the rejection of racial integration and gender equality in the United States in the 
mid-20th century was justified by social custom and religious authority, which saw such 
ideals as newfangled notions aimed at destroying “Western civilization,” as detractors 
still claim. In light of this, those fighting for racial and gender equality had to go out of 
accepted bounds, resort to “weaker over stronger” tactics like sit-ins, marches, and rallies, 
using affective means to overturn the established logics of how people are supposed to 
act and interact. The fight for justice required breaking the law. I return to this point later 
in this essay.  
 
iii “1) By the sixth century B.C., both in Greece and China, an ideal and a program of 
liberal training had evolved, which included both intellectual and martial components. 2) 
In both cases, this ideal became corrupted in later centuries, as combative arts became 
commercialized in the Hellenistic period, and as Confucian training became 
bureaucratized. 3) During the sixth century A.D., a liberal component of the older 
curriculum became codified and institutionalized in those havens of ideal pursuits, the 
monasteries. 4) In the medieval period, these paedetic curricula became enriched and 
extended, with the firm establishment of the trivium and quadrivium in medieval 
universities, and of the arts of kung fu and tai chi chuan in Chinese monasteries. 5) In the 
late nineteenth century, mainly in the United States and Japan, the ideals of those 
curricula were revived and propagated in the form of new secular programs of liberal 
training” (7).  
iv However, this ideal of bushido was just that, and the samurai were sometimes nothing 
more than aristocrats using their power, influence, and skills of war to gain more power 
and influence, and it was also part of the nationalism employed by Tojo and Hirohito in 
popularizing the war effort of Imperial Japan. As I have been arguing, the Greek arête 
has likewise suffered from the uses to which is has been put, and the historical-cultural 
conditions surrounding it, meant that only those with property and leisure were able to 
partake in it, and later the professionalization of martial arts and combat sports made it 
lucrative career path in itself. That is, both bushido and agonistic arête are examples of 
an ideal of nobility, trained and enacted through contest, conflict, and contention that 
failed to always live up to or encourage the best lives and courses of action. However, 
despite this failure both remain some of the longest standing and effective forms of 
education, and ones that have much to learn from one another. 
 
v In Contesting Nietzsche, Christa Davis-Acampora claims that Paul is the origin of the 
shift away from the Greek notion of struggle as positive and productive to emphasizing 
the pain, agony, in the contest. It is this Christian ideology that motivates the negative 
view of conflict in the Greeks, and even of Nietzsche as well, who not only uses the 
Greeks as a model, but also employs their agonistic approach as we can see in his Rules 
for Kreigs-Praxis in Ecce Homo. Furthermore, Tannen also cites Walter Ong’s 
investigation into the roots of Western education, an all-male situation, which draws from 
the contentiousness of the Ancient Greeks and the disputation tradition from medieval 
monasticism, those that serve as the origin of modern education. Tannen also cites David 
Noble who posits the Aristotelian investment in formal, binaristic logic and the Christian 
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Church, with its evil enemies and incontrovertible “good,” and the development of 
modern science out of these styles of inquiry to account for the agonism in education.  
vi I use this term articulation, in the sense of Sharon Crowley in Toward a Civil 
Discourse, in which she uses the term to describe the connections of ideas in an 
idealogic. By changing these connections, by taking apart and putting together 
differently, we can change the force, effect, and meaning of these ideas.  
 
vii In this, the ancient Greeks are attentive to the binary model espoused by the modern 
hoplologists, scholars of warfare. They delineate between martial arts as training 
practices for and by the military, while everything else are civilian combat sports. Their 
division has a definite sense of superiority, and I see a sneer on their part toward those 
who study civilian martial arts as quaint and not worth taking seriously. There are other 
methodological and ideological problems I have with hoplology, but they’re really 
irrelevant for my present purposes.  
 
viii “There were two distinct versions of the sport, differing according to the holds 
employed and the methods of deciding the victor of a contest. Kato pale, or ground 
wrestling, was decided when one competitor acknowledged defeat by raising his right 
hand with the index finger pointed. In orthia pale, or upright-style wrestling, the 
objective was simply to throw the opponent to the ground. Three falls constituted a loss 
for a fighter, with the winner declared the triakter…a fall was defined as touching the 
ground with the knees. Once a wrestler threw his opponent, he would pin his foe’s 
shoulders, thereby winning the contest” (4). This distinction between Up and Down will 
become more important when we return to pankration in Chapter 2.  
 
ix In the Love Fighting, Hate Violence Manifesto, written by a non-profit organization 
dedicated to using martial arts and combat sports study as a way to combat assault, 
ethical problems, and rhetorical demonization, we have a differentiation of violence as 
something occurring against or without consent, while fighting is something taking place 
within mutually agreed upon rules.  
 
x Slapping distributes the force of a strike over a wider surface area, making it less 
impactful and damaging than a closed-fist punch, while the palm heel is much harder and 
stronger than the fist: a well-aimed palm strike can shatter the bones of the nose and 
launch them into the brain, causing instant death.  
  
xi While today, “mixed martial arts” is the product of combining distinct cultural 
traditions into a singular fighting style—combining Japanese judo throws with the 
complicated Brazilian jujitsu ground-fighting and the hard strikes of Muay Thai “kick 
boxing”—, the “mixing” of pankration came from the mix of modalities rather than 
traditions. 
 
xii In the 12th century and post-Byzantine era, “pankration experienced a revival and 
became known as clotsata (to cry out). It later spread to Western Europe, where it was 
known as lactes during the Middle Ages and patso clotso during the early 19th century. 
We only have poetic verses and accounts by early scholars and the numerous vase 
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paintings, coins and frescoes that suggest the techniques of antiquity. For this reason 
alone, there are many interpretations of what pankration is today. To some, it is just a 
convenient label for combining techniques for sport fighting, while others have 
developed it into a karate system complete with preset forms based on what they think is 
depicted in artistic renderings” (Arvanitis The First Mixed Martial Art 14-15). However, 
others challenge this conception. Kostas Dervenis and Nektarios Lykiardopoulos note 
that popular media has attempted to connect modern mixed martial arts to classical 
pankration, and they consider this a theft of Greek culture. They cite the authority of their 
personal connection, Lykiardopoulos’ grandfather was a champion wrestler and 
Dervenis’ village had vestiges of 19th century martial arts. But because traditions are 
traded between generations, handed down, traditions’ original form are lost. “Certainly 
this is the case of Greek martial arts, which did not survive, generally speaking, even in 
Greece itself” (xi). There’s evidence of unarmed combat practiced around the turn of the 
20th century, and most can be traced back to the 14th century. “As can be clearly seen by 
any experienced hoplologist, the techniques exhibited have nothing to do with Mixed 
Martial Arts, and look more Eastern than Western (in fact, the movements have to do 
with use of weapons)” (xi). Furthermore, these scholars have an investment in showing 
the Greek origin of martial arts writ large, which is a problematic project, one with 
arguable grounds, as well.  
 
xiii Alongside this globally-informed, pseudo-neo-classical mode of combat, Arvanitis 
incorporated cross-training, fitness, and diet, which was both historically accurate for the 
Greeks and quite prescient of mixed martial arts training in later decades. 
 
xiv Susan Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists argues that their attention to cultural context, 
nomos, rather than Truth, logos, resembles the anti-foundationalism of the 20th century, 
that the Sophists were ancient post-moderns, opponents of what would become 
Eurocentrism, and even the first feminists. Edward Schiappa’s Protagoras and Logos 
examines the author of the famous maxim, “man is the measure of all things,” who 
provides a different approach to metaphysics, truth, and reality, one against which the 
younger Socrates set his own thought. Debra Hawhee’s Bodily Arts shows how the 
Sophistic pedagogy of rhythm, response, and repetition was based on and understood as 
physical training, making a nature (Physiopoesis), a far more attractive and nuanced 
pedagogical approach than the reductive straw man we inherit from the anti-Sophist 
classical tradition. 
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Chapter 1  
Fighting Euthydemus: Rhetorical Dialectic and/or Dialectical Rhetoric
The contest itself continued uninterrupted until one of the combatants either surrendered, 
suffered unconsciousness, or expired. 
Grandmaster Jim Arvanitis, Pankration 13 
 
Which is “is” is is very important, but it seems like laughable sophistry, or perhaps 
merely an ‘academic’ or ‘philosophical’ (i.e. irrelevant) question, and thus a difficult 
move to employ. Although such common ignorance makes it a useful ambiguity to 
exploit. 
Trevor C. Meyer, Fighting Euthydemus 16 
 
I. Transition and Summary 
In my introduction, I outlined the “open hand” and the “closed fist” as a potent 
metaphor of how we understand, practice, and evaluate argument, as well as how the 
possible origins of that metaphor in ancient Greek boxing and wrestling might illuminate 
the complexities and problematics of the easy division of argumentation into two, 
ethically unambiguous modes. However, I also illustrated the mutually exploitative and 
exclusive nature of those modes. So rather than champion one over the other, I instead 
argued that we need an argumentative mode that can do both. Just like pankration as an 
art uses both striking and grappling, this mode can account for and perform both 
expressive, possibly fallacious or “merely rhetorical” argument as well as deliberative, 
dialectical argumentation. That is, we need an argumentative mode that is both rhetorical 
and dialectical, but ultimately reducible to neither. We need a “complete fighting system” 
that prepares students better than more limited systems, especially if students argue in 
realistic, practical contexts, argument “on the street,” not just in the Lyceum. 
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To illustrate rhetorical pankration, in this chapter I turn to Plato’s Euthydemus, a 
dialogue often overlooked or thought to be mere parody. In it, Socrates refutes, learns 
from, and is refuted by the titular sophist and his brother, themselves martial arts experts, 
and the argument itself is presented as a pankration match with punches, throws, 
knockouts, and submissions. The conclusion is even more interesting: Socrates is 
defeated, knocked out, by the sophists. That is, here sophistry overcomes philosophy, 
fallacy defeats argument, and the gathered crowd cheers in recognition. This illustrates 
that we cannot be successful in “any given case” if we limit our training to traditional 
standards of argument when arguing with others who have different metaphysics, tactics, 
and ethics. Because such a project shifts foundational assumptions about argumentation, 
it’s difficult to conceptualize and articulate, so here I perform this mode of argument in 
my interpretation and analysis of the dialogue. That is, I engage with the fallacious and 
logical argument of all parties, whether hero or villain; it’s not enough to simply analyze 
the moves, but I must enter the contest myself.  
*** 
The Euthydemus (On Refutation) begins at the Lyceum with Crito asking Socrates 
with whom he was speaking the day before. In response, Socrates describes the extended 
conversation between himself, young Cleinias, and the brother-sophists Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus, surrounded by a crowd of Cleinias’ admirers and the brothers’ followers. 
Already familiar with these men, Socrates persuades them to demonstrate to everyone 
their great wisdom and persuade Cleinias to study virtue (Lamb 273c).xv They obligingly 
engage Cleinias in a series of sophistic refutations, using the ambiguity of words and 
amphiboly of grammar to bring him to contradictory conclusions: for instance, that both 
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the “wise” and the “foolish” are those who “learn.” After exposing this trick, Socrates 
demonstrates his own method, persuading Cleinias to study philosophy and to love 
wisdom with all his heart.  
Satisfied with himself, Socrates asks the sophists to do the same and persuade the 
boy to wisdom. Dionysodorus responds that in wanting the boy wise, Socrates and the 
others want him dead, and Ctesippus, one of Cleinias’ lovers, angrily calls Dionysodorus 
a liar. Defending his brother’s honor, Euthydemus refutes Ctesippus, proving that “lying 
is impossible.” Socrates again steps in, and demonstrates his method, persuading Cleinias 
that wisdom is the only way to happiness, although they are unsure of what that wisdom 
specifically consists. Crito here interrupts, incredulous at the young man’s wise responses 
and Socrates wavers, unsure who exactly said such wise things, but he is sure it was not 
either of the sophists. Returning to his story, Socrates again asks the brothers to follow 
his example or otherwise provide the wisdom that leads to happiness.  
The brothers respond that Socrates, and everyone else too, always already knows 
everything. Ctesippus, incredulous, jumps in again, and begins adopting the methods of 
the sophists, and uses it against them, striking Euthydemus silent. Turning next to the 
brother, Ctesippus asks whether all things speak or are silent, and Dionysodorus responds 
“both and neither.” The hot-blooded youth laughingly declares victory, Cleinias along 
with him. However, Socrates chides the boy for laughing at such beautiful wisdom, and 
Dionysodorus questions Socrates whether indeed beautiful things exist. Socrates eagerly 
contends with him, “attempting to imitate the cleverness of these men” (301b). This last 
refutation concludes Socrates’ account.  
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In the end, Dionysodorus argues that if something is ours we can do whatever we 
want with it and also that all living beings are animals. Therefore, if we have animals that 
are ours, then we can kill or sacrifice them. Socrates has gods that are his, gods are 
animals, and their being his means he can do whatever he wants with them, therefore—
Socrates doesn’t answer, so Euthydemus does for him—if Socrates has gods, he kills 
them. He is stunned silent and thus refuted. Seeking to help the brave hero, Ctesippus 
attempts to intervene, only to admit defeat also and declares the brothers “invincible,” 
and “everyone present without exception” cheers until the very columns of the Lyceum 
shake with laughter (303a-b). Begging to be their student, Socrates praises the victors for 
their “amazing genius,” caring “not a jot for the [opinions of the] multitude” and seeing 
“no difference of things at all” (303d-304b). Ending his story, Socrates tells Crito that he 
too should join as a student of sophistic refutation.  
Having heard the story, Crito explains that he spoke with a man the previous day 
who saw the sophists’ “refutation” as an “inconsequent ado about matters of no 
consequence” and Socrates as foolish for wanting to follow them, before angrily storming 
away from the crowd (304e). Identifying this unnamed man (a speech-writer widely 
thought to be Isocratesxvi) as half-philosopher and half-statesman, Socrates explains that 
such “middle men” will always be half as good as the ones they middle between. Crito 
ask Socrates whether his own son Critoboulos should study philosophy, considering the 
refutations, Socrates’ defeat, and the angry middle-man. Letting philosophers and 
sophists be as they will, Socrates tells Crito “when you have tested the matter itself, well 
and truly, if you find it to be a poor affair, turn everyone you can away from it, not only 
your sons: but if you find it to be such a thing as I think it is, pursue and ply it without 
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fear, both you, as they say, and yours” (Lamb 307c). In the end, the dialogue asks us to 
figure it out for ourselves.  
 
II. Ignorant Introductions and Bracketing the Corybantes 
Traditionally, this text is seen as a satirical demonstration of the inherent ethical 
and effective superiority of the Socratic elenchus over the sophist eristic (Eris or 
“strife”). Indeed, Georgia Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi argues that Euthydemus is “structured 
as a crescendo,” escalating in tension to a conclusion that “presents the reader with some 
of the most absurd sophistic claims,” like rejecting the Principle of Non-Contradiction 
(Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 84). That Socrates is refuted and defeated is variously 
understood to be Platonic irony, only apparent (i.e. sophistic) refutation, or downplayed 
in favor of focusing on the character of the characters. While sophists are rhetorical 
bullies only interested in haughty superiority, bandying words and employing absurdity 
to achieve victory, Socrates is kind, generous, and his elenchus leads people to true 
wisdom and real goodness.  
As Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi explains, philosophers generally ignore this text for 
lacking a unique and positive contribution to Platonic doctrine, classicists see it simply as 
Plato’s poor imitation of Aristophanean satire, and rhetoricians likewise have only 
alluded to this dialogue briefly, as it’s generally assumed there is nothing beyond the 
obvious here.xvii Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi argues this oversight is due to our academic 
“division into separate fields with separate methodologies, [which] gives us insufficient 
tools to work with Plato” (1). As a field with strong interdisciplinary reach, pervasively 
influenced by and interested in the classics, and the sophists in particular, rhetoric is 
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uniquely suited to engage with this dialogue, and the dialogue too is uniquely informative 
to rhetoric. We should be interested in this juxtaposition of Socratic and sophistic 
methods, their combination and interplay, and especially that Socrates himself is stunned 
silent by the sophists, a rare occurrence in Plato, even after combining sophistic methods 
with his own.xviii Indeed, we too might have much to learn from, the all-wise (pansophoi), 
all-powerful (pagkratiastai), all-fighting (pammachon) demi-gods, Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus (Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 128).xix  
However, this whole exchange with the sophists is contained in a story that 
Socrates tells Crito within a fiction authored by Plato, which complicates Socrates’ defeat 
as literal, but it doesn’t negate that it happened either.xx At various points in the text, 
Socrates shifts his role in the refutation, sometimes acting as participant, engaging with 
the sophists, but elsewhere acting as judge, chiding Ctesippus for being hot-blooded or 
the sophists for their insufficient methods, and even stopping the contest itself, but he is 
also the overall source of the argument. He is fighter, referee, and commentator. 
Furthermore, Socrates cannot remember many details of his own story, possibly serving 
as evidence of Plato’s satirical intention but also troubling the reliability of Socrates as 
narrator, beyond the (unprovable and irrelevant) intention of Plato.xxi  
That is, the refutation presented through any Platonic dramatic frame like 
Euthydemus is necessarily fixed and predetermined, like a kung fu movie fight scene or a 
professional wrestling match, rather than a real contest, like a street-fight or boxing bout. 
While all these contests are “real” in the sense they take place, have bodily risks and 
material rewards, the contest is not determined by the effort of the competitors in this 
dialogue, but rather dictated by a narrative arc. It’s “fake” with each player playing along 
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and playing their part.xxii The arguments here are not refuted by merit, but because the 
game itself is rigged. Fixed fights produce clean, easy, comfortable narratives like “good 
guys defeat bad guys” or “bad guys win by cheating,” but real fights are messy, 
disorienting, and difficult to engage with certainty, as well as perhaps tedious and boring 
for those without the requisite fighting experience needed to pay attention to detail.xxiii  
Furthermore, all written arguments are necessarily Corybantic, framed and 
directed toward some conclusion, constrained by the fixedness of writing, rather than the 
dynamic orality of a “real fight.”xxiv But just as the Corybantes fighting-dance was useful 
training for actual fighting, an ancient Greek kata, so too the fighting-dance of written 
argument is useful and necessary for training students in the real fights of live argument, 
whether oral debates, coffee shop or barroom discussions, or even Facebook fights. 
While some might see the “fight” of this dialogue and argument more broadly as purely 
metaphorical—another Platonic inheritance— it is productive to read Euthydemus on its 
own terms as a Nietzschean kriegs-praxis, a fight-argument.xxv Finally, this isn’t just any 
fight, but a fight with all powers, a pankration match.  
 
III. Arguments Full of Fighting and Agonistic Excellence 
Socrates identifies Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to Crito—and Cleinias within 
the story, as well as the reader—as the perfect pankratists, skilled experts in armed 
combat (hoplomachia), generalship (strategon), and legal battles (dikasteriois machen), 
having the “finishing touch to their [fighting] skill” in refuting any claim, whether it is 
true or false (271d-272b).xxvi Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi identifies these arts all as sub-sets 
of pankration, which she translates as “an art of constant victory,” omitting the obvious 
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connection Lamb notes to “the very vigorous sport which combined wrestling and 
boxing” (Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 128, Lamb 380 n1.). The popular “heavy event” was 
added to the Olympic Games in 648 BCE and this dialogue is purported to be written 
around 384 BCE, so the allusion to literal pankration, especially with the brothers’ 
expertise in related arts, makes sense here, although there doesn’t appear to have been 
Olympic pankration that year (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 38).xxvii  
Furthermore, the argument itself is set specifically in fighting terms throughout 
the text. The refutations are a series of falls (kataballontes), the Protagorean Maxim 
“there is no falsehood” is a “sacrifice throw,” overthrowing opposing views yet falling 
itself (anatrepo), and Socrates says he was “knocked out” (plēgeis) by the sophists, 
among many other examples (Hawhee 36-7, Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 71, 80, Lamb 
286c).xxviii However, the sophists tell Socrates that the fighting arts are mere “diversions” 
for them now, having devoted themselves full time to the teaching of virtue (arête), 
which they can teach to anyone faster (tachista) and better (kallist’) than anyone else, 
regardless of whether or not the student believes virtue can be taught or that the sophists 
themselves are capable of teaching it (273d-275).xxix If we consider the arguments here as 
a form of fighting, the entire dialogue itself hinges on arête as a term and its connection 
to Greek agonism. 
As I argue in the introduction, arête is only achieved through a questing, constant 
agonistic enactment, through contest as the sophists exemplify here, rather than some 
static internal “goodness” or “grace” (Hawhee 17).xxx Therefore, arête is more properly 
translated as “virtuosity” or “excellence” rather than “virtue,” and so the sophists offer 
excellence in skill that can only be acquired, enacted, and maintained through agonistic 
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conflict, just like any other fighting skill (Hawhee 25). So rather than the sophists being 
bombastic charlatans for claiming to teach goodness, we must understand them as expert 
fighters providing expertise in fighting through fighting itself, their previous diversions 
being how virtue/excellence itself is taught, enacted, and recognized.  
Socrates doesn’t seem to see it that way though, initially chiding them for being 
too playful, fallaciously striking with/at the mere surface of language, and offers to 
demonstrate his own clumsy but superior method, which gets deeper into the structure of 
the arguments, grappling with the warrants rooting claims and the data used to support 
them. However, Socrates also uses ambiguity and amphiboly to refute a claim or forward 
an argument, fallaciously arguing in his own right, and indeed he becomes more sophistic 
as the dialogue progresses.xxxi While the sophists are usually derided as only interested in 
victory at all costs, this accusation equally applies to Socrates here, although charitably 
justified by scholars because he does so “for good reasons.”xxxii Furthermore, Socrates 
tells Crito that Ctesippus also adopts the techniques of the sophists later in the dialogue, 
having “picked up these very words by overhearing the men themselves” (300d). That is, 
over the course of a single conversation, the sophists have taught their arête to Ctesippus, 
who didn’t even believe them real teachers, and even to Socrates, who isn’t sure it can 
even be taught at all. Over the course of this dialogue, the pankratists teach their arête of 
refutation through refutation, so that by the end, even Socrates is a pankratist to some 
degree, but ultimately still not good enough to escape defeat.  
Also, and perhaps more interestingly, the sophists themselves become more 
Socratic as the dialogue progresses, using moves that they had chided Socrates for using 
earlier: asking for clarification, positing qualifications, and questioning the warrants of 
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the interlocutors.xxxiii While initially they use sophistic techniques like striking on the 
surface of a claim and playing on the ambiguity of a word, they later delve deeper, 
grappling with the warrant and backing, unbalancing the structure of the argument: the 
pankration method of engagement that starts with striking before moving to grappling 
(Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 63, Pankration 12, 20, Dervenis and 
Lykiardopolous 36). As the sophists shift from surface to structure, they show themselves 
capable of philosophy as well as sophistry, skilled grapplers and strikers both, the perfect 
pankratists as Socrates describes them to Crito.  
In the end, the obvious and inherent divisions between philosophy and sophistry 
become blurred, indistinct, and perhaps indistinguishable in the agonistic mixing-in of 
refutation. The differences between the sophists and Socrates seem to be the emphasis of 
their pankration, either striking with grappling or grappling with striking, but ultimately 
both and neither (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 15). However, rather than 
choosing sophistry or philosophy, or bewailing the difficulty in separating them, we 
should attend to their differences as modes of engagement, which are ultimately two 
poles of emphasis in a singular “all-powers” argument that is truly “invincible.”xxxiv 
To analyze the fighting moves in Euthydemus, I bring in Aristotle’s treatise on 
Sophistical Refutations, a useful complementary resource written some thirty years later, 
in which he addresses the specific moves sophists use and how to counter them. 
Interestingly, he uses the same or very similar examples as those in the dialogue to 
illustrate his points, even specifically referring to Euthydemus himself.xxxv For Aristotle, 
the ambiguity of words and amphiboly of grammar are obvious fallacies, linguistic errors 
in the representation of ideas, what we call barbarism and solecism. However, by 
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adopting a Sophistic perspective on language—it is not merely or only a representational 
medium, but an affective force—and by changing the ideology that grounds Aristotle’s 
treatment of fallacy we can use his work to help rearticulate the moves of this dialogue in 
a different way. The first refutation in the Euthydemus is a perfect example, and thus a 
perfect place to start.  
 
IV. Five Moves of Sophistic Pankration 
. Latching on Ambiguity: Basics of Engagement 
First, Euthydemus asks Cleinias: “what sort of men are the learners, the wise or 
the foolish?” (275d). Everyone has already assented to the Principle of Non-
Contradiction by this point, and so Cleinias cannot answer “both” because one cannot be 
both foolish and wise at once, so “whichever way the boy answers, he will be [refuted]” 
(Lamb 275e).xxxvi Initially, Cleinias answers commonsensically that the wise learn, but 
Euthydemus shows him that students have not yet acquired what they’re taught, so rather 
than the wise, those that have already acquired it, the foolish are the ones who learn.xxxvii 
Next, Dionysodorus asks Cleinias which students learn the recitations of the teachers, the 
wise or the foolish, and Cleinias responds that the wise students learn their recitations, 
rather than the foolish ones. Thus, he has refuted his previous response, yet confirmed his 
original, refuted response. As Socrates explains to him later, Cleinias is trapped because 
“learn” means both acquiring knowledge and possessing knowledge (277d). Also 
addressing “learn,” Aristotle admits: “inevitably the same formula, and a single name, 
have a number of meanings” (1). That is, “learn” is only ambiguous as a word, not the 
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thing itself—a fault of language as a medium of transmission—and so a precise dose of 
“language medicine” would clear the whole mess right up (Ranciere, Dissensus xi).  
Aristotle identifies that such “language dependent” fallacies occur when we are 
unaware of or inattentive to the correct/proper name of a thing or willfully reject such 
propriety (Sophistic Refutations 3). However, because “it is impossible in a discussion to 
bring in the actual things discussed,” Aristotle acknowledges, “we use their names as 
symbols instead of them; and therefore, we suppose that what follows in the names, 
follows in the things as well” (2). If things don’t actually appear in argument, then all 
argument only operates on the level of names. To deal with this limitation, we must then 
make language singular in meaning, use it precisely and regularly as possible, and reduce 
ambiguity to prevent such fallacious arguments from having any force. No more silly 
poetry or obscene figuration.xxxviii But there’s no necessary reason why learn must mean 
only one thing or mean one of its meanings more than any other, except as argued by 
traditional usage, historical etymology, or unprovable intention.xxxix But as we will see 
here, and can see elsewhere, Socrates shows that such endoxa can be easily refuted 
through questions, and that tradition, history, and intent crumble when pressed 
(Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 12).  
But not only is the word itself slippery like an oiled wrestling opponent—words 
mean many things with some more widely meaning than others—, but the meaning also 
changes through the grammatical form in which they are written, both temporally (one 
has not learned before one has learned) and completion (learning is a process, while 
learning is a product). Above we have “learn” in the simple present with two meanings, 
but we might also differentiate them by grammatical aspect: the present progressive 
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(“learning”) and the present perfect (“have learned”), as Mary Margaret McCabe argues 
(81). Rather than “learn” being a single entity with multiple meanings, it is a dynamic 
process. Once it has been completed, one is no longer “learning” but has “learning,” or 
one has “learned” and is therefore “learned.” One name stands for many things, one thing 
can have many names, the names and things are further complicated as entities subject to 
time and change, and all are affected by the necessity of engaging with them in language 
itself. Ambiguity, lexical and structural, is not a fault of language, but an inherent feature 
of language to which any interlocutor must attend as well as an opening any other can 
latch onto and twist.xl  
The fighting body is ambiguous; it is both a mechanism for the enactment of force 
and the vulnerable target of that force, and this true is for words as well. If we are to be 
word-fighters, we must first train to become attentive to and knowledgeable about our 
language, how it moves, and how it can move, the basics (kihon) and form (kata) that are 
necessary preparation for the fight (kumite). However, we might also jump right into the 
fight (kumite), and learn like Cleinias: by being knocked around (275e). By forcing a 
division and coercing a choice, the sophists trap Cleinias in a structure that is, as 
Dionysodorus whispers to Socrates, “inescapable” (afukta) (276e).xli  Preemptive cutting 
into the coming answer with the blade of or, “Splitting the Wood” of the matter so that 
whichever side Cleinias chooses, the sophists are ready to refute him.  
. “Splitting the Wood”: Distinction, Opposition, Binary 
While the sophists’ choice, the wood they split, can be argued both ways, as 
Socrates explains both the wise and the foolish might be said to learn (in difference 
senses of course), Socrates also uses this technique, but with more speed and intensity. 
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Socrates asks Cleinias whether those who have knowledge of something, such as flute-
players or grammarians, will be more successful and have more good fortune than those 
who do not. Here, we see Socratic fallacy. Initially, Socrates states success is the result of 
good fortune, then success is good fortune, then he makes good fortune the necessary 
result of wisdom, shifting from the wise as more likely to be successful to the wise being 
necessarily more successful, moving from arguments of probability to arguments of 
necessity (Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 16).xlii He concludes that wisdom precludes error 
because error would mean that the person wasn’t wise because if they were, they would 
not have erred. Aristotle points out that such circular arguments “depend on the 
assumption of the original point to be proved…[and] appear to refute because men lack 
the power to keep their eyes at once upon what is the same and what is different” (5). 
Here, Socrates has shifted his kinds of arguments and concluded in a circle, a skillful 
combination of fallacy. Then, Socrates asks Cleinias whether a man without wisdom, 
who must necessarily err, would err less if he did less, and do less ill, and therefore be 
less miserable, and Cleinias assents (281b-c). This move is Socrates’ characteristic flurry 
of blows, and like Bruce Lee, his punches are too fast to see. 
Rather than having Cleinias choose between options, Socrates splits the wood in 
rapid-fire combination as complex answers and has Cleinias agree. Who then does less, 
Socrates asks, the weak or the strong, high or low class, brave or cowardly; idle or busy, 
slow-minded or quick-witted, dull-sensed or sharp-sensed? (281c-d).xliii Each of these 
terms is presented as a binary choice, like the sophists do, but Socrates’ alternatives are 
not simply alternatives. Rather, they are a conflation of an evaluative binary (a desirable 
and an undesirable) and a qualitative binary (a having and a lacking). In the structure of 
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the Principle of Non-Contradiction, by asking a series of comparative questions with 
binary choices with only one option having some desirable quality, Socrates leads 
Cleinias to another tautological consequence: the lesser do less. Already held by Socrates, 
Cleinias himself doesn’t think to ask “do less of what?” and the sophists politely remain 
silent. However, just as Socrates points out the ambiguity of “learn,” here we might point 
out the ambiguity of “less.”  
In each of Socrates’s cases, as with the wise and the foolish being those who 
learn, the binary might function differently; the strong might do more or do less than the 
weak, depending on the doing in question. For example, the weak, lower class, and 
cowardly might all compromise or surrender more than the strong, high class, and brave 
do. The strong might fight more than the weak, while the weak flee more than the strong. 
The high class might be strong in coin and influence, but weak in body, lacking the 
robust musculature of the poor plowman. The slow-minded might agree more than the 
quick-witted, as the dull-sighted squint more than those who see more clearly, or the idle 
sleep more than the busy. Therefore, the lesser do both less and more than the greater, 
who also do both more and less than the lesser. While Socrates might ask such questions 
of the sophists and be celebrated by scholars for doing so, in asking these questions of 
him about how “lesser do less” we might be chided by Socrates (and scholars) for 
“wrangling” or “prating” rather than answering or frustrate our readers by “not moving 
the argument forward.” We might be said to be missing the point or not understanding it. 
However, Socrates is not really concerned with “doing less” in each of these 
different cases. His concern is not attending to the differences between “less” for 
weaker/stronger and “less” for the rich/poor. Rather, he is interested in “doing less” in 
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general or “less-ness” itself. He was likewise concerned with “success” in general, as 
seen above, conflating Cleinias’ preference of a wise general or wise doctor with the 
technical expertise of the flautist or grammarian in promoting or guaranteeing success. 
He also neglects the possibility that the wise could not succeed or err at all, thus ignoring 
chance or accident. In this, Socrates is using the converse of division: combination. By 
erasing or ignoring the differences between the weak and the poor, Socrates creates a 
new, common concept that then “includes” success in each particular case. Rather than 
simply articulating differences, splitting the wood, Socrates is “Smashing the Clay” of 
radically different cases together to throw on the wheel into a new artful vessel that we all 
have been told (and may presume) will hold water.  
 “Smashing the Clay”: Combination, Conflation, Confusion  
Demonstrating how he wishes the sophists to proceed, Socrates begins by asking 
Cleinias what leads to happiness, turning first to the endoxa that the possession of many 
good things brings happiness (Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 12). However, other than these 
“good things” being “good”—the positive side of an evaluative binary—they fall into 
four very different categories: material goods (wealth), bodily goods (health, beauty, 
talent), social goods (power, class, honors), and moral goods (temperance, justice, 
courage, and wisdom) (279a-d, Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 12). For Socrates, rather than 
just possessed or acquired (another ambiguity he exploits), all these goods are only good 
when used, and then only truly goods when “used rightly,” i.e. led by wisdom, and not 
goods when not guided by wisdom, neutral when not used, and great evils when “used 
wrongly.”xliv Moving to (right) use, we can see the differences more starkly, and Socrates 
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smashes even more goods together, adding a great deal of food and drink, and the tools 
and materials of carpentry to the above list.  
The goods only benefit us when they are used, and used rightly, but what use 
means is different in each case: when food and drink are used they are consumed and 
destroyed to become bodily tissue, tools of carpentry persist throughout the carpenting 
while the materials do not, and using the other goods is complicated. For things like 
justice and temperance, “wrong use” is quite quizzical because “having justice would 
mean acting justly,” having temperance acting temperately, and having bravery is acting 
bravely; if we don’t act in these ways, then we don’t have these qualities (Sermamoglou-
Soulmaidi 24). It’s also unclear what “wrong use” of health or the other bodily goods 
might be besides a certain style of living, contrasted with another that constitutes “right 
use.” However, “right use” is never explicitly defined, which leaves an unresolved 
ambiguity at the heart of this dialogue, troubling whatever rightness can accomplish. That 
is, such “right use” is not obvious or natural, but the product of rhetorical work, 
especially collapsing distinctions, even as it works as the foundation for future rhetorical 
work. But this doesn’t trouble Socrates because “right use” is obviously use when guided 
by wisdom, which will always be good and successful.  
Furthermore and likewise, capital (wealth, power, class, and honors) might be 
used wrongly to forward one’s own personal agenda as much as it could be used rightly 
to help the “common good.” But in doing so, ignoring potential opportunities to increase 
our own capital might likewise be considered wrong use of wealth, especially if 
“common good” means supplementing the wellbeing of the undeserving, idle, and 
wicked. What is “right use” for one is “wrong use” for another. By glossing over these 
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perhaps obvious differences, Socrates can eliminate alternatives to his own argument for 
Cleinias: that wisdom is the only true unconditional good, the point that began the 
argument in the previous section. The sophists also erase difference, but do so differently.  
After everyone agrees that they seriously want Cleinias to be wise, Dionysodorus 
argues that if Cleinias is not now wise (i.e. ignorant), and his friends want him to be wise, 
they want him to be not what he is now. Therefore, he says “since you wish him to be no 
longer what he now is, you wish him, apparently, to be dead” (283d). Dionysodorus 
presents a binary of wise/ignorant and combines not being ignorant with not being in 
general, smashing together “is” (estin) in the predicative and existential senses 
(Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 76).xlv If Cleinias is, then if he isn’t, then he would not be. 
While “good in general” for Socrates is allowable, body and society being only accidental 
qualities of good, “is in general” seems to only be subject to a Clintonian question about 
“what the meaning of ‘is’ is.” Which is “is” is is very important, but it seems like 
laughable sophistry, or perhaps merely an “academic” or “philosophical” (i.e. irrelevant) 
question, and thus a difficult move to employ. Although, such common ignorance makes 
it a very useful ambiguity to exploit.  
However, if Cleinias were to become wise, he would no longer be the same, 
ignorant Cleinias, but a different, wise Cleinias, and the ignorant Cleinias would certainly 
be vanished “into the void of what is not” (McCabe 82). Socrates himself acknowledges 
this, offering himself to be “killed” like Cleinias if only he could be wise afterward 
(285c). In response, we might follow Aristotle, identifying arguments from accidental 
qualities as sophistic refutation and defining true argument as that which concerns 
essences, and contend that Cleinias is more essentially Cleinias than he is essentially 
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ignorant (30). But this split requires additional rhetorical work, distinguishing between 
Cleinias’ essential “Cleinias-ness” that persists through his education from his ignorance 
and other qualities, perhaps even his name “Cleinias,” as merely accidental.xlvi Although, 
if there’s no things but names, as we said above, then accidental qualities might actually 
be all we deal with in argumentation: there’s no Cleinias but “Cleinias.”xlvii  
Although, we might then be chided for not being precise enough, and need to 
further specify the difference of such differences, but then be considered potentially 
wrangling, making unnecessary divisions, and then told to ignore more differences, and 
back and forth and on and on, again and again. Aristotle also identifies these techniques 
as characteristic of sophistic refutation: “if the argument depends upon combination, then 
the solution consists in division; if upon division, then in combination,” which also goes 
back and forth and on and on, again and again (23). In sophistic striking, we can hit and 
block on the surface of our language with the surface of our language, cutting and 
smashing words. However, the useful opposites of Splitting the Wood and Smashing the 
Clay are not only mutually destructive, each using concussive force to negate an 
opponent, just as a hard block negates a strike, but are mutually enabling as well, as a 
block negates by striking the strike itself. That is, Splitting the Wood requires allowing 
previous smashes to remain unsplit and Smashing the Clay requires allowing previous 
splits to remain unsmashed. Ultimately both opposites require both opposites, only 
differing in specific emphasis and tactical relation.  
Not limited to claim-based arguments, Aristotle also suggests we attack 
opponents’ warrants using opposites in the same way. If a person is arguing from Nature, 
then oppose them with Law, and if by Law, then by Nature. If their ideology might lead 
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them to use or rely on paradoxical or contradictory opinions, then attack those grounds. 
While we might begin by engaging opponents on their own terms, we might tactically 
decide to use the opposite instead.xlviii Everyone in an argument is engaging with others 
and must latch onto the responses they’re given, but by engaging with what we’re given, 
by latching on and drawing in, we make ourselves vulnerable to our opponent’s counters. 
When we close into warrants, rather than just claims, just as in pankration, the lines 
between the tactically distinguishable but fundamentally indistinct moves becomes 
blurred, as do the distinctions between rhetorical striking and dialectical grappling. 
 “Burn the Earth”: Counter Clarification, Reversing Qualification, Feigning Exception 
Identifying the sophists as using a Protagorean (or Antisthenean) Maxim “there is 
no such thing as speaking false,” Socrates gently attacks their paradoxical foundation 
(Lamb 286c).xlix As he did with Cleinias, Socrates has Dionysodorus assent to a chain of 
equivalences (the links of which we might break if we were so inclined): if there’s no 
false speech, there’s no false thought, no false opinion, no ignorance or ignorant men, and 
thus no mistakes.l In doing so, Socrates brings Dionysodorus to a point of contradiction. 
If Socrates is mistaken and can be refuted, then the Protagorean Maxim is false, but if 
Socrates is not mistaken and he cannot be refuted, then Dionysodorus loses his earlier 
claim that he can refute anyone. If the sophistic questions are inescapable submission 
holds, then Socrates here has found a way to likewise apply his own submission, arguing 
that their maxim “still suffers from the trouble of knocking others down and then falling 
itself” (288a). By using the Principle of Non-Contradiction to establish the bounds of the 
contest, the sophists set up an absolute binary, using this structure to refute but are also 
themselves subject to being refuted by it. However, we can side-step contradiction as 
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Socrates and Ctesippus do in latter parts of the dialogue, finding counter attacks to the 
sophists in disrupting the refutation by asking for clarifications, positing qualifications, 
and finding exceptions. 
When asked whether he knows with that with which he knows, Socrates asks for 
clarification: “I think you mean my soul, or is that not your meaning?” and Euthydemus 
chides him for answering a question with a question (295c). Socrates sees the ambiguity 
in the refutation and refuses to answer until he himself has been answered. Euthydemus 
presses him to engage with the terms he is given and calls him a driveling “old dotard” 
for refusing to follow the rules (295c). Socrates might very well be innocently asking for 
clarification so he can make sure to answer correctly what Euthydemus is specifically 
asking, as “knowing with that with which you know” is certainly a feat of linguistic 
acrobatics (295c).li Alternatively, he has already seen the sophists use “learn” to catch, 
trap, and strangle Cleinias in characteristic pankration fashion, so Socrates counters and 
blocks Euthydemus’ “name stranglehold” (Onomata peristēsas) before he can lock it in 
tightly (Arvanitis, First Mixed Martial Art 63, Lamb 295d).lii As we saw earlier, Cleinias 
is refuted by the binary of wise and foolish if he accepts the terms and the structure of the 
refutation, but here Socrates uses clarification to disrupt the very terms on which he 
would be refuted. As Euthydemus begins closing his arm around his opponent’s neck, 
Socrates pushes it up and spins away.  
Breaking from the story, Socrates then tells Crito that he saw Euthydemus 
become frustrated with his questions, and so he asks Euthydemus to start over, even 
though he continues to refuse to be taken in (295e). Instead of answering a question with 
a question, Socrates imposes his clarification within his answer, qualifying that he knows 
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“by means of [his] soul,” and is again chided for not following the rules, until he finally 
retracts, concedes, and admits he does know everything (295e, 296d). Similarly, Aristotle 
suggests: “whenever one foresees any question coming, one should put in one's objection 
and have one's say beforehand: for by doing so one is likely to embarrass the questioner 
most effectually” (17). Not only do we need to make sure our own techniques don’t have 
any obvious openings or weaknesses, but also we should be able to know the weaknesses 
of any responses we can predict in advance. If a term is ambiguous, then ask for 
clarification or include a qualification within the answer. In addition to clarification and 
qualification that disrupt the terms of refutation, we can also disrupt the structure of the 
refutation itself.  
Late in the dialogue, Ctesippus begins finding “ridiculous” exceptions to the 
sophists’ binaries that disrupts their refutations. When asked whether a cartload of 
medicine is enough for a sick man, Ctesippus returns that it is, were the patient “as big as 
the Delphian statue” (299c). When asked by Dionysodorus whether it is proper to have 
many spears and shields in battle, like Socrates he preemptively counters the refutation, 
confirming that Euthydemus would argue for one person only, and posits the mythical 
giants, two-bodied Geryon and hundred-armed Briareus, as needing far more than one 
spear and shield, thus silencing Euthydemus because a “man-at-arms…should know 
better” (299c-d). When Dionysodorus posits that talking about iron is Ctesippus speaking 
of the silent, Ctesippus retorts that he hears iron cry out whenever he walks by a smithy 
(299b-300c). By bringing in myth and metaphor, Ctesippus is not refuting, but disrupting 
the refutation. While the sophists start out the dialogue being ridiculous, here the sophists 
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are serious, Socratic questioners berated by an eristic interlocutor, who uses absurdity to 
disrupt the discussion.  
We can also get our interlocutor to disrupt the refutation for us. We see these two 
moves in basketball as the juke and “drawing the foul.” When Dionysodorus claims that 
Cleinias’ nice friends want the boy dead in being wise, Ctesippus is drawn in to defend 
his beloved and his own honor, only to be refuted by Dionysodorus. “By offering him 
what appears to be an opening, you force the opponent into ‘taking the bait.’ Even though 
it is a deliberate error, it must never appear this way to him, since an experienced fighter 
seldom, if ever, falls prey to a ‘setup’” (Arvanitis, Pankration 95). Socrates also uses this 
technique, stating that if he knows everything, then he knows “the good are unjust” which 
prompts Dionysodorus himself to jump in and ruin the argument and be chided by his 
brother (297a-b). Here Socrates is feinting, which “cannot look like a feint; it must appear 
to be an actual attack” (Arvanitis, Pankration 82). At other points, Socrates acts as a 
judge to stop the refutation, worrying Ctesippus has become too aggressive and abusive 
to the sophists (285a, 288b).liii Lucky Socrates is there, lest the boy learn first-hand about 
the fighting expertise of the brothers.  
After Ctesippus asks whether all things speak or are silent, Dionysodorus 
responds: “neither and both [oudetera kai amphotera]…an answer that will baffle you!” 
and Ctesippus laughs and declares himself victorious (300c-d). Dionysodorus does not 
respond, but nor is he struck silent. While here the response is laughed away, later in the 
dialogue Socrates outlines an acceptable example of “both and neither.” The unnamed 
“middle man” is both and neither statesman and philosopher, only half as good as and 
worse than each in their respective ways, which is the case when one middles between 
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two good things. But when one middles between two evil things (and how these 
evaluations are made is of course left out), then one is only half as bad as each in their 
respective ways, and therefore much better than both (306a-c).  
In both cases, both elements have the same evaluation, either good or evil, and so 
the middle is a mix: one is blue and one is red, both/neither is purple. Pankration itself is 
a purple mix of angry, violent striking and calm, gentle grappling. But if we pursue a 
middle between a good and an evil, a different kind of binary, then we are half as good as 
the good and only half as evil as the evil. When the binaries have the same evaluation, 
but are qualitatively different, the middle is the opposite evaluation; but when they have a 
different evaluation, but are qualitatively the same, then the middle is the middle. Unlike 
red or blue, we might see it as hot or cold; the warm is half as hot and half as cold, but is 
both and neither cold and/nor hot.liv That is, the imposition of a middle term, whether 
better than two evils, worse than two goods, or lukewarm and neutral, is a middling, a 
both-and-neither that disrupts the absolute binary.  
If we grant the Principle of Non-Contradiction and are presented with only two 
mutually exclusive absolute choices, then we have several options. We can trouble the 
terms provided, either questioning our questioner or qualifying our answer. We should 
either refuse to grant what is granted or give well more than is needed to obviate any 
additional attack. We might find an exception to the absolute that ruins the refutation, 
regardless of the exception we use. If we can get an opponent to make a misstep or foul, 
we also benefit. Besides exceptions to absolute terms, we can also posit situations of 
contradiction that disrupt the Principle of Non-Contradiction itself, rejecting the ground 
on which we are challenged and throw the opponents and ourselves to gain a better 
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tactical position. Sometimes such throwing is strategic and other times foolish, but we 
might throw either way and still end up on top.  
. “Shifting the Stones”: Throwing Principles and Twisting Topoi 
After Dionysodorus responds “both and neither,” an obvious contradiction, 
Ctesippus considers himself as having performed the “a clean decisive [wrestling] 
throw,” which forms the Platonic image of victory (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial 
Art 56). However, the sophist brothers are not wrestlers, but pankratists: “A wrestler who 
was thrown to the ground was defeated but a pankratist might deliberately fall on his 
back (hyptaismos) in order to throw his opponent more heavily or to gain a better 
strategic position,” then the pankratist can mount his opponent and rain down blows, 
something the wrestler cannot do (Arvanitis, Pankration 14). That the sophists fall when 
throwing is not a failure or a fallacy, but the strategic use of a move characteristic of a 
different game altogether. We might then back-fall, mount, and rain down blows here as 
well.  
As we have already seen, Dionysodorus has any number of possible responses: all 
things speak and are silent in different senses, thus both and neither. All things might 
speak at some times and might be silent at others, thus both and neither. There might be 
silent speech and speaking silence too. What do we mean by speaking and silence 
anyway? Perhaps we mean the inaudible resonance of Cosmic Being beyond human 
perceptions and understanding? If a sophist speaks and no one hears it, then has he truly 
made a sound? Maybe Ctesippus is just too stupid to see the insightful point 
Dionysodorus is making, Socrates too cowardly to relate what was really said to Crito, 
and Platonic scholars too limited by Eurocentric logics to account for such great wisdom. 
 55 
Regardless of the infinite possible unsaid answers laughed over by the haughty youth, the 
sophistic silence speaks volumes.  
Even though they have used the Principle of Non-Contradiction to refute their 
interlocutors, the sophists themselves are not bound by it, because they have instead a 
Heraclitean-Protagorean world-view, which grounds the maxim “there is no falsehood” 
(McCabe 76).lv Indeed, Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi claims “consistency need not be 
assumed in principle or forced on the texts,” so we shouldn’t force it on the characters in 
the texts either (4). In pankration submission is defeat, forcing concession is victory, 
nothing else. Without believing in an absolute, absolute arguments are no more than 
effective fallacies to use on those inattentive to particularity, just as arguments that 
require absolutes see inconsistency as self-evidently fallacious. Although, from a tactical 
standpoint, argument and fallacy can accomplish the same end. Consider the topos of 
general and specific, where the general logically and causally precedes the specific 
In this deductive metaphysics, The Platonic Form of Justice generates the 
multiplicity of specific just acts, which can only ever resemble, but never actually be 
Justice itself, which we know by recalling it from within our souls. However, this is not 
necessarily the only way this topos can function. We might see a sophistic metaphysics 
instead, and rearticulate the topos in a different way. Rather than specifics, there are only 
episodes of radical singularity and entities with haecceity that cannot be totalized by a 
general category, but can and must be violated and coerced into the construction of larger 
assemblages. That is, there is no “Justice,” but only specific justifications in each instance 
induced together over time until there’s an abstraction that is then posited to be the thing 
in common to these various heterogeneous cases in the Heraclitean-Protagorean-
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Antisthenean flux. However, it doesn’t matter for the judge whether Justice is a 
foundational and unquestionable principle from which all specific just decisions derive 
(general/specific) or that ‘justification’ is a socio-cultural construct abstracted from 
radically singular cases by erasing differences in ways that follow traditionally acceptable 
rules that are themselves socio-cultural constructs (haecceity/abstraction). In a court of 
law, the result is still the same: guilty or not guilty, Life or Death. How we get there may 
be different, but these two, irreconcilable metaphysics are not incommensurable.  
In the end of the fight, Socrates is knocked out, Ctesippus gives up, and the only 
consistent judge, the gathered crowd and the words of the text themselves, laud the 
brothers as victors. While before “previous successes had been highly acclaimed one by 
one,” with each side cheering their own champion, now both sides and “even the very 
pillars of the Lyceum” cheer the brothers’ beautiful defeat of Socrates (303b-c). 
Although, we might easily say that Socrates doesn’t really kill his gods and that 
Ctesippus could refute the brothers as easily he does earlier, that he’s just tired of the 
game. But the fight still ends, the sophists still win, and the crowd still goes wild. 
Socrates indeed was executed for killing his gods and Ctesippus’ frail constitution and 
lack of stamina led to his concession and defeat. Sure, we can grumble and sneer at such 
a conclusion all we want, think it ironic as scholars have for centuries, or we can think 
more deeply about our means of rhetorical fighting, the practical needs for efficacy, and 
how we establish and judge such fights as productive of truth or dictating the course of 
action. Rather than cry foul or argue with the results, we can stand up, dust ourselves off, 
and take defeats as lessons in how to fight better, how to fight rightly.  
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V. The Irrelevance of Truth, the Necessity of Rules, and the Reality of Death  
Sometimes contradiction is contradiction and sometimes it’s not, depending on 
the case, sense, and context, and without consensus, there is no contradiction, not really. 
Sometimes we can ask after specificity upon specificity with no issue, at other times 
we’ll be called dotards for asking stupid questions, laughed at for questioning common 
sense, or forcibly rejected for not understanding what “argument” means. This is 
especially true if we are presumed, from the onset, to be villainous and not worth taking 
seriously. Such is the case for the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who can 
refute any claim “whether true or false” and stun Socrates to silence, a conclusion 
presumed impossible from the outset. That the great gadfly is defeated must be a joke.  
If we take the sophists’ victory over Socrates seriously, then truth value or 
“strength” is irrelevant in word-battles. Indeed, the “winner in battle is not necessarily the 
stronger individual,” not the “bigger” or “better” person, but always the better fighter, the 
one who uses all available means, all powers to achieve their end, “the fighter with better 
technique and strategy” (Arvanitis, Pankration 81). We therefore need an unarguable 
standard to “analyze all the aforesaid modes of fallacy into breaches of the definition of a 
refutation,” a stable point from which to argue safely and enact judgement, by preventing 
the worse from defeating the better (Sophistical Refutation 6). Aristotle specifically 
claims that “the art of contentious [eristic] reasoning is foul fighting in disputation,” and 
so anything that violates the rules is cheating or a crime, and the cheater should be 
excluded and the criminal punished (Sophistical Refutations 11). We need Justice.  
 However, how we define argument and fallacy can also be achieved through 
argument or fallacy, and the accusation of fallacy itself can be made, refuted, or justified 
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by fallacious means. Furthermore, depending on the sense, case, and context, whatever 
we might “logically” argue could be nonsensical babble, irrelevant and eristic wrangling, 
or seen as inherently biased against our interlocutor. Indeed, interlocutors might not share 
the same warrants or methods, metaphysical or epistemological assumptions, and our 
investments might be as unjustifiable to our interlocutors as theirs might be to us, 
meaning “the charge of ‘foul!’ is vacuous” and unjustified (McCabe 77). Likewise, we 
might be refuted by irrelevant nonsense and fallacious innuendo because the most 
effective arguments are not necessarily the most virtuous nor the virtuous necessarily 
effective (McCabe 77). So, what does it do or matter if an argument is fallacious if it is 
successful? If an interlocutor “didn’t really win” yet wears the laurel of victory? What do 
we do when fighting fair is foolish and cheating the best way to prosper? Here at last is 
the unresolved ambiguity at the heart of Euthydemus: What is ‘right use?’ What does it 
mean to fight rightly? 
On the one hand (men), right use is a matter of ethics. Such “righteous use” would 
be identifying the manner or mode, as well as the contexts, in which fighting and 
argument would be acceptable: when, where, and why fight, and then how to fight? (Jus 
ad bellum et jus en bello). However, ethical right use is a matter of much negotiation and 
argument, and thus vulnerable to all the above moves, fallacy or otherwise. There is no 
unarguable, no unquestionable grounds from which to base our claims and definitions. 
Recall, there are no heroes or villains in real fights, only any number of interlocutors with 
any number and types of intentions, metaphysics, and skills in fighting, all who 
comfortably justify their own means by their self-proclaimed “noble ends” whether 
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sincere or not, and demonize those of their inherently-evil and obviously-fallacious 
interlocutors. So again, how do we fight rightly? 
On the other hand (de), right use is the most effective and efficient use. Right use 
of fighting and argument is defeating an adversary in the quickest and safest way, using 
all our powers and available means to refute, persuade, coerce, and destroy via the 
physical limitations of the human body, from appealing to cognitive biases and affective 
investments to the extremely persuasive rhetorical appeals of fear and pain, all the way to 
the edge of Death. The only true absolute and necessity, the only totalizing boundary of 
argumentation, the only consequence without contradiction, the only unqualifiable and 
unexceptable conclusion, Death is the foundation for all binaries, that and its otherwise, 
Life itself. So aside from death, which words cannot directly achieve, everything is all a 
matter of rhetoric and refutation, fighting right and fighting rightly.  
Therefore, what matters are the kinds of rules that are made, what those rules can 
accomplish, how such rules produce victory or defeat, how such rules are enforced, and 
most importantly, how such rules can be contested. We must be able to fight back using 
all our powers, so next I turn to the rules of pankration itself, as a contest very close to 
real fighting for life and death. Without rhetorical pankration, being able to use all 
available means and all our powers, we may very well end up like Socrates, dead on the 
floor of our prison cell with hemlock dripping from our lips, or perhaps trapped in a 
political system, run by an incompetent avaricious megalomaniac with devious, inept, 
and corrupt advisors who systematically erode our ability to dissent, fight, or escape the 
ultimate refutation: “submit or you will die.”
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xv I have consulted both WRM Lamb and Benjamin Jowett’s translations, and I use 
Lamb’s throughout. However, in future instantiations of this project, I intend to translate 
the text myself, because I have found both Lamb and Jowett insufficient. My corrections 
and Greek are from the Perseus Project.  
 
xvi If this conversation historically occurred and we have evidence that everyone involved 
did exist, I like to think that it was the direct exigence for Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, 
which is a tempting claim based on the similarities between the texts. That is, after 
speaking to Crito, he rushed home in a huff and angrily wrote his short speech in 
response. However, the identity of an unnamed character in a fictionalized depiction of 
long-dead people is truly irrelevant for any practical and productive inquiry, whether or 
not it is based on or intended to be another long-dead, but less well-known, person, and 
such a fact is truly impossible to prove.  
 
xvii Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists makes no mention of Euthydemus, Schiappa’s 
Protagoras and Logos only discusses Euthydemus as a sophist and the evocation of 
Protagoras in this dialogue, Hawhee’s Bodily Arts only touches on it briefly as I will 
discuss shortly, and Poulakos’ Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece cites the sophists’ 
expertise in fighting and legal battles. While other sophistic dialogues, like Gorgias, 
Protagoras, or The Sophist have been treated at length, there is no such attention paid to 
the Euthydemus and there has been no treatment such as mine in rhetoric, to my 
knowledge. 
 
xviii Furthermore, Dionysodorus might himself be caricature of the famous orator Lysias, 
as L.A. Post argues, which connects this dialogue explicitly to the practice of rhetoric in 
antiquity, as well as more standard rhetorically-focused dialogues, like the Phaedrus, in 
which the youth recites a speech by that same man. Post’s evidence is ample and his 
argument very persuasive, but beyond the scope of my argument here.  
 
xix Pammachon is elsewhere understood to be the specific art of unarmed combat as it 
was used by Greek soldiers in war (Dervenis and Lykiardopoulos 15).  
 
xx This is especially the case in the Euthydemus, which is a “mixed dialogue”; it is neither 
a drama—a representation of a conversation among various interlocutors—nor a dialogue 
strictly speaking—the recollection of conversation by a single narrator—but uses 
elements of both (Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi 208). The Protagoras, the Phaedo, and the 
Symposium all fit within this category as well. Plato is telling a story about Socrates 
telling a story in which he lost an argument; if nothing else, cognitive biases, would 
affect how honest Socrates the character is or even can be. 
 
xxi Furthermore, when Crito interrupts incredulously at Cleinias’ response to Socrates’ 
question, he cannot recall if it were truly Cleinias who said it, but he is certain that it was 
not the sophists. How can he be sure who it wasn’t, but not certain who it was, and 
shouldn’t such ambiguity be suspect? Although, the dialogue does indeed become more 
bombastic and humorous as it progresses (play and seriousness are another theme 
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throughout). Additionally, at various points Dionysodorus is chided by his brother for 
“ruining” the refutation, making a fool of himself, and being generally obnoxious. 
 
xxii Indeed, throughout the Platonic corpus, the conflict is predetermined, the fights 
progress dramatically, and the jargon of professional wrestling is informative here: the 
good guy, “babyface,” wins over the bad guy, “heel,” on the surface, but really the 
participants “work” unseen to present the narrative cooperatively and the entire contest is 
dictated by an authorial figure, Plato here and the “bookers” in professional wrestling. 
This is contrasted with a “shoot” or “real” fight, such as UFC or boxing.  
 
xxiii Warfare is no different, which is why past battles can be idealized and glorified, but 
contemporary conflicts need framing to cut out the bloody, tax-funded death of children, 
unless useful for propaganda, votes/funds, and policy points. The details matter, as do 
footnotes, so please Dear Reader, pay attention.  
 
xxiv “Korybantes” were semi-mythical armored dancers in the Skiamachia or Pyrrichios 
war dance. They worshipped Rhea/Cybele, who was a Harvest Mother Goddess, and later 
the Magna Mater of Rome. Rhea, “flow, discharge” is a similar root as “rhe” or “flow of 
speech” that grounds rhetoric as a term. Elsewhere, in the Republic and Laws, according 
to Grandmaster Arvanitis, Plato is a great proponent of the war-dance, as best dancer 
makes the best warrior, but here he seems to be treating it as mere trickery. 
 
xxv I use Nietzsche’s term from Ecce Homo, elsewhere translated as ‘fighting-writing,’ or 
simply ‘war’ to describe the eristic, ‘strife’ based arguments here as well as the general 
provocative and polemic presentation by Plato here, as well as my equally polemic 
treatment. Nietzsche’s attempt at agonism and sophistry is limited by the intellectual and 
academic context in which he was trained and working. 
 
xxvi Post, who reads Dionysodorus as a caricature of Lysias, sees this expertise as sheer 
bombast and mockery, but has an interesting read on it: “Lysias formerly manufactured 
shields and put them into men's hands; now he manufactures speeches to put into their 
mouths; the use of his speeches makes men competent advocates and statesmen: ergo, the 
arms he gave them must have made them competent fighters and generals. If to 
manufacture speeches is to give instruction in oratory, then to manufacture shields is to 
give instruction in hoplite fighting and in strategy” (3). 
 
xxvii Actually, Socrates lists the fighting expertise of the brothers twice, first to Crito 
before beginning his story and also at the beginning of the story, when introducing them 
to Cleinias. Although, the art of the general comes first in the diegetic list, considered by 
Aristotle to be amongst the greatest of arts in Rhetoric, and one that shows up again later 
in this dialogue, and the logon agones drops out, having yet to be demonstrated. 
However, the two constants are fighting in armor and fighting in court, a repeated doublet 
that seems to reinforce the mutual connection of these two fighting arts.  
 
Perhaps it is a remnant of the first law-courts being trials by combat, or the recognition 
that both panoply and law are violent instruments—weapons—of civilization, one against 
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enemies/others and the other against allies/fellow citizens. Perhaps it is a recognition that 
armed combat is the necessary precondition for the establishment of law, but also 
constitutes the failure or limit of law’s power, even though law in the instance of 
execution uses weapons just as easily as the warrior, albeit less often. 
 
xxviii Hawhee’s Bodily Arts uses this dialogue among many others to illustrate the 
agonistic connection of athletics and sophistry, but does not explore the specifics of 
pankration training, see 36-37.   
 
xxix My interpretation here contrast with the traditional understanding of the sophists as 
ignoring the necessary preconditions for the teaching of virtue. As we will see, they teach 
it anyway, not needing to waste time with the preliminary groundwork.  
xxx Indeed, much of our understanding of the ancient Greek terms has been corrupted by 
the foreign and anachronistic influence of Pauline Christianity in subsequent centuries. 
Paul wrote in Koine Greek and turned kairos in providence and agōn in agony. 
 
xxxi Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi rejects the principle of charity, by which scholars always 
give Socrates the benefit of the doubt when he uses fallacious arguments, which he does 
quite often. Scholars excuse it as “ironic,” Plato not needing to believe something he 
argues, only “apparent fallacy,” or poetic devices. Furthermore, “the view that the 
character Socrates will not have employed fallacious arguments is an assumption on the 
part of the interpreter which runs the risk of misreading the text” (4). Alternatively, 
Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi justifies the use of such fallacies because “even if the means by 
which persuasion is achieved are fallacious, the end is reached: Cleinias is convinced that 
he ought to practice philosophy” (42).  
 
xxxii The moral seems to be that if (we believe) what we’re doing is right, then anything 
goes. When this ruthless pragmatism is coupled with an unwavering faith in the cause, 
and a cause that is absolute and unarguable, such as the Platonic Forms or their 
descendant in the Christian “Will of God,” we have a dangerous Crusader Complex that 
can commit genocide without conscience, and even with glee and happiness in doing 
“God’s will.” This ethic is also extremely useful for those directing armed forces, even 
though the leaders need not actually believe in such things themselves.  
 
xxxiii Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi points out that they seem to adopt Platonic viewpoints as 
well, e.g. in claiming that everyone already knows everything when they’re born, 
Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi identifies this with Plato’s theory of Recollection. 
 
xxxiv We can defeat mere word-play with questions about warrants and backing, and such 
inquiry can be deflected by questioning meaning and seeking exception, which can be 
preempted by the construction of categories and consensus-based rules, which can then 
be shown to be insufficient for a particular case, which can then necessitate a questioning 
of the consensus of the warrants on which such rules are based, and generally most give 
up before we reach this seemingly academic or philosophical point. This is essentially the 
argument I will work through, so you’re welcome to tap out here.   
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xxxv Whether he knew of the dialogue, the conversation as it actually happened, or that 
these were simply common sophistical techniques are all possible, but again as all 
concerned parties are long dead and dust, it doesn’t really matter. However, his reference 
to Euthydemus in Sophistical Refutations does not cite him as the source of any of the 
arguments presented by Plato. But he is the source for related, similar arguments that 
serve as examples of “arguments that depend upon the same point the solution is the 
same, whereas this will not fit all cases of the kind nor yet all ways of putting the 
questions: it is valid against the questioner, but not against his argument” (20).   
 
xxxvi Exelegchthestai, translated by Lamb confusingly as “confuted” also means “refuted” 
and “convicted.” This is another reason we need updated translations that are not limited 
by anti-rhetorical bias and limited by archaic educational privilege.  
  
xxxvii The specific term in Greek is amantheous, which most literally, to me, is “not-
knowers” especially when contrasted with the manthoeus, or “knowers.” Lamb translates 
it as “foolish” and Jowett variously as “ignorant,” “foolish,” or “not knowing.” However, 
the terms can also mean “learn,” which makes Clenias’ poor confusion understandable: 
“do the learners learn or do the not-learners learn?” Such complexity and inattention to 
language is another reason for new rhetorician’s translations of the sophistic dialogues. 
 
xxxviii This is the approach of John Locke in his influential 1690 Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. 
 
xxxix My argument here also resembles the claims of the proto-Cynic Antisthenes, a 
student of Socrates and contemporary of Plato. Sara Rappe makes the case that 
Euthydemus is rife with allusions to Antisthenes’ doctrine, making it a satire by Plato at 
his rival’s expense. Antisthenes believed that “there is only one possible way of referring 
to any object of discourse, and this by means of the oikeios logos, or proprietary 
account…Wherefore Antisthenes mistakenly thought that there is no reference, except by 
means of the proprietary account, one [word] referring to one [non-linguistic 
referendum]. From this it results that it is impossible to gainsay another’s logos’” (298-
9). That is, there is no proper name of a thing unless it completely accounts for the 
totality of the thing in every aspect and detail, perhaps making the reality of reference 
itself impossible. My responses and critiques of Socrates might be seen as possible 
responses by Antisthenes, who was a teacher of Gorgias and Diogenes, an important and 
influential figure, but one shoved far to the right side of the School of Athens by Raphael.  
 
xl Other language dependent false refutations include accent and grammatical form, 
which are radically contingent on the language in question. Aristotle identifies both 
combination and division, moves I explain later, as language dependent fallacies, and he 
is constrained by the language-specifics of Greek grammar and lexicon, which varies 
greatly from English. That is, while all language-based arguments are fallacious for 
Aristotle, how the fallacies would specifically function would be different in languages 
with different practices and concepts of “word,” and especially in those without “words,” 
understood in the Indo-European language sense.  
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xli Lamb has it as “leaves no escape,” which violently and cruelly rips apart afukta. I 
rather leave it whole and intact, the kinder and more ethical handling of the word.  
 
xlii Also, while he begins and ends his argument with necessity, in the middle he shifts to 
Cleinias’ preferences, whether he would prefer a wise general or wise doctor. While the 
commonsense response certainly holds, Socrates’ shift back and forth, bringing in 
Cleinias and changing tactics midway through, is fallacious by changing the terms of the 
argument midstream, but as elsewhere, some excuse them on account of his “good 
reasons.”  
 
xliii Midstream, Socrates switches the order in which the positive and negative terms are 
presented, and concludes with problematic terms that we might today identify as 
intellectual or sensory disabilities. While we cannot disregard that blind or deaf people 
certainly do less seeing and hearing, respectively, than others without similar conditions, 
the problem comes when placing them in combination with other positive/negative 
binaries, something we now call “ableism.” 
 
xliv Here, Rappe argues here “Plato anticipates the Stoic doctrine of adiaphora, that things 
are in themselves neither good nor bad, but good if led by wisdom and bad if by 
ignorance” (293). We might also see the echoes of this in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, about 
which he makes the same claim of right use having great benefits and wrong use 
producing great evils.  
 
xlv  In addition to predication and existence, there are the veridical (It is!) and identity 
(Cleinias is Cleinias) senses of estin.  
 
xlvi Here too I resemble Antisthenes, as Rappe relates that he also questioned the 
differences between accidental and essential qualities (300). 
 
xlvii The sophists and Socrates later in the dialogue deal with the same issue, with 
Socrates’ family and friends who have the same names as Homeric demi-gods. Also, the 
final latch-on that submits Ctesippus concerns him saying “bravo brave Hercules” to 
Socrates, having been defeated, and Euthydemus questions whether Ctesippus is calling 
Hercules a bravo. 
 
xlviii For a wonderful visual representation of this combat philosophy, see Jet Li’s The 
One. The protagonist, Yulaw (Li), uses bagua, a soft style that works on a circle, while 
the antagonist Lawless (Li), uses xingyi, a straightforward and aggressive style. As might 
be expected the protagonist who uses soft force overcomes the antagonist who uses hard 
force. 
 
xlix Rappe states Aristotle, Alexander, Proclus, and Diogenes all attribute this doctrine to 
Antisthenes (287). Specifically, Socrates says he heard this spoken by the followers of 
Protagoras, and others well before.  
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l That false speech means necessarily that they’re no false thought presumes a perfect 
transmission of thought-to-word, which not only relies on positing some causal primacy 
to extra-linguistic content, but also ignores the possibility of misspeaking, multiplicity 
meanings, and the existence of communicative disorders, which even the great 
Demosthenes was reported to have has. The same might be said about false action, which 
likewise presumes a perfect transmission of thought-to-action. Aristotle specifically says 
that distinguishing an expression of a thought and the thought so expressed, that “they are 
not the same,” is “absurd,” rather than explaining why or entertaining why not (10).  
 
li Here, the grammatical differences between Greek and English are evident. Euthydemus 
employs episteme in both the accusative (epistemon) and dative (epistasai) declensions, 
differing between object and means. Since we don’t have noun declensions, and only 
eight inflections in English, it’s difficult to translate this phrase adequately, and therefore 
difficult to read and engage with as well.   
 
lii Lamb translates this as “word snares,” but the use of onoma here connects to the larger 
thematic of names rather than things and the nomological emphasis of the sophists in 
general. See Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists. Also, Arvanitis argues that the stranglehold, 
as well as the kick, was characteristic of pankration and not shared by wrestling or 
boxing. Since the sophists are perfect pankratists, their refutation is pankration, and they 
would therefore finish their opponents in that same way. The most famous finisher here 
was klimakismos, the ladder trick, what is understood in modern parlance as the sleeper 
hold with body scissors. That the perfect pankratists have been catching and refuting 
people, encircling them with words, the translation of peristēsas as stranglehold makes 
sense here, as does the use of the term in medical jargon for vasoconstriction, peristalsis, 
what the stranglehold accomplishes in a fight.  
 
liii Recently, a more nuanced version of this move, was identified as Trevor’s Axiom, as a 
technique used by internet trolls in “The End of Serialization as We Know It” an episode 
of the animated series South Park. While the troll attacks one person for some quality, the 
goal is not actually the attack on their target, but rather to draw the ire of another 
observer, who jumps into defend the perceived victim. However, as this defense can 
appear to be unwarranted, an overreaction, or haughtiness in its own regard, this person is 
further attacked by others, which continues to spin more and more, gaining more and 
more interlocutors, all operating under a logic of righteous indignation. Undoubtedly, my 
Coloradan countrymen named it after me, a sophistic rhetorician, and I greatly appreciate 
the honor. 
 
liv The warm might also be said of the cool, which produces another possible middle term 
between cool and warm, and so on, and so on. That is, the imposition of a middle term 
complicates but does not prevent the binary from continuing. 
  
lv “all there are (in the end) are the episodes, momentary and discrete, so that there is 
nothing that persists, nothing that underlies change, no continuing subjects, and no 
continuing objects—there is no stability or persistence at all.” (McCabe 76). 
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Chapter 2 
Articulating Agonism: Rules of Engagement and Modes of Argument
Just relations between and among opponents are also difficult to establish when the 
argumentative goal is consensus, when everyone begins with the knowledge that the 
positions taken by some or all must be eroded or forgotten if deliberation is to succeed. 
Indeed, the achievement of consensus can simply mean that the most powerful interests 
managed to silence all other parties  
Sharon Crowley, Toward a Civil Discourse 22 
 
Pankration, from the Greek words pan (all) and krates (powerful), was the earliest no-
holds-barred combat sport…Victory was determined when a contestant either held up an 
index finger or was unable to continue. Fatalities were common. 
Grandmaster Jim Arvanitis, the First Mixed Martial Art 62 
 
I. The Necessarily Coercive Foundation of Contestation 
At the beginning of the exchange with Socrates, Euthydemus establishes the 
boundaries for their refutation. First, Euthydemus explicitly asks whether those 
assembled believe in the Principle of Non-Contradiction”—that something cannot both 
be and not be—and the group responds resoundingly in the affirmative, as rejecting such 
a principle is understood to be ludicrous. Second, Euthydemus requires Cleinias to only 
answer when he is asked questions and the Sophists will answer in kind, as we can see 
when they are questioned by Socrates. These two rules illustrate the foundational 
necessity of rules for any contest to be productive, but they also illustrate that there are 
different ways of inhabiting the space created by these rules, and that these inhabitations 
have different affordances, ones that complement and contradict one another.   
The first rule, the Principle of Non-Contradiction, limits the claims because 
something cannot both be and not be, except when it can, as we see in the first exchange. 
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When the Sophists ask Cleinias “who are the ones that learn, the wise or the ignorant?” 
the fluidity of language and multiplicity of meaning allows learners to be both those who 
know and those who do not, both the wise and the ignorant. This seemingly obvious 
contradiction, as Socrates explains, is actually the result of two different senses of the 
word “learn.” That “learn” can mean both the acquisition of knowledge and the 
possession of knowledge has two contradictory consequences. The view of Socrates (and 
Plato) is that these two senses of “learn” are two different concepts that unfortunately 
have the same name (homonyms).  
Alternatively, in what seems to be the view of the Sophists, “learn” does not have 
a singular essence, but multiple and even contradictory ones, meaning that the principle 
upon which the Principle of Non-Contradiction rests is itself instable. However, even 
though this principle is not strictly adhered to throughout the course of the dialogue, since 
the Sophists reject the Platonic perspective, all parties still use the Principle of Non-
Contradiction as the metric of victory and defeat. That is, even though this principle is 
troubled almost immediately after it has been assented to, it is still the means by which 
the refutation continues, develops, and concludes with the sophists ultimately defeating 
Socrates. Even if the sophists don’t “play by the rules,” it is still based on these rules that 
they achieve victory, or rather cause another’s defeat. 
Second, like the Principle of Non-Contradiction, the question-answer rule only 
allows certain discourses. Indeed, as we see from Socrates in the beginning of the 
dialogue and the Sophists near the end, not responding directly, qualifying the response, 
or asking for clarification is considered outside acceptable bounds, as the Sophists and 
the Socratics argue in their respective turns as questioners. Furthermore, the question-
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answer form is used by both the Sophists in their refutation of Cleinias and by Socrates in 
his elenchus with the boy, but like the Principle of Non-Contradiction, they do not inhabit 
the rules in the same way. The sophists ask questions they know the likely answers to, 
while Socrates asks questions without any easy answers. However, the traditional ethical 
distinction between what the Sophists and Socrates both do to Cleinias is not so simple; 
the Sophists ask balanced questions, offering choices, while Socrates asks weighted 
questions in a series that pushes Cleinias to certain answers, the answers that seem to 
support the perspective of Socrates (and Plato). That is, both sides provide Cleinias the 
illusion of choice, but because of the skills of the Sophists and the subtle phrasing of 
Socrates, the boy ends up in both instances exactly where they want him: silenced by 
refutation or seeking after wisdom.  
Even if these rules aren’t followed faithfully over the course of the dialogue, they 
still determine the conditions for the argumentative victory, or more properly, the manner 
of defeat: if I cannot answer a question or my answer contradicts another answer or itself, 
then I am defeated, and whoever defeated me is the victor, regardless of whether the rules 
were strictly adhered to throughout the course of the contest. Socrates is still defeated by 
being struck into silence, by being knocked out, and Ctesippus is still defeated by giving 
up, tapping out, admitting his own defeat. The truth and logic of the arguments are 
irrelevant here, because what matters for the sophists is the force and effect. As I argue in 
the previous chapter, the sophists don’t claim to offer any truth or foundational 
understanding, but simply a better set of fighting skills. Fighting skills, however, are 
purely instrumental; the punch or throw can be performed in self-defense or assault, and 
the ability to be successful at fighting, to be a good fighter is not reducible to the ethical 
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justifications for the fighting. Those whose motives and goals we find abhorrent don’t 
necessarily suffer from our low judgment of them, and if they are well-versed in the arts 
of argument, our low judgment, our inability, or unwillingness to take such villains 
seriously, will lead us, like Socrates, to defeat.  
But in light of the efficacy of the Sophistic wrangling over the Sophistic elenchus, 
the question about “right use” becomes much more complicated. On the one hand, “right 
use” can be understood as “righteous use,” following particular ideological goals or 
working within particular moral bounds. Using rhetoric to persuade the people to follow a 
policy that would serve the common good, even if they bristle at such persuasion, might 
be called “right use” by Aristotle. Since the Sophists have ideological goals that differ 
from, or even oppose, those of Aristotle and his Platonically-inflected argumentative 
frame, they cannot be using rhetoric rightly since self-enrichment and victory are, by 
themselves, not true good and real wisdom.  
On the other hand, “right use” might be understood as a more technical “correct 
use,” or using rhetoric to achieve our ends in the most efficient and effective way. Such 
tactics like using ambiguous words, empty signifiers, or enthymemes with polyvalent 
minor premises that allow people to be persuaded without recognizing the full extent of 
the argument, allow the rhetor using this ignorance to achieve argumentative victory or 
even public office. But what happens when the norms of argumentative discourse, the 
rules for virtuous use (logical rigor, empirical verification, openness and uncertainty) are 
drastically ineffective when faced with those who reject such norms, employing a whole 
host of ad hominem, tu quoque, red herring, and other fallacy to dazzle, distract, and 
ultimately destroy any other argument in the eyes of a captive audience.  
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In a similar situation, Aristotle sets out to defeat eristic, and in order to do so, he 
must first define it. In Sophistical Refutations, he outlines thirteen types of fallacious 
arguments. While there are many different types, in the final chapter “Aristotle describes 
all the preceding false arguments, whether deceptions or errors, as paralogism” with 
ignoratio elenchi, ignorance of refutation, as “the way of accommodating all the other 
twelve” (Tindale Reason’s Dark Champions 48, 49). The primordial fallacy is the refusal 
to accept the rules of argumentation that Aristotle outlines, meaning that rhetors either 
accept and enact the proper rules of argument or are not actually arguing at all.lvi In each 
of these cases, arguments are evaluated through a metric of necessity. An argument is 
only acceptable if the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, and fallacious if 
it does not. Everything that is different from a necessary argument is the same in being 
wrong, and it is necessarily wrong because it doesn’t follow the rules of necessity. By 
having such an exclusionary structure, Aristotle’s own rules are eristic in their own right. 
By establishing a strict division between logic and illogic, they completely shut out any 
opposing view. If we don’t follow the rules of a contest, then we are not participating in 
that contest.  
However, as we can see in Euthydemus, the rules of necessity are not themselves 
necessary for refutation. That the Sophists can argue and win without using a logic of 
necessity means that the Aristotelian logic of necessity is not itself necessary in 
Aristotle’s sense. Put differently, the rules of argumentation are not necessary for 
argument, but nor are they arbitrary, per se, but rather they are arbitrated. That is, the 
rules of necessity laid out by Aristotle are not inherent and obvious, natural and divinely 
ordained, but the result of human work, human constraints, and human enforcement. The 
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sophists and Socrates respect the rules for the force they provide, the direction and 
limitation that allows the force to work, but also work around them when necessary, and 
only change tactics when such working is called out.lvii  
While there’s no necessity at work in an ad hominem argument, it can still effect 
persuasion, and quite effectively too. Absent formalized constraints, without a referee or 
judge to dictate and enforce boundaries, using the ad hominem, as all the interlocutors in 
the dialogue do, whether directly or indirectly, has no value beyond what it accomplishes 
and no risk beyond what it cannot accomplish. Once we move beyond the rules of logic, 
we turn to a logic of practical force: it doesn’t matter that ad hominem is illogical, what 
matters is what it can do. In this case, we might be doing students a disservice in rejecting 
fallacious argument or demonizing it in moral terms. Instead, we might teach students 
how these rules work, why they might be useful, and how to respond when someone 
doesn’t use these rules, when the institutions that establish, espouse, and enforce these 
rules cannot be relied upon. Put differently, we must account for the Spartan Critique of 
Elean Pankration. 
 
II. The Spartan Critique and the Rules of Agonistic Logic 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the warlike Spartans were fierce competitors in the Pan-
Hellenic Games. The combination of civic pride, even a zealous sense of superiority, and 
a harsh training regimen beginning in infancy made those who survived to adulthood 
some of the most effective warriors of theirs or any period, as famously described by 
Herodotus in the battle of Thermopylae. Their investment in physical fitness and ruthless 
aggression made Spartan athletes extremely successful, especially in the “heavy events,” 
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which they rightly understood as training for war, as martial arts training in a strict sense. 
It is said that Spartans even eschewed safety gear when boxing, which “was seen as a 
method to harden their faces in order to effectively ward off blows” (Arvanitis, The First 
Mixed Martial Art 90). However, they did not participate in pankration, the closest 
contest to actual combat, and they declined to do so for two reasons.  
Explicitly, the Spartans did not compete in pankration because the rules against 
biting and eye gouging made the contest too far removed from actual combat. Following 
rules that are not reflective of reality makes the contest of pankration a poor training 
model for warriors and even trains them at a disadvantage. Because warfare has no rules, 
any training for it should also lack such rules, except obeying the trainer, paidotribes, 
who backs up etiquette with the harsh strike of a staff. However, other writers and 
scholars posit that the Spartans avoided pankration lest a Spartan be defeated in a combat 
sport by another, “lesser” Greek, and touted their concern for authenticity to obscure this 
insecurity. If a Spartan lost in an open contest with free and equal rules in the view of 
their fellow Greeks, then all of Sparta would lose face; their claim to Herculean lineage 
and the accompanying divine superiority would be tarnished. There’s no reason why 
these are mutually exclusive, and however much they overlap is as unknown as it is 
irrelevant. However, the Spartan Critique does provide a powerful opposition to the 
traditional understanding of and orientation toward rules of engagement.  
In war and self-defense on the street, gouging the eyes, biting, attacking the groin 
or other vulnerable areas is explicitly part of the repertoire people should use because 
they are extremely effective. Even the largest fighter will still be vulnerable in their soft, 
squishy bits, and absent other advantages, attacking these weaknesses might mean the 
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difference between survival and death. While in argumentative terms, we cannot kill with 
words directly—the judge’s verdict of guilt in capital offenses does not itself kill the 
defendant, someone else does the deed—we can still cause great psychological and 
emotional harm to others by likewise violating the integrity of their argumentative 
bodies, by attacking them as people, rather than their positions as interlocutors. That is, 
the ad hominem fallacy is not simply outlawed because the person delivering the 
argument doesn’t necessarily have any bearing on the truth and logic of it, but because it 
violates the boundary between the argument and the person delivering it. It goes beyond 
the bounds of the contest, even though it is immensely effective and perhaps because it is 
so.  
It might not be effective at generating some common ground or creating good 
will, but goading someone into a misstep, coloring them as villainous and their positions 
likewise, and making them look bad before a lay audience can certainly be more effective 
than a logically-informed, mathematically-precise proposition with each specific nuance 
laid out in detail, which might lead a lay audience to become bored or confused, lacking 
the necessary experience and knowledge to attend to the fight closely. Certainly, we 
might see such tactics as dishonest and ill-suited to the ethoi we hope to generate in 
students, but unless everyone participating in a particular contest knows and believes in 
the rules of proper argument, and those rules are explicitly and vocally defended, then 
they don’t matter. Therefore, training students to act only within these rules puts them at 
risk in future arguments, unpracticed at and vulnerable to tactics that might lead them to 
defeat.  
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Even still, this mutual respect and adherence to the coercive foundation is what 
allows for agonistic logic to function, for victory to bring value and legitimacy.lviii For 
example, in a foot-race, a literal competition and the simplest form of agōn, the distance, 
course, and start time are the same for everyone, so that what would lead to victory might 
be the same for all participants.lix Put simply, the fastest person wins the race, and the 
best runner wins the most races. These superlative labels are the result of the contest, the 
value of the particular capacity the rules are designed to measure and establish: the best 
runner is simply the one who wins the most races, and the fastest person is the one who 
covers the most distance in the shortest time. Anything that muddles this measurement, 
any extraneous factors that might disrupt the fastest runner from winning the race, 
troubles the entire agonistic assemblage and must be excluded; rules against false starts, 
leaving the course, or harassing fellow competitors, all ensure that only speed achieves 
success. Without these limitations, whoever gets to the finish first, by whatever means, is 
the victor, although they might not have been the fastest runner. In such situations, we 
might then cry foul and claim that the victor didn’t “really win” and they aren’t “really” 
the fastest, but absent the strict establishment, enforcement, and acceptance of those rules 
such cries would simply be those of a sore loser. However, agonistic rhetoric is not based 
on the competition but the fight.  
As in the foot race, rules in fighting are established to make sure that the one who 
wins is the “best fighter,” that “fighting skill” is the measurement of victory. However, 
“fighting skill” is a far more complicated and nebulous quality than “speed,” and 
therefore that much more complicated to measure and establish through contest, which 
makes the rules defining victory, and mutual adherence to them, that much more 
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important. In argumentative terms, Patricia Roberts-Miller suggests this as a “minimalist 
notion of rationality,” one in which “a line of argument is rational if the person using it 
applies it consistently, that is, if it is not rejected in other places in the argument and if 
s/he considers it a valid line of argument when used by an opposition” (Deliberate 
Conflict 214). A fighter would only use moves the same way throughout the fight, and 
only if they would accept such moves being used against them. In such cases, when 
mutually-agreed boundaries are established and respected, the best argument will be 
successful and the best fighter will win. But like in the foot race, the winner of the fight 
might not be the “best fighter” in terms of the outlined rules, but simply the one who wins 
by whatever means, and this risk is exacerbated by the manifold complexities that make 
up “fighting skill.” Furthermore, because a “real fight” has no rules beyond survival, as 
the Spartans note, part of “fighting skill” includes winning when the rules of contestation 
are not present, respected, or relied upon. This contingency and complexity means that in 
any given fight, not only is the evaluation of “fighting skill” at stake, but the terms of 
engagement in the contest are as well. That is, whenever we fight, we don’t just fight 
about something, even if just deciding whose “fighting skill” is more or better, but we 
also always fight about fighting. 
In argumentative terms, whenever we engage in an argument outside of a 
formalized debate attended (to) by people knowledgeable about and experienced in the 
rules of argument, we are participating in a fight that can become “real” at any moment. 
In these cases, calling out someone for an ad hominem or other fallacy has no bearing 
unless the interlocutor recognizes, accepts, and agrees with the evaluation. If they 
don’t—and participants that employ fallacy in street-fight arguments might have little 
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compunction is doing so—, then we have reached the end of argument. The boundaries 
that enable an agonistic assemblage to measure skill, to grant legitimacy to victory, fall 
away. When the best argument is not ensured to be most successful, then the most 
successful argument is the best. We must then consider what options we have when we 
find ourselves in such a street-fight argument, whether online or IRL.  
Initially, we might abandon righteousness in favor of results, seek to shut down 
opponents and their argument through whatever means necessary, fallacious eristic 
certainly, but perhaps also with the inarguable force of the fist, blade, or bullet. After 
using dirty tricks to achieve hegemony, we might then outlaw them, as both history and 
the rules of conduct are written by the victors, looking back at the necessary evils 
committed in service of peace and goodness. An uncomfortable option indeed. 
Alternatively, we might hold to our principles, going “high” in response to underhanded 
or overreaching tactics, regardless of how much damage is done, believing that the 
righteous will win out in the end. But if we take this tact, then we might very well fall 
victim to the same underhanded tactics, again and again, until the only means by which 
such tactics might be judged as dishonest or out of bounds—the rules themselves—are 
rewritten so that the only discourse out of bounds is that which contradicts the word of 
those in power, the only cheat a rejection of established hegemony, legitimized models of 
argument, and orthodox ideology. Perhaps this is the only result that ever happens. 
However, we have a third option: we might very well value the principles of 
traditional argumentation, a reasonable articulation of needs and desires in a deliberative, 
compassionate way that leads to consensus, but we must also train in and against the 
arguments disqualified by these rules, especially because calling out such disqualification 
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might have little effect on those employing such tactics in the first place. That is, we 
might promote an ethos of the adversary, as Chantal Mouffe and Sharon Crowley 
suggest.lx Unlike enemies who have no rules in their engagement beyond achieving 
victory or allies who are understood to not conflict at all, adversaries adhere to the same 
set of grounding principles, the rules of the contest, even as they attempt to exert their 
will, become the victor using only the means that are explicitly allowed. However, we 
must take this ethos further; unless our adversaries accept us as adversaries as well, they 
are not part of the contest, and not deserving of honor in contestation. That is, we are 
once again faced with the necessary coercion at the root of the contest. 
By establishing and enforcing rules, the violence that prevents violence, 
contestation is not a simple melee, a writhing mass of blood, death, and suffering, a 
Hobbesian bellum omni contra omnes. However, we must remember that these rules are 
not qualitatively different from this melee, but an intensification of this melee on itself. 
At each moment, these violent rules might break down into violence, and it is only 
through violence of mutually-acceptable terms of engagement—sublimated through and 
supporting either judicial oversight or codes of conduct—that the contest holds. In an 
argument, the rules of argument are argued, implicitly or explicitly, and it is only through 
agreeing on the rules of argument that arguing happens at all. This tautological limit of 
articulation, the rules that define the contest and define victory, is where we must begin 
our training. We begin where the bounds of the contest that we must-but-might-not 
adhere to are built, at the border of the impossibly fragile and extremely foundational 
ground of commensurability. 
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III. The Rules of Pankratic Argument 
Winning a pankration bout was accomplished in several ways, among them the 
submission and the knockout, which are recognizable endings to a fight that I will 
address in more detail, but there were also cases of a draw, in which victory was awarded 
to the gods by sacred decision (heira) (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 41). Rather 
than seeing a draw as neither competitor winning, because such excellence was 
demonstrated for the gods, they were the winner. Furthermore, this divine oversight is 
central to agonism as the Greeks practiced it: the contest was a miniature version of the 
Greek cosmos, with the peoples of Earth being contestants and the gods the judges and 
referees. This divine oversight and the sacred dimension of the Games meant that Greek 
fighters adhered to the rules, to varying degrees, as religious orthodoxy. But one didn’t 
only follow the rules because they might be punished by the religious authority of the 
games master (agonarchos), but because they might be punished by the gods 
themselves.lxi However, while the well-fought contest was a sacred offering, this was not 
as effective at generating arête among peers as a decisive victory, when the end of the 
contest was clear and obvious.    
First, the preferred method of victory was by submission, making an opponent 
surrender, usually by applying a hold to an opponent’s limbs, bending a joint backward, 
twisting it out of the socket, or strangling them with the famous klimakizo or “ladder 
trick.” We might know this technique today as the hadaka-jime (rear-naked choke) from 
judo or the “sleeper hold” of catch- and professional wrestling.lxii With this technique, 
victory is swift and almost certain, and so opponents caught in this hold would need to 
 79 
surrender or be rendered unconscious.lxiii Admitting defeat was indicated by raising one 
finger or “tapping out,” slapping an opponent’s leg, arm, or the floor of the arena. In this 
moment, the fighter has conceded, admitted defeat and ended the contest, and we might 
equally recognize this as explicit persuasion in a rhetorical exchange: “You know, you’re 
right. I hadn’t thought about it that way.” In this victory, the victor is named as such by 
their opponent, which is much stronger than simply being proclaimed as such by the 
judges or the gods. 
Additionally, there is a mutual concession, what we might call compromise. In 
these cases, as is possible in a pankration match, both fighters might secure submission 
holds on each other, with the only resolution being consensus, the stopping of the fight, 
the differences being irreconcilable, or they each snap each other’s limbs, ending the 
contest as well. Ironically or fittingly, this situation, a tie, is the resolution of argument 
most favored by irenic, invitational, and deliberative approaches. That is, consensus-
oriented arguments aim for a situation in which both parties come to a mutually agreeable 
solution, which would usually involve conceding part of their needs or desires in order to 
achieve others. Furthermore, these approaches might seem to reject conflict altogether, 
but they are simply grappling-focused styles taking the tools of their art to its logical 
extension, and this extends even to pacifism, a style of fighting that also succeeds by 
submission. 
For example, there's the interesting figure of Melankomas the Karian, who stands 
out among ancient boxers, not only because he died undefeated, but also “in some cases, 
he would compel his opponents to submit without ever landing or receiving a telling 
blow. It was his belief that to strike another, to injure or be injured, did not constitute 
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bravery” (Arvanitis, The First Mixed Martial Art 87). He would deflect, circle, and 
evade, making opponents quit through sheer exhaustion. While he was a boxer, which 
makes his pacifist approach all the more strange and interesting, he might just as easily 
have been successful in pankration because his skills at evading blows would also, 
perhaps, assist him in avoiding throws and holds. We could certainly see Melankomas as 
an instance that disrupts the very idea of contestation: winning by not fighting. However, 
we must remember that Melankomas did not win because of his pacifism, his ethical 
high-ground, but rather because of his impressive cardiovascular conditioning—he was 
said to have been more suited for running rather than boxing—and even if he won 
without using his excellent body in the expected way of the boxing match, he won using 
his body, the site and engine of contestation, nonetheless. 
Similarly to the submission, one could win by opponent forfeit (akoniti). This was 
the case for many of the opponents of Sostratos of Sikuōn, an infamous fighter whose 
victories number more than anyone else in antiquity, with one exception (Arvanitis, The 
First Mixed Martial Art 87).lxiv Known as “Mr. Fingers,” Sostratos was so successful and 
so named because he would begin his fights by breaking or dislocating his opponent’s 
fingers, which was perfectly acceptable within the rules of pankration, even if it might be 
distasteful, and extremely effective in self-defense outside of pankration contests. 
Breaking the fingers attacks the smallest joints of the body, central to any engagement 
with an opponent, but usually tacit and unnoticed until they are damaged. The bodies of 
our arguments too rely on small nuances, tiny joints, that are usually tacit and unnoticed 
until they are attacked. These kinds of attacks, like Descartes’ Evil Demon or Hume’s 
Guillotine, challenge our ability to know with certainty and make claims about what 
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should be done, and they keep any argument from going anywhere, but work especially 
well when critiquing an opponent’s position.  
Taken together, Melankomas and Sostratos provide an interesting contrast 
regarding submission because both “win without fighting.” The former rejects 
engagement so successfully that opponents surrender anyway and the latter engages in it 
so brutally that opponents surrender without even facing him. Furthermore, these two 
fighters provide interesting, yet problematic approaches to the contest. Melankomas’ 
approach is problematic because of the immense time and discipline required, and this 
approach also risks being caught unprepared to deal with conflict when we do encounter 
it. While the fighter himself died undefeated, any particular fighter following after him 
who attempted such a strategy might easily and quickly find themselves unconscious on 
the ground. Even still, such a risk might be worth it for those who see any conflict, any 
striking or being struck, as dishonorable, even if it succeeds only until someone more 
agile, and perhaps more unscrupulous, catches up to them.  
Conversely, and perhaps more obviously, Sostratos’ approach is problematic 
because it shuts down contestation as well, not by rejecting conflict within the fight, but 
by persuading opponents to the reject the fight for fear of what will happen. In this way, 
Sostratos forced his opponents to be like Melankomas and avoid conflict altogether. Both 
fighters embody styles of engagement that we might provide students, evasive pacifism 
and ruthless pragmatism, but these two extremes must necessarily be excluded for the 
contest to function for most people in the majority of circumstances. That is, either 
training students never to fight, avoiding it at all costs, or training students to brutalize 
people, frightening others into never fighting, might certainly be successful strategies for 
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contestation, but they are not practical ways of providing students the skills in 
argumentation that they will need when they must do so.  
While the act of concession is a choice, not conceding and refusing to surrender, 
is also a choice, and in the klimakizo, this choice would result in another form of victory: 
knockout. More privileged in boxing, the knockout was even more likely in pankration, 
not only because strangleholds were a main part of the strategy, but also because kicking 
was also allowed and these types of strikes are far more powerful than striking with the 
hand. In cases of a knockout, the victor has overpowered their opponent, and in the cases 
of argumentation, this victory is much less sure and solid than submission. Someone 
might be struck silent for any number of reasons. A knockout is therefore more aleatory 
than a submission, and paradoxically it can take much more or much less work: some 
fighters might take blow after blow without flinching, carrying on through bruises and 
swelling, while others might be struck just-so on the point of the chin, causing temporary 
paralysis, unconsciousness, or even death. Here, at the ultimate boundary, what I see as 
the foundational division upon and in the form of which all others are built, I must pause 
to consider death in pankration. 
We do not know for sure how much and to what degree death occurred in 
pankration contests. According to Arvanitis and others, death was common and even a 
sanctioned form of victory. However, Dervenis and Lykiardopoulos and others argue that 
killing was not part of the sanctioned victory, and was in fact quite uncommon. Indeed, 
the most famous pankratist is Arrichion, who died while successfully defending his third 
Olympic pankration championship, refusing to submit to a klimakizo and inventing an 
ankle lock counter in the process, being the “only accidental death in a pankration match 
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recorded in ancient Olympia” (Dervenis and Lykiardopoulos 28). That his death was so 
well-known, they argue, is evidence for how uncommon such deaths were. Certainly, 
pankratists were perfectly capable of killing, having the necessary skills and knowledge, 
and at any point, as I have argued, the contest might become deadly, what Mouffe calls 
the “radical negativity” of politics, what I term the Spartan “real fight,” the always-
present contestation and potential violation of the rules of the contest while contesting 
(Agonistics 1).  
While we might shudder at the proposition, we cannot argue that the dead can’t 
argue back, their dissent being silenced for good.lxv Violence is the most effective means 
of ending disagreement, and the only ultimate foundation on which we build and enforce 
systems of rules. We see this in pankration, embodied in the hellanodikes, the divinely-
charged referee who was armed with a staff to enforce the rules and punish those who 
break them. This not only evokes Weber’s point about the state monopoly on violence, 
but also the Greek pantheon’s place as divine judges and referees. But despite the 
centrality and complications surrounding death in combat sports and martial arts, this 
topic requires its own engagement and much more time and space than I have here. 
However, as a long-term strategy for the contest and as part of a training regimen, killing 
is not a feasible or practical strategy, even if death is always present as possibility in the 
contest or outside it. In the end, we simply don’t know to what degree death was part of 
pankration, and for my present purposes, I must reject killing as rarely, if ever, the best 
possible decision.  
While we may not know the rules regarding death for certain, we know two other 
rules that were set in stone: no biting and no gouging. These techniques are unacceptable 
 84 
because they break the surface of the interlocutors’ skin, either with the teeth or through 
the eye sockets, even if such techniques are effective parts of a self-defense repertoire. 
The moves that are banned are the moves we need most in life-or-death fighting 
situations. In violating the integrity of the body, they violate the integrity of the contest. 
These transgressions perform their transgression, and in every rule there is the implicit 
“breaking rules is against the rules.” However, in argumentative terms, the transgression 
of the rules would function a bit differently, and next I must consider the transgressions 
that attack the body of the interlocutor.  
However, this requires me to modulate the realities of pankration to address 
contemporary issues in contemporary contests: the questions of sex and gender. For my 
purposes, developing an argument out from pankration is not necessarily limited by the 
limitations of pankration as it was practiced. That is, in the ancient Games, women did 
not compete, nor did they engage with men, but I cannot develop a model of argument 
that excludes women, as Foss and Griffin argue about all traditional argumentation and 
against which they posit their own feminist “invitational argument.” However, as argued 
by Jarratt and others, conflict is not simply male or female, and an all-out rejection of 
conflict can end up reifying traditional inequalities as well.lxvi Indeed, because women are 
more likely than men to be victims of violence, teaching them to defend themselves, with 
words or limbs, is much more needful. However, as with death, the feminine in/and 
rhetoric of violence is too complex to deal with sufficiently here.lxvii  
Although, the question of bodily difference in contemporary arguments is a potent 
site of conflict and the always-accompanying meta-conflict, and it must be addressed in 
the ways we teach it. That is, while we don’t want to encourage attacking people on the 
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grounds of their bodily difference, we need to teach students to be aware of bodily 
difference and how it plays an important role in any instance of argumentation. While we 
might idealize the notion of equality, the concept and term itself is the product of drastic 
inequality, a history of exclusion, and functions to allow any position to have 
grounds.lxviii  However, in cases where the notion of equality would threaten the 
functioning of the contest, such as allowing a misogynist’s attack on a woman’s 
womanhood on grounds of allowing him a “fair say,” the judge must step in, affirm the 
rules of the contest and outline how rejecting someone a priori due to bodily difference 
threatens the functioning of the contest: sacrificing fairness in service of equity.  
However, differences in bodily composition are central to fighting in training and 
practice, and especially so in pankration and the other “heavy events” because all adult 
participants, regardless of body size and weight, competed against each other. In each 
case, an individual would face an individual, strike and grapple with their opponent as a 
singular, unique system of bodily force. That is, while there are a whole host 
complications regarding the normalization of certain bodies and the definitions of 
“ability,” in fighting terms, the body is a mechanical system for the enactment of force 
and a series of articulations that are themselves vulnerable to force.lxix It doesn’t matter 
who we fight, but rather what the physiological powers and limitations of their particular 
body are. In continuing to consider the argument as a fight, we must also see the 
argument as an opponent with a particular articulation of structure, an anatomy that can 
enact and be vulnerable to force. We can use this model of the fight and manner of 
engagement from pankration, and from it develop a way of engaging an argument as a 
body with particular physiological, material affordances and limitations. In thinking 
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about arguments in anatomical terms, I turn to Stephen Toulmin, who considers it in this 
same way, even if this particular element seems to have been overlooked by many 
scholars.  
 
IV. The Anatomy of Argument(ation) and The Pankratic Method 
While Aristotle presents the enthymeme as an incomplete or “corrupt” syllogism, 
Toulmin delves deeper into the positive qualities of the body of argument rather than 
finding it wanting in comparison to a mathematic-logical ideal. Rather than a collection 
of dead letters, Toulmin argues that “an argument is like an organism,” with “both a 
gross, anatomical structure and a finer, as-it-were physiological one” (Toulmin 94). We 
can attend to the gross anatomy of arguments in terms of both the Claims and Data and 
the surface features of a text, and with its finer physiological structure, how Warrants are 
Qualified and Rebutted, how they support Claims and Data and are supported in turn by 
Backing, as well as what kind of Claims can be made, which Warrants, Data, and 
Backing are acceptable, and what Qualifiers and Rebuttals must be accounted for in a 
particular case. If arguments are bodies, as Toulmin suggests, then we can attend to them 
as bodies with an anatomically shaped surface we can strike and with a physiological 
structure we can grapple, but we want students to be able to both engage with a text in 
terms of varying intensities of precision and force, and in terms of logical connections 
and rhetorical trajectory. 
While we can certainly engage with an argument on the level of Claims and Data, 
asking what specifically and in detail is being proposed and how well and in what ways is 
it justified, these specific moves are themselves based on the Warrant. Whereas Aristotle 
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requires universal-absolute Major Premises, Toulmin points out that the specific and 
specific kinds of Warrants “may confer different degrees of force on the conclusions they 
justify” (Toulmin 100). Without a strong Warrant, Claims and Data will ultimately lack 
any force to persuade.lxx However, the Warrant is also vulnerable to attack as well, and 
engaging with it requires something different that engaging with a Claim. The Warrant is 
the center of power of an argument, the phrene, the core of the body, what allows it to 
enact force, like the proper working of the hips and knees that allow for the force of a 
punch to knock down an opponent. Furthermore, like the phrene, the Warrant can be 
engaged with through the Claims and Data it supports, but also directly if an interlocutor 
has the skills to close the distance and grab hold. That is, surrounding the Warrant, there 
are two levels of structure, engaging with which requires different modes of argument, 
two modes we have already seen—striking (with) surface and grappling structure, 
Sophistic argument and Socratic argumentation—and two modes that are integrated into 
a monistic, pankration approach, even if such integration is not resolution.  
That is, even though it disrupts the binary between striking and grappling, in order 
to train their students in pankration, ancient Greek paidotribes split their training into two 
parts. The first part, ano (up) pankration, was “used for training or preliminary bouts,” 
and required fighters to remain standing, using punches, kicks, elbows, and knees, very 
little grappling, and no ground fighting (Arvanitis, Pankration 13). The second style, 
“kato [down] pankration, was primarily used in the Games and was a much rougher 
form” that emphasized the grappling, throwing, ground-fighting and submission holds 
(Arvanitis, Pankration 13). Pankration matches would begin with both fighters standing, 
but usually end on the ground, with one fighter being locked into a hold by the other. So, 
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teachers began training students with the beginning of the match, progressively working 
toward the full match, beginning upright and ending down after rigorous practice. Such 
an approach mirrors that of writing instruction: we begin teaching students words, and 
only later do they “really” learn to attend to lines of argument, coherent structures of 
persuasion and communication.  
Just as students in pankration begin with the “natural” striking focus of upright 
fighting, when students engage with a text, they initially encounter it as a series of 
surface features, specific fixations on words that are “read” into phrases.lxxi If we engage 
with arguments in a text, we do so with and on the surface, we strike at it as it strikes us, 
and we also go past the surface, delving deeper into the structure of reasoning and 
support. When students get closer they engage not with the surface features but the 
structure and strength of the body of the text, discussing the underlying assumptions that 
support claims, how strong these assumptions are and how well they are themselves 
supported. In this, we have shifted to a more involved engagement with a text, writer, and 
the assumptions at work for both. Unlike the striking-match, in which adversaries express 
against each other and attempt to weaken the foundation of each other’s claims, in a 
grappling match, we close the distance, embrace these foundations, and attempt to 
unbalance them, which also requires deeper critical thinking about the epistemological 
rules of particular disciplines, possible groundless assumptions, and it also involves a 
deep discomfort as students find themselves stretched, uncomfortably bent out of shape. 
Any reading, engaging, or interpretive work, anything we do with and to a text can be 
understood as acting upon a body. 
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Dealing with simply the first blush, the raw presentation of a text can leave little 
understanding, affective impact, or rhetorical effect: it is precisely what it seems to be, it 
says what it says. In this objectifying mode of engagement, interlocutors express 
themselves to and at us, while we either let the blows come, if we’re being open and 
engaging, cover our faces to block the blows, or shift around and avoid their barbs. As we 
close in, come together, find a stance within one another’s gravity, a common ground, we 
have to change the mode of engagement. We don’t deal with mere terms and names 
anymore here, but logical articulations and ideological structures. We ask questions to 
unbalance our opponents, we find a lower center, a firmer foundation from which to tip 
them over, their own certainty and surety tipping up and over, and from there, we wrench 
out the implications of their reasoning and/or the problematic, unconceived foundations 
from which they’re working. We torque their arms and legs, preventing their ability to 
make the claims they had and move from where they had been. We can strangle them, 
rhetorically, smothering their subjectivity until they cannot do anything anymore and 
must submit: “yes, you make a very good point; well, I hadn’t thought of it that way; I 
have lots to reconsider.” At this moment, the moment of concession and the moment of 
consensus, for any compromise means one or both parties give up, we gently wrestle our 
interlocutors. We find common ground, under-stand their position, find a freedom to 
move, and come to a resolution: the model of philosophical, rational, liberal-deliberative 
discourse. 
However, it doesn’t always work this way; rhetorical fights, arguments, however 
much we may wish it, are not wrestling matches. As you close in to find common ground, 
your opponent can slip away, they can change the foundation on which they were 
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standing, and by going forward in an expected and predictable way, you leave yourself 
open. Here with that openness, with that distance, the striking can continue. The 
opponent can hold in reserve and protect the integrity of their stance and foundation, 
delivering words in rapid succession at your now unbalanced form. Pure insult, a wide 
sweeping elbow of demonization aimed at vulnerabilities learned through closeness, can 
crash unexpectedly from the side; a knee-jerk response takes your breath away, leaving 
you speechless. But these strikes, these expressions can’t manifest at a distance, but 
instead are more intimate, more close-range, at that point between modalities when we’re 
no longer dealing in simple expressions of belief and opinion, but not yet deep into the 
nuances and complexities of philosophical argument either. It is at this point that we 
vacillate between arguments of word and phrase, of sophistic word-games and deep 
meditations of meaning. When it’s no longer one or the other, this middle range is where 
most arguments happen; we don’t live in stark dualities, but a singular, constantly 
middling.  
However, our ways of conceiving differences in engagement little account for 
this, and this is even more complicated by the ethical resonance that certain modalities 
have that others don’t: boxing is violent and bad, wrestling is forceful but good. But now 
we can see that despite the traditional ethical choice applied to these two styles of 
fighting, these are simply two different modes of bodily interaction: concussion on 
surface and coercion of structure. One is not preferable or more effective than the other, 
as there is no absolute metric we might use to make these judgments, but simply 
different, and most usefully, mutually disabling. We cannot assume that what we have 
traditionally devalued is not important in its own right, or even less important than what 
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we have valued. Rather than simply continuing what we have done, or simply invert our 
binaries for fairness’ sake, we might instead deconstruct the binary itself, making the 
modes of expression and deliberation, constructing and engaging texts as a series of 
words and as a structured propositional set, but as both at once, moving in and out of 
these modes as the exigence, topic, genre, or occasion might require. We cannot simply 
strike at each other, expressing ourselves until exhausted and bruised, but we cannot 
simply grapple either, turning and torqueing others and ourselves, feeling the pain of 
coercion while forcing a smile because it’s the right thing to do, and the right way to do 
it. We need to do both and neither: we need pankration.  
However, there’s certainly pain in having our writing and argument broken, the 
connections our claims have to supporting evidence can be snapped with a little pressure 
at the right angle, but we can simply ignore that pressure. In argument, others can not feel 
pain in having their argument broken. Unless they agree on the means and method for 
engagement and victory, if we have a common sense of what the contest is, then they 
might just as easily reject our critiques as we might reject theirs. We can claim that the 
opponents and critics don’t understand the nuance or the method, that their critique is 
unfounded or antiquated, naïve or too simplistic, or simply ignore their critiques as 
“absurd,” as Aristotle and others do of anyone who rejects or troubles the Principle of 
Non-Contradiction.  
Toulmin points this out as well, asking whether an interlocutor can “still raise 
genuine questions about the validity of the argument,” if they’ve had all the necessary 
information presented and all the implications of logic explained (131) Therefore, if 
someone with whom we are arguing has been defeated in our estimation, but they refuse 
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to accept such defeat “what then are we to say about him? Now we must say, rather, that 
he is blind to, i.e. fails to see the force of, the argument. Indeed what else can we say? 
This is not an explanation: it is a bare statement of the fact. He just does not follow the 
steps, and the ability to follow such arguments is, surely, one of the basic rational 
competencies” (134). Unlike the pankration match, there’s little force behind the rules of 
argument, little pain in persuasion, and unless someone follows our rules, then they 
cannot and will not be playing our game, and so we are then back again to the beginning: 
coercing against coercion or be excluded as coercive.lxxii There’s no answer, no victory 
here, but simply the charge to fight more and fight better, and one of the foundations of 
fighting are a basic competency with material and a basic respect for the rules that 
establish, define, and produce the fight, even if we teach students that sometimes rules 
are meant to be broken.   
 
V. Conclusion and Transition 
While addressing surface issues, “lower order concerns” might be easier for 
students to begin their training, as a discipline we have focused on grappling with ideas 
and structure, “higher order concerns.” Attending to the local surface features of a text is 
seen as current-traditional pedagogy, which leads some instructors to tell their students to 
fight against correction, to ignore errors and focus on the “real things” like content or 
coherence, and the rest will fall into place. That is, good global writing is assumed to 
inexorably trickle down to good local writing.  
Furthermore, that such lower order concerns are seen as “lower,” and therefore 
less important, illustrates that writing itself is not the most important part of writing 
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instruction, except as a vehicle for the transmission of concepts, which seems to 
encourage rather than challenge the identification of good writing with “correct writing.” 
However, in this view “errors” are dialectical deviance, their difference marking either 
race/ethnicity as barbarisms or class/rurality as solecisms. This orientation to difference is 
what makes them seem like errors in the first place, and ignoring them as unimportant is 
as violent as uncritically seeing them as simply “wrong.”  
But regardless of the problematic privilege of correctness and its history, “real 
world” audiences, like upper-division educators and future employers, will expect and 
demand correctness, punish its deviance, and see writing that insufficiently adheres to 
their expected norms as not even writing at all. We can’t simply ignore the words as 
they’re written or the need for students to present strong words that hit at precisely where 
the students need them to. Concise and precise claims are part of what writing is and 
does. If we consider the work of words within the paradigm of force I’ve outlined here, 
then we can start to train it better.  
In order to begin training, we must start with the basics. The basics of prose, 
diction and syntax, and in following the pankration method I have outlined here, we must 
turn to the manner of training basics in martial arts. This turn is also a return to the 
abandoned method of current-traditional rhetoric: repetitive practice, or as might be more 
than mere cliché now, “drill and kill.” Finally, we must consider the material and 
technological implications, affordances, and limitations of the actual tools and tropes in 
which we train students, which requires us to reconsider the relationship between speech 
and writing in the work of training students in the use of language.
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lvi Aristotle says “For a proposition is a single statement about a single thing” (6), and so 
for him refutation has to be categorical and universal, and the “example syllogism” used 
to demonstrate the logic of necessity is well known. “Socrates is a man, all men are 
mortal, and so Socrates is mortal.” This example offers a singular premise and a universal 
premise, one that is true in a particular case, although Socrates might be swine in another 
case, and the second that is always and necessarily true. Death is about the only example 
we might find for this, as Toulmin shows that the “all” in the universal premise is far 
more complex than it is usually taken to be by professional philosophers and lay-persons 
alike. While for such a universal premise, “the force of the [‘all’] statements is invariant 
for all fields of argument,” but the “grounds or backing supporting a warrant of this form 
will depend on the field of argument” (112). So, unless we’re arguing about Death or 
mathematics, the “All” will seldom if ever mean “forever, in every place, in every case, 
for everyone all the time.”  Therefore, Aristotle’s bar for categorical and universal 
refutation is not possible, or rather only limited to cases of Life and Death; those means 
by which we stave off the inevitable conclusion and inevitable conclusion itself. Justice 
and fairness are not universal, necessary, or categorical; what the “good life” is has 
remained a philosophical question since before the term was even coined, and the “right 
decision” is so contextually determined that it’s nearly impossible, or indeed impossible, 
to consider what it would be outside the specific situation. Even then, a decision in situ 
presumes that any decider has all necessary data, the best motives, and a good idea of 
consequences.   
 
lvii In Man Play Games, Caillois outlines the structure of games, of which the contest, 
agōn, is merely one of four, and the type of game that a fight, or refutation, 
predominantly is. He explains that while rules constitutes the bounds of any given game, 
any contest, there are different ways these rules might be broken, with different effects on 
the game and from different affective positions that form the players themselves. 1. 
Cheating: know the rules, acknowledge them and their use, but look for exploits, gaps, or 
loopholes to succeed in spite of them, or blatantly foul without being caught. Cheaters 
can be caught, punished, and excluded from play, making them not really that harmful to 
the overall assemblage. 2. Spoilsporting: knows the rules, but argues they are unfair, 
unwarranted, stupid, and therefore this whole contest is suspect. Taking the ball and 
going home, ruining the game for everyone. However, we might add a third, a 
both/neither here that illustrates the importance of and complication regarding the rules. 
3. Working the Rules: presents the rules as binding, when in fact they are not. Presenting 
the contest as open and honest, when it is not. Making the show of a contest, an agonistic 
encounter, while cooperating to mutually protect the players, the image of the game as 
legitimate, the sanctity of the game in its reality, and preventing the investment, 
emotional and monetary, from leaving the audience.  
 
lviii Indeed, the agonistic logic works throughout many of the practices we call a “test.” 
The Socratic elenchus functions as an agōn in this way: an interlocutor posits a view, and 
it is attacked with questions until it either remains or is reduced to dust. Furthermore, the 
scientific practice of reducing variables to test a specific one follows this same pattern: to 
test a physiological quality of any material, the strength of particular materials used to 
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make rope, each is subjected to the same test, a tension test for example. In each case, the 
only variable that changes between tests is the “contestant” itself, the ropes of different 
materials, the independent variable. In other, more complicated instances, as I will 
discuss with the fight as agōn, the rules are more complicated because the independent 
variable to be tested, e.g. fighting skill, is more complicated, even though it functions 
with the same logic of the agonistic assemblage. 
 
lix This is what makes the agōn the kind of structure, the kind of “game” that it is, in 
contrast to other games. For more on this, see Homo Ludens by Johan Huizinga and Man 
Play Games by Roger Caillois. 
 
lx In Agonistics, Mouffe explains that “Adversaries fight against each other because they 
want their interpretation of the principles to become hegemonic, but they do not put into 
question the legitimacy of the opponent’s right to fight for the victory of their position” 
(7).  In Toward a Civil Discourse, Crowley explains that adversaries are “people who 
maintain agendas that compel them as forcefully as our own compels us” (21). 
Furthermore, she notes that “acceptance of one’s opponents as legitimate adversaries 
requires a change in subjectivity, a chance in orientation toward antagonistic discourses, 
and an attitudinal change toward those who whom one disagrees” (22). While agonism is 
a foundational logic we might find throughout the Western intellectual tradition and 
within institutions in contemporary society, this agonistic orientation toward the other 
seems to have fallen out, into either irenic rejection of conflict altogether or a violence 
enmity that sees all contestation in the same terms as war.  
lxi See Ellsworth “Agônios, Agônarchos, Agônistêrion” for more on the logistics of the 
institutions of Pan-Hellenic competition.  
 
lxii A pankratist would have to get behind their opponent, and slip their arm up under their 
opponent’s chin, wrapping their neck between the forearm and the bicep, while cradling 
the back of the head with their other hand, locking the hand of the arm around the neck in 
the bent of the other elbow. From here, the opponent’s head is securely locked, and the 
pressure from the arm cuts off airflow, blood flow, and attacks pressure points on the 
sides of the neck. Next, as per the “ladder” name, the pankratist would either leap on the 
back of their opponent or fall backward with their opponent on top of them, either 
simultaneously or directly following either transition, they would wrap their legs around 
their opponent’s torso and squeeze, intensifying the stranglehold, and pressing their heels, 
“the hooks”, to the inner hip joint, thus immobilizing their opponent as well. 
 
lxiii One important exception to this was Arrichion, who invented and applied an ankle-
lock counter while being trapped within the hold and falling backward.  Even though he 
died in the process, he was awarded victory because his opponent submitted. We will 
meet him shortly.  
 
lxiv Theagenes of Thasos (The Invincible) was one of the most famous of ancient fighters, 
having won 1400 matches in boxing and pankration, more than anyone in history, 
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including Olympic crowns in 480 BCE and 476 BCE (respectively), even a double 
victory in both, nine Nemean boxing titles, and even a victory in the dolichos, a running 
even of about 3 miles. After his death, his statue even killed a sore loser who was never 
able to defeat Theagenes. The murderous statue was thrown into the sea, but salvaged 
following a famine in Thasos and an oracle that all exiles should return. 
 
lxv Aside from personal, moral, or legal justifications and an ancient and pervasive 
commonplace that “murder is wrong,” the act of murder is also rhetorically expensive. 
That is, those that use violence to win arguments can be said to hurt their own cause, 
taking things too far, and unless very specific conditions are met, murder will lead to 
imprisonment, demonization, and death; from there, whatever cause, righteous or 
otherwise, for and from which we make the terrible choice to take a life will suffer 
because the dead become atechnic proofs, martyrs who were sacrificed for the Cause, and 
resources for other, opposing rhetors. That is, murder is not only costly for the rhetor, but 
beneficial for the opponent as it builds ethos to be martyred. But, in the face of people 
bent on destruction, more normative and civil tactics might not be effective, leaving 
violence as the only available means of persuasion. We kill for a whole range of reasons, 
and it is looking at these reasons, as much as the conditions of the act itself, that 
determine how expensive it would be. 
 
lxvi See Jarratt, “Feminism and Composition” 
 
lxvii While I freely acknowledge the historical (and perhaps biological) connections 
between masculinity and violence, there’s no reason why women could not have 
competed in the heavy events, that they can’t fight too, and some of the origins of 
pankration even cite Atalanta or Athena herself as the creator of the art, which 
complicates the easy division between men and women as violent and non-violent. 
 
lxviii An uncritical adherence to “equality” is problematic for arguing in a plural society. 
That is, because “equality” from isegoria and isonomia from the Greek Solon and 
Cliesthenes to the “liberte, equalite, franternite” of the French Revolution, had been an 
equalizing of already-similar groups—these white land-owning men are the same as these 
other white men who own less land—the notion of equality itself is a Euro-patriarchal 
concept, and so it cannot but always fall back on itself when used outside of the 
originally similar group outlined for it; equality is based on sameness and so it has 
trouble with difference. That is, in the 20th century, with the expansion of equality to 
include other, more different bodies, does the notion of equality break down and shift, 
leaving it open to anti-feminist and racist counterclaims that rejecting a misogynist on the 
count of his misogyny is bigoted, or the absurd claim of “reverse-racism” which ignores 
the historical and systematic weight that grants certain groups privilege over others.  
 
lxix This martial arts economy, just like any economy, requires those exchanging to have 
the same medium of currency; in the case of bodily arts, this currency was not some gold 
coin or agreed metric of exchange, but the constant medium of the human body. For the 
purposes of martial arts training, the human body is a constant across cultures and 
history, albeit with several important exceptions, such as ability, sex, and stature. 
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Because the martial arts come from the training for war by the warrior classes of various 
cultures, the normalized body presumed by martial arts training is that on an elite healthy 
male, like Achilles who embodies the Greek ideal of arête. However, here too the martial 
arts complicate a simplistic account, and indeed the historical lineage of the warrior-caste 
culture runs explicitly against the ethos and ideology of martial arts practice. 
 
In pankration, for example, we must fight a taller and leaner opponent differently than a 
shorter and stouter one, just as we might approach different audiences or interlocutors 
differently. This is not because of any bigoted hatred of the short people, or an 
unwarranted privileging of the tall, but rather an awareness of how bodily difference 
manifests in engaging with the body as a mechanism of force. We don’t think taller 
people are smarter than shorter ones, but we do know that they have a higher center of 
gravity and a longer reach. We therefore might stay distant from the tall person, letting 
them swing their long limbs at us, until we find the Kairos to shoot inside his striking 
range and grapple him low. Conversely, a shorter opponent has a lower center of gravity 
and a shorter reach, so we would be wise to keep our distance and strike at him, using our 
own advantages, and taking special care if we do grapple, but try to take advantage of our 
own longer limbs in the types of throws and holds that we use.  
 
However, this notion of exploiting a weakness and using our own relative strengths is a 
logic of engagement born out of a homogenous group of male competitors who differ in 
size and strength, and indeed the Heavy Events were so-called because the bigger, 
heavier competitors were usually the most successful, which is the case in war as well. 
The bigger, better-armed, and better-trained army is usually the more successful, but in 
certain cases, training itself (or better arms or sheer numbers) can overcome other 
advantages. That is, the art of fighting not only makes the strong stronger, but can also 
allow the weaker to become stronger, and to overcome the weaker. In the case of a 
pankration contest, this would be the smaller fighter defeating the bigger, the shorter over 
taller or taller over shorter depending, the newer over experienced, or perhaps even the 
rule-bound and honorable over the ruthless pragmatist who wins at all costs. 
 
For example, one of the most famous wrestlers, Milo of Kroton was said to be gigantic 
with divine strength, and thus indomitable in his sport, making the heaviest of the heavy 
the most successful of the events. However, the intertwined mythological origins of these 
arts provide a different story. One origin of wrestling has Theseus invent it to fight the 
bigger and stronger Minotaur, and Herakles’ fights with the Nemean Lion, the giant 
Anteus, and the god of the underworld Hades, all bigger and stronger opponents, are cited 
as possible origins for wrestling as well. In each of these cases, the hero resorts not to 
strength, but to skill. He is not the naturally superior combatant, the stronger, but ends up 
victorious by resorting to artfulness, technique, and subtlety. That is, martial arts allow 
the weaker to overcome the stronger, making the need for the strong, powerful, able body 
not a necessary condition for martial arts practice or even mastery. 
 
Indeed, in a list compiled by Eric Kondo, martial artists with a wide variety of bodily 
differences and physical challenges have found success and prominence in a wide variety 
of disciplines (http://martialartistwithdisabilities.blogspot.com). The USA Taekwondo 
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Federation also notes that “adapted kumite is remarkably similar to its able-bodied 
counterpart…as adaptive athletes are not allowed to earn points for strikes to the head 
area,” showing that adaptations are only made when necessary and when done so as 
minimally as possible (http://www.disabledsportsusa.org/sport/martial-arts). However, 
considering the use of martial arts for self-defense and the unfortunate reality of people 
with disabilities being more likely to be targets of violence, adapting martial arts for 
people with disabilities is not simply one accommodation among others.lxix While the 
interesting ways in which martial arts training is adapted and practiced by people with 
disabilities provides valuable insight into adaptive education itself, it is beyond the scope 
of this inquiry. However, it does provide a useful example of the problematic, but 
necessary limitations we must make in theorizing and practicing pedagogy.   
 
Even though we should be, in principle, attentive to each individual student and their 
individual needs in each individual case, we cannot be in any practical sense. This radical 
attentiveness to the particularities runs counter to the foundational logic of general and 
specific, the establishment of education as a series of levels, course outcomes, assignment 
design, curriculum, teacher training, etc. All of which ignores the time and effort that 
each particular educator, individuals themselves, already invests, which makes the ideal 
attentiveness to particularities wildly unworkable, and just as ideal as the ideal body that 
is complicated and rendered impossible by the differences among individuals in the first 
place. However much it may be a theoretical, ethical, and economic problem, there has 
been a necessary normalization, as we see in the requirements for “basic competency” 
with English for students entering first-year composition, but also the pedagogy itself 
changes and adapts when it encounters differences it had not encountered previously. But 
when considering the body as a mechanism for the enactment of and engagement with 
force, considering it as a combat apparatus, there are consistent (but not totalizing) limits 
that produce a materially normalized body and a materially consistent set of techniques. 
That is, the body only moves and bends in certain ways, and so there are a limited, but 
not slight, number of movements of which humans are capable. 
 
For example, the moves depicted on the walls of the Egyptian tomb of Baquet III, dated 
21st century BCE, show up a millennia later in Olympic frescoes and urns, but might still 
be seen today in an Olympic judo match or professional wrestling ring. This shows that 
despite the many cultural differences surrounding and characterizing the striking and 
grappling arts of China, Okinawa, Japan, as well as Egypt and Japan might be understood 
as the same art: the art of striking and the art of grappling, not as some ur-form that is 
later disseminated into various cultures, although this might certainly be the case, but 
rather that these two manners of engagement with another body, either separate or 
synthesized, are consistent across humanity. Because the human body is consistent, 
different cultures would develop similar techniques in response to similar situations. This 
consistency is what allows for very different bodies in different cultures and histories to 
be sufficiently similar as to allow for the ‘same’ move to be taught over and over, and 
this is also what allows the kind of exchange that gave rise to karate, and later allowed 
karate to function as an element in the reconstruction of pankration, an art with which it 
has a distant and tenuous causal relationship, at best. Even though all the arts might be 
able to work through a body in similar ways, which does not mean that all the arts are 
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necessarily similar. Rather, these developments are not the same nor necessarily 
consistent across all traditions, leaving gaps or weaknesses in styles that other styles 
might exploit.  
 
lxx Toulmin explains that “Some warrants must be accepted provisionally without further 
challenge, if argument is to be open to us in the field in question: we should not even 
know what sort of data were of the slightest relevance to a conclusion, if we had not at 
least a provisional idea of the warrants acceptable in the situation confronting us. The 
existence of considerations such as would establish the acceptability of the most reliable 
warrants is something we are entitled to take for granted” (106). 
 
lxxi As Paulson et.al. show, “reading” is not a smooth physiological motion, but a stop-
and-go series of fixations on 3-6 letter spaces at a time and saccades from one fixation to 
the next, coupled with context and prediction that “allows readers to visually skip words 
but still feel as though they have seen and read every word” (311). Even as your eyes 
move over these marks, Dear Reader, and you’re pulling some idea out of or thinking 
into them, judging their progression against your experience and expectation and 
abstracting some larger “structure;” you’re seeing them as a surface, even if you’re only 
reading about 66% of it (313). Because of the physiological nature of reading, Paulson 
et.al. suggest that we have students address surface issues “before asking students to 
move on to more holistic critiques” because “students do indeed find an initial holistic 
approach difficult at best” (328). 
 
lxxii As an art of attack and defense, rhetoric has a “conjunctive equivalence and 
disjunctive antithesis” with the violence of war, as Megan Foley explains in her treatment 
of peitho and bia (173). In conjunctive equivalence, both peitho and bia offer the same 
result in conquest, as “violence erupts at the point where persuasion fails; strength 
conquers what seduction concedes…violence becomes rhetoric’s double” (173). This 
disjunctive antithesis makes “peitho and bia appear diametrically opposed. Peitho seems 
to be predicated on the exclusion of bia” (174). Foley argues that Aristotle’s definition of 
rhetoric as a dunamis (potentiality) means that rhetoric only concerns endekhomenon 
(that which can be otherwise), while bia or force carries the weight of necessity, that 
which cannot be otherwise (179). This definition of rhetoric as potential “necessarily 
entails impotentiality,” and any actualization of the potentiality of rhetoric would require 
force to overcome its concomitant impotentiality (180). That is to say, rhetoric’s 
enactment requires force, making bia “an immanent privation, a lack at the heart of 
peitho,” a lack because persuasion cannot match the necessity of physical force (180). 
Foley argues that “simultaneously enabling rhetoric’s force and delimiting its domain, bia 
operates as the interior limit or constitutive exclusion of rhetoric” (180). As “good” 
conflict, rhetoric lives between “bad” conflict, Foley concludes, “the virtue of rhetoric is 
that—unlike violence—it will always…[be] lacking the full force of necessity and thus 
opening the possibility of change. The forces of bia and peitho do not differ in kind, but 
only in degree—and rhetoric’s relative weakness is its ultimate strength” (180-181).  
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Chapter 3  
Kihon of Rhetoric: Kobudo Weaponry, Precision of Expression, and Facility 
with Grammar
Some who have read this far are undoubtedly ready to call up the underground 
grammarians to do one more battle against those who would rip out the Mother Tongue 
and tear down Civilized Western Values. But need I really assert that, just because many 
rules of grammar lack practical force, it is hardly the case that none of them have 
substance?  
Joseph Williams, “The Phenomenology of Error” 164 
 
Karate and kobudo are mutually supportive practices; the knowledge of both skills can 
improve the student’s techniques immensely. Without a thorough knowledge of karate 
basics, the tonfa student is severely limited in his development. By the same token, 
improvement in the use of the tonfa extends the attacks and strengthens the blocks of the 
karate student. Continued practice with the tonfa can help improve balance, coordination 
and physical strength.  
Master Fumio Demura, Tonfa: Karate Weapon of Self-Defense 7 
 
I. Explication  
For many outside the discipline of composition studies, and especially outside 
academia, a major element of writing instruction is “correct grammar.” Writing 
“correctly” is therefore a powerful expectation of those for whom our students will be 
writing and a potent anxiety for our students in first-year composition, an introduction to 
future college writing that prepares students to write after college as well. However, 
within composition studies, we have a more nuanced perspective on “correct grammar.” 
We are less certain what it means, as well as how and how heavily it features in writing 
instruction. As writing instructors, we occupy a tension between those within 
composition pedagogy invested in students’ language and social justice, and the 
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expectations outside composition for students to write correctly for future professors, 
employers, and clients. That is, even if we reject the oppressive attitudes that make 
“correct writing” a neutral and objective standard, seeing it as an idealization of the 
dialectic of particular people in particular places, we cannot reject the pervasiveness of 
these attitudes, ones that will prevent our students from non-hegemonic linguistic 
backgrounds from being treated seriously outside the purview of our course. That is, the 
question of syntax and diction, correct grammar and clear prose, is the fundamental 
question and the foundational challenge of writing pedagogy.  
But even though we may reject the notion of correctness as obvious, natural, and 
neutral, there are still limits in writing as a linguistic system. That is, not only does some 
written language not work for/on some audiences, but some language choices don’t work 
at all. Furthermore, these choices are themselves caught up in the complicated 
relationship between written and spoken language. Unlike spoken language, which bears 
far fewer burdens to communication and benefits from the fluidity of its (im)materiality, 
training students in written language and how to match that language to the audience, 
purpose, and context, requires training students in the use of a tool, an object, a thing very 
much like “language” they acquired by nature of their humanity, but one very different as 
well. To develop this model, I turn to a non-Western model in the art of kobudo and the 
tool-become-weapon tonfa as a way to conceive of the unique, but not relative, forms 
individual writing takes, what I term the idiographolect. These differences and the central 
challenge of effective writing requires a training approach, not so that students might 
become like the elites whose language exemplifies and creates correctness, but so that 
they might gain facility with the inter-subjective technology of writing. 
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II. The Foundational Problem of Composition 
From the onset, students need to know how to write in order to teach them how to 
write; all composition pedagogy has the prerequisite of “basic competency.” Whether 
students come from non-English or non-hegemonic English backgrounds—or they have 
learning or language challenges—, without this presumed and somewhat occult “basic 
competency,” whether indicated by a placement test, specific accommodations, or other 
metrics, students are not yet ready for the work of composition. They therefore must be 
“remediated” with given extra training in preparation of the work of composition. 
Ironically, composition itself began as such a remedial course when it first began, and as 
such the question of remediation of “basic writers” or “English Language Learners” is 
fundamental to all composition. However, it is also an area of study and pedagogical 
challenge that requires more time and space than I have here. So just like all composition 
courses, I must begin with the assumption of “basic competency.”lxxiii 
With having “basic competency,” students are then expected to develop their 
skills beyond basic competency into something like fluency, adequacy, or even skill. One 
central concern is the ways they use the structures of language to connect words together, 
make the proper and expected changes, and develop something called “correct grammar.” 
The dominant lay attitude considers “correctness” as an objective and neutral quality of 
superior writing. Correctness is a single “straight” path that language can travel and 
straying from that path is not simply deviation or difference, but deficiency and 
degradation (Etymonline). For this “single standard model,” grammatical choices are 
right or wrong, considered as proper or improper etiquette (Students’ Right 3). While 
following this path is expected and rewarded, deviance illustrates a technical deficiency, 
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if not an inherent inability or unwillingness of the students themselves to do things 
“correctly.” Personified in the “Grammar Nazi,” a common caricature both inside and 
outside academia, this attitude sees “poor grammar” as evidence of a poor student, a bad 
writer, and even an immoral person (Lindblom and Dunn). In this perspective, our job as 
writing instructors is to correct student’s work in the same way as our mathematics 
colleagues, making sure their prose all adds up in a strict universal monologic process. 
The “standard” discourse becomes a dogmatic code, language use a moral concern, and 
composition instructors become etiquette police. 
However, within the field of composition, we understand that any particular 
“standard” is not neutral or natural, but the product of historical precedent and cultural 
conflict. We understand that “correct” language reflects the language of those who 
traditionally have had the most access to the best education (elite white males)—those 
who have had the power to decide what is “correct”—and error is a mere “wandering” or 
simply dialectal difference (Etymonline). For students from lower socioeconomic class or 
rural areas, students of color, and those who identify as women, this means learning to 
write the “standard” way, i.e. like elite white males. That is, “correctness” is simply the 
dialect of a particular group articulated as universal that treats difference as deviance. 
Uncritical acceptance and privileging of this “standard” language is the maintenance and 
proliferation of white supremacy, urban elitism, and patriarchy through a seemingly 
objective “correctness.” This became quite visible following the advancements of Civil 
Rights and Open Admissions, increasing education access for students from a whole host 
of non-privileged backgrounds. When they entered the gates of the university that had 
been barred to them, the system that was built on their exclusion found them wanting, 
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“basic writers,” as Mina Shaughnessy notes in Errors and Expectations. Because the 
“standard” was articulated as neutral and objective, the conclusion outside the field was 
that the students themselves were the problem. 
In response, NCTE drafted Students’ Right to their Own Language, illustrating 
the contingency of the “single standard model” and challenging it by instead seeing 
“good writing” as contextually bound and conventionally delimited (3). “Standard” is not 
neutral and natural, and “correctness” need not be dogmatic, but rather it is a specific set 
of linguistic choices privileged in the historical-cultural context in which students and 
teachers find themselves. In proclaiming students’ language as something they have 
“rights” to, language shifts from something that is purely technical and objective, a 
process subject to metrics of correctness, to a personal and cultural expression deserving 
of respect on its own terms, a form and extension of identity. This edict sees the language 
students already have not as a lack to be remedied or deficiency to be replaced, but as a 
reflection of them as individuals and an expression of the singular intersection of the 
various communities of which they are a part. As writing instructors in this view, our job 
is to teach students to use what they already know better, and affirm their difference, 
rather than penalize it. That is, engagement with the standard should be a negotiation, and 
correctness another rhetorical constraint to account for in each given rhetorical situation 
(Lu 482).  
Rather than “correct,” we help students find the “proper” language for the specific 
rhetorical situations in which they find themselves. However, in maintaining this 
rhetorical focus as instructors, we must remember that the audiences for whom our 
students will write after and outside our class will not see dialectal difference, but 
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“incorrect grammar,” finding both our students’ writing and our writing instruction 
insufficient and ineffective. In valuing students’ rights to their own language, we are 
failing as writing instructors in the view of those outside the field, for whom writing 
instruction is “correcting grammar.” For the clear majority of people for whom our 
students will be writing, correctness is simply the way it is, and deviation from 
correctness serves as evidence of failing education, the inherent inferiority of “those 
people,” or even the downfall of Western civilization itself. If we are really taking 
seriously our goals of teaching students rhetorical self-defense, for not just our students 
but ourselves as well, then the dominance of “correctness” makes grammar instruction 
more important pragmatically than highlighting institutional bias (but nor are they 
mutually exclusive). While the presumed neutrality of the standard obscures the 
inequalities at work in Standard English, this standard is not simply discriminatory, but 
the result of pragmatic limits on variation.  
The “standard” is the contingent product of historical and cultural conflict, 
embodies urban elitism, white supremacy, and patriarchy, but there is also a necessary 
commensurability with the expectations of particular audiences in a specific situation. 
Without meeting these expectations, writers will not be taken seriously, be effective with 
rhetorical goals, or even understood to be writing at all. That is, unless a teacher can 
understand a student’s writing, then that writing can’t do anything, whatever its goal. If a 
lawyer cannot communicate with the judge and jury in a way they understand and accept, 
the lawyer will not be taken seriously and a murderer could walk free. If a student’s job 
application is riddled with what the hiring person sees as a lack of sufficient education, 
that student might very well starve to death in the street. We do our students, especially 
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those outside the privileged groups, a severe disservice if we do not prepare them to meet 
and inhabit this reality of discourse in the world by being more accommodating to 
language difference than those outside our class will be.  
In promoting standard language, we’re giving students access to power, privilege, 
and legitimacy, but we’re also reinforcing the sedimented inequalities that have 
marginalized the communities of many of our students in the first place. Conversely, in 
challenging standard language, we are valuing each student as a singular intersection, but 
ignoring the pragmatic realities of language beyond our class, which poorly prepares 
students to deal with these harsh standards of judgement. We cannot ignore the 
sedimented inequalities that hide structural bias in writing in the guise of objective, 
technical neutrality, but I doubt any of us would glorify these inequalities either, which 
puts composition instructors in a double bind. We must, but cannot, teach “correct 
grammar,” and we should respect students’ right to their own language, but this could 
mean not doing our job in the view of students, or those outside our class, including 
administrators. Luckily, most students and administrators neither know nor care about 
this problematic, but rather simply value correctness as a given. This renders our 
handwringing about students’ language into a merely academic point that has little 
bearing on writing outside our courses, as long as our students have “correct grammar.” 
We cannot escape this double bind per se, but we can occupy it differently by challenging 
the metaphysics of the singular, moral, correct path of “correctness” and changing the 
myth of neutral, inclusive elite education that directs writing instruction.  
I challenge correctness on four grounds, which are metaphysical assumptions at 
work in writing instruction, ones that have been around since the Greeks at least, and 
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ones that become problematic when we consider the developments in rhetorical and 
composition theory in the 20th century. That is, even though teachers seek to combat the 
oppressive and exclusionary history that gave us “current-traditional rhetoric” and the 
foundation for all writing pedagogy that came after, because we still operate within and 
under this linguistic metaphysics, we cannot escape them nor the requirements they 
require of our students.  
To provide an alternative metaphysics, I turn to a non-Western model in the art of 
kobudo invented by common farmers using farm tools, like the tonfa or “mill-handle” to 
defend themselves from elite samurai, armed with better weapons and training. By 
thinking about the language students bring to and practice in the class as a tonfa, a 
wooden tool adapted by each user, we can see this unique, yet intersubjective technology 
of writing in material terms that reject the elitism and ethnocentrism in the Western 
tradition of language education. By challenging this metaphysics of correctness and 
changing how we conceptualize and practice writing, even with people who do abide by 
these metaphysics, we might better provide students the opportunities to develop facility 
and skill.  
 
III. Four Errors of Correctness: Objectivity, “Written Speech,” Representation, Identity  
First, the borders between error and correctness are much less rigid and rigorous 
than people think, making the moral dogmatism of correctness more prejudicial than 
practical. For example, Joseph Williams shows that while readers always notice the 
violation of some grammatical rules, like “incorrect verb forms, many incorrect pronoun 
forms, pleonastic subjects, double comparatives and superlatives, [and] most subject-verb 
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disagreements,” other rules like restriction (which/that), beginning sentences with “and,” 
“but,” or “because,” and switching “less” and “fewer” are ignored as often as observed 
(“Phenomenology” 161). Williams even inserts a hundred errors into his essay, showing 
that error is phenomenological in the reading-of-a-text, rather than objectively in the 
writing itself. In doing so, he illustrates error is easily forgiven or ignored unless it is 
blatant (or we are looking for it), which is the orientation we often take with student 
writing. Correcting grammar is about feeling superior and educated, Williams argues, 
rather than fidelity to any universal or neutral logic, which is what allows an established 
scholar like Williams the freedom to be incorrect in a published essay. In sum, certain 
errors do not really inhibit communication, hypercorrectness is often more damaging than 
productive, and correctness is a variable rhetorical constraint to which some writers are 
more tightly held than others. This nuanced perspective will allow students to be more 
aware of writing as built through rhetorical choices, rather than either right or wrong, and 
perhaps less vulnerable to the anxiety that comes with such strict binaries. 
Second, even though error is phenomenological, errors in writing seem more 
material than errors in speech. In the late 19th century, Harvard adopted a standardized 
written entrance exam in place of an oral declamation, which was an important material 
change in conceptions of error. This shift “placed a new premium on correctness as error 
was reified in writing in a manner much more conspicuous than error in oral 
performance,” as Tracy Santa explains in Dead Letters (17). These exams were riddled 
with “slovenly grammar,” marking students as insufficiently prepared for the Harvard 
experience (Douglas 93). Differences glossed over in speech, like sound changes in an 
accent—e.g. “warter”—become obstacles to understanding in writing: “error betrays 
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written language’s implicit pact to be transparent in representation” (Santa 129). In 
response, Harvard instituted “English A” as a composition class focusing on grammatical 
correctness and prose clarity, forming the contemporary field of composition as a distinct 
practice out of “a heretofore ancillary byproduct of classical, spoken rhetoric” (Santa 18).  
In effect, this produced a new practice that was not merely “written speech,” troubling the 
traditional conflation of speech and writing as two instances subject to the same kind of 
judgement. Because error is phenomenological (not objective), but more “material” in 
writing than speech (not subjective), effective writing is intersubjective: neither simply 
individual nor collective, but a material technology shared between specific interlocutors, 
authors and readers, rhetors and audiences. 
Third, the intersubjective nature of writing means that it cannot simply be “clear” 
or not, simply transparent or obscure like glass, but “what is written should in general be 
easy to read” for a particular reader, as Aristotle argues, although he sees ease in speech 
and writing as “the same thing” (Rhetoric III.5.6). Facility requires writing to the specific 
audience, as what is easy for one audience might be far too difficult or condescendingly 
simplistic for another, which troubles the notion of objectively “clear” language. 
Therefore, if writing is easy or difficult to read for particular audiences, then we do not 
have to consider writing as a purely representative technology. If we consider writing 
instead as a technology of force, which allows my body to affect other bodies in specific 
and contextual ways, then it is not a matter of clarity and correctness, but precision and 
facility. Shifting away from a monologic notion of “good writing,” toward a more 
pluralistic notion of “effective writing” allows us to achieve the same kind of writing 
goals without relying on the traditional, discriminatory, and problematic metaphysics of 
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correctness. Rather than the un/clear neutral medium of transmission between 
interlocutors, writing is the means by which one interlocutor enacts force on another, 
specific to the case, context, and goal. We do not let people “see” our ideas through our 
words, but put our words onto others to make them think, act, and feel differently. How 
we use our words on others depends on who our audience is, but it is also a reflection of 
who we are as writers. 
Fourth, because the specific audience for Aristotle was sufficiently homogenous, 
error was not simply a mistake, but performed a particular and undesirable identity, an 
attitude inherited by Western language education ever since. We can see this in the 
ancient classifications errors in diction being called barbarism (literally “Non-Greek,” 
ethnic difference) and errors of syntax being called solecism (literally, “from Soloi,” a 
“backwater” Greek city) (Aristotle, Rhetoric III.5, Quintilian Institutes, I.5).  Inability to 
use to hellenizein or “Good Greek” like an urban Athenian meant one had an 
insufficiently good soul, a sign of inferiority and degradation (Rhetoric III.5: 231). 
However, barbarism and solecism also appear later in the work of Quintilian, who has a 
different view regarding error and his own standard, latinitas or “Proper Latin.” While 
these terms are epithets to some degree—in the same way as “redneck” or “illegal” might 
be—, Quintilian uses the names of these established types of grammatical error even as 
he works to challenge their derogatory connotations.  
Rather than inexorable difference-qua-deficiency, Quintilian suggests we “let the 
offensiveness of barbarisms and solecisms be put away…as these faults are sometimes 
excused, either from custom, or authority, or perhaps…because it is often difficult to 
distinguish faults from figures of speech,” a point echoed by Williams centuries later 
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(Quintilian I.5.5). Quintilian’s more inclusive attitude is certainly preferable to Aristotle’s 
elitist ethnocentrism, but it is also assimilationist (e.g. using non-Latin words is 
barbarous) and insufficient for Modern English, with its mixed lexicon of Germanic and 
Latinate words and drastically different grammatical structure from Latin.lxxiv Recalling 
Williams above, solecisms, errors in grammatical connection, are more noticeable than 
barbarism, “wrong words,” so we need to teach them differently. For our contemporary 
pluralistic American English composition classroom, barbarism and solecism are not 
errors to be avoided, but a way to grapple with the two-fold challenge of writing well and 
easily: precise diction in expression and the facility with syntax work together to create 
facility in reading. 
In sum, writing is an intersubjective technology with material effects, a reflection 
of the students who use it and the audiences for/on whom it is used. Our job as writing 
instructors is to help students write precisely to allow ease of reading, so that those 
outside our class might (indistinguishably) read their writing as clear, correct, Standard 
English. While students acquire their speech, a bodily force conditioned by culture and 
physiology, they learn writing, making the material class conditions of their education 
more influential than who they are body-and-soul. Language difference in writing is a 
reflection of the tools and materials that they have inherited and the capacities they 
acquired for use; writing is always a matter of weaponry, rather than body. Writing well, 
therefore, can mean either inheriting the best weapons and elite training methods, or 
using meager resources in innovative and effective ways to achieve commensurability 
with those who have the best resources at hand. Put differently, some students are born 
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into an elite class that provides them with swords and swordsmanship, while others are 
born into a common class with farm tools and economic concerns. 
 
IV. Class Materials, the Idiographolect, King Sho Shin’s Sword Ban 
For our contemporary students, the sword they need to wield “correctly” is the 
Formal Standard English Grapholect.lxxv However, the “standard” is not so singular, so 
regular, or so thin as the sword, and the majority of students don’t come from the sword-
class anyway, so treating their language difference as a lack (of swordsmanship) places 
us right back into the double-bind of error and correctness. Rather than training to use the 
sword, classical elite education, we would do better to meet students where they are and 
with what they have. If most students are born into the farm class, understood as anything 
below upper class, then what we should do is train them to use their native farm tools in a 
way that would allow them to match the sword. Even if they don’t come from a 
privileged class, students still deserve the material means to succeed and defend 
themselves with what they already have, especially against those who do come from 
privilege armed with better weapons.  
Because this conception of writing is idiomatic yet intersubjective, each student’s 
specific writing-weapon is their idiographolect (“singular writing tongue”). Because of 
the material practice of “graphing,” the idiographolect does not have the same linguistic 
freedom as a solipsistic idiolect, but it also is not simply a singular and standard 
grapholect either. Rather than the same opposition of “standard” and “error,” an 
idiographolect must be used in a particular way so that it resembles the “Formal Standard 
English Grapholect,” a rhetorical construct abstracted from many instances of “good 
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writing.” That is, even in challenging the status quo, we must be recognizable within it. 
That is, we need to help students achieve goals without necessarily relying on the 
discriminatory attitudes that have traditionally dominated writing education. If words are 
weapons, then looking to actual weapon training is useful for inventing pedagogy.  
Rather than Western civilization, from which we inherited the problems of 
correctness and error in the first place, I propose a non-Western source, one in which 
weaker overcame stronger with only their own tools and training, the situation in which 
many students will find themselves, especially those from outside privileged 
communities. The Okinawan martial art of kobudo provides us a story of farmers and 
fishermen using their tools as weapons to defend against and even defeat bandits armed 
with swords, the symbol (and evidence) of elitism in early modern Japan. Kobudo and the 
pedagogy I am inventing here have the same goal: precision and facility with an 
individual-yet-intersubjective tool to be able to match or defeat someone better armed 
with power and privilege. If farmers armed with sickles and mill-handles can defeat 
samurai armed with the greatest sword technology of all time, they might be able to teach 
us how to teach students to use their own farm tools in a way that can defeat those armed 
with the swords of power and privilege. 
In 1477, Sho Shin took the throne of the Kingdom of Ryukyu (Okinawa). To 
consolidate power, he enacted a sword ban and ordered all nobles to leave their 
respective districts and move to his capital city, Shuri. While this was simply one of 
many sword bans to come, it also generated two new traditions of fighting without 
swords.lxxvi While the dis-armed nobles “sought out, learned and developed te [hand], the 
art of unarmed combat,” the commoners developed “weapon systems based on the use of 
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tools and agricultural implements” like the bo (staff), nunchaku (flail), or tonfa (mill-
handle) among others (Philips 3).lxxvii Rather than simply tools or weapons, these material 
objects functioned as both together, a variability like that of writing: it can produce 
economically, but it can also harm and defend. The art called kobudo (“old warrior way”) 
has many tool-become-weapons, but one is unique, the tonfa, and it is a similarly 
individual and intersubjective tool like the idiographolect. While purported origin of the 
tonfa is a millstone handle, it is most famous today as the police baton, the PR-24 
(Yamashita 221).lxxviii  
With “a large hardwood body…and a small cylindrical grip secured at a right 
angle,” the tonfa functions as an extension of the fist and arm, unique among weapons, let 
alone those of kobudo (Demura 7).lxxix While other weapons certainly come in different 
sizes, the tonfa, like each idiographolect, functions as an extension of the students’ 
individual body (they are cut to fit the user), even though the handle is common across all 
tonfa, making training common across different students with different weapons (Demura 
12).lxxx Figure 3.1 provides one typical example, but the shaft can vary widely, from 
Figure 3.1: Tonfa Anatomy 
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square to round to paddle-shaped (Demura 6). This individualization and close 
correlation with the body, like that writing shares with speech, provides an example of 
the kind of bodily-material training we can use for composition.  
As Fumio Demura notes in my second epigraph, the practice with the tonfa and 
practice in empty hand karate techniques are mutually beneficial; one needs some basic 
karate background to begin to grasp the tonfa practice, and in turn the tonfa practice 
strengthens karate skills as well. These two practices, karate and kobudo, illustrate a 
perhaps more fitting way to conceive of the relationship between speech and writing. As I 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, without some basic competency with English, 
students are not prepared for the training in the tools of writing that we are to give them. 
Students need to understand the speech language in order to engage with the writing, but 
training in writing in turn might provide students better awareness of and care for 
language, which would improve their speech. Furthermore, the tonfa and the fist share the 
same material and affective relationship as the “voice” and the voice, such that we must 
understand the former in terms of the latter, even if we acknowledge their important 
differences.lxxxi  
Additionally, tonfa training provides us with two major insights into teaching 
facility and precision with the idiographolect students bring to our class. First, rather than 
a singular “techne” with contradictory goals and sensibilities, the “art” of the tonfa is 
two-fold and mutually enabling: tonfado and tonfajitsu. We might adopt this strategy as 
well to train students both in the manner of do, in safe and accessible ways, and in the 
manner of jitsu, attending to the practical necessities of that training. Second, like many 
martial arts, tonfa training begins with basic technique drills. Specifically, the tonfa 
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requires students to be able to manipulate the tonfa, either by switching grips from handle 
to shaft (or vice-versa), a technique called kote-gaeshi, which changes the shape of the 
tonfa and how it might be used. Also, students must learn how to swing the tonfa by the 
handle in a controlled way, a technique called furi, loosening and tightening the grip on 
the handle simultaneously with the movement of the arm, shoulder, and hips. Both 
controlled movement and structural manipulation are integral parts of writing well within 
the bounds of acceptable syntactic choices. Both the dual-emphasis in training and the 
practice of basic drills provide the foundation for a tonfa-model of composition in which 
students learn to wield their idiographolect as if it were their own voice, their weapon as 
if it were their own hand. 
While the tonfa and other tools “originally served only to propitiate the daily 
process of work and harvest,” their becoming weapons allowed Okinawan commoners to 
defend “their natural heritage—peaceful living” (Yamashita 23). From this perspective of 
the weaker, less-privileged commoner, kobudo weapons training “should never be an 
excuse for any kind of violence, but a powerful means of helping to alleviate that scourge 
of history” (Bishop 9 qtd. Philips 1). However, kobudo is actually a later development of 
the art that began as purely self-defense: kobujitsu. Originally, there was only kobujitsu, 
and training with the tool-become-weapons was a direct and practical necessity, but when 
the practical training in traditional martial arts was rendered obsolete, the practice gave 
rise to do. While do emphasizes the “spirit of the martial way,” training in traditional 
forms for exercise, self-awareness, or ethical development, jitsu is a more practically 
oriented art of self-defense “in actual life or death struggles” (Yamashita 24). In this, 
kobu is simply a particular example of this difference between do and jitsu across the 
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Japanese martial arts (grappling: judo/jujitsu, sword: kendo/kenjitsu and iaido/iaijitsu, 
etc.). Rhetoric too was once the practical art of argument in the Agora, the court, or the 
gentlemanly professions of law, medicine, and theology; rhetoric now is more 
multifarious, theoretically and pedagogically, with some ethically concerned as in 
composition and communication, with other disciplines like marketing, advertising, 
political campaigning, or journalism focusing on “practical persuasion.” However, 
kobudo and kobujitsu are not mutually exclusive practices, but mutually constitutive 
emphases in fighting with the same tool-become-weapon, two valences of the same 
practice.  
For the tonfa, it means using the tool-become-weapon differently based on the 
situation. Indeed, Tonfa by Fumio Demura and Advanced Tonfa by Tadashi Yamashita 
both include formal practice performed in the traditional gi and self-defense applications 
performed in street clothes.lxxxii The kobudo sections feature prearranged sparring 
sequences against bo (staff), other tonfa, a katana, or unarmed attackers, and the 
kobujitsu sections focus on knife defense, and Yamashita’s final section on 
“contemporary tonfajitsu” is a wide departure from the earlier kobudo sections. It features 
the twenty-two techniques of the PR-24 police baton, including grappling, submissions, 
and even techniques for stop-and-frisk. Kobudo/jitsu also differ in styles of motion and 
philosophies of engagement. Kobudo sequences emphasize blocking and redirection of an 
oncoming attack, with counter-attacks to the body and head following almost 
simultaneously in a flowing, rounded motion, while kobujitsu is more linear, preemptive, 
and attacks the more vulnerable targets of groin, throat, and joints. In sum, do is about 
training the student’s spirit, and jitsu is about protecting the student’s own body. 
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Put differently, kobudo is training in the dojo (school), while kobujitsu is training 
for the street; kobudo is a necessary foundation for effective kobujitsu, but kobudo alone 
does not prepare students for real self-defense situations. Likewise, we need to train 
students to write for both future academic contexts and for the “real world” as well. 
Kobudo trains students in far more than they need in a practical situation, but this excess, 
and the ease of use and self-awareness that comes with it, means practical application 
will be more reflexive afterward. However, a purely pragmatic focus does little to prevent 
students using their skills in aggressive ways; doing well doesn’t mean one will do good. 
That is, kobudo helps students gain facility with the tonfa and an ethical use of it to 
defend peace, while kobujitsu helps them be ruthlessly effective with it, breaking arms if 
need be. Considering the idiographolect as the specific writing-weapon each student 
brings to class, a tonfa fit to the user, we need both kobudo and kobujitsu.  
While any martial arts training, or training of any kind, might offer benefits like 
health, self-awareness, and ethical reflection, without effectiveness in the specific goals 
that training is supposed to afford, there is little point to it. That is, unless we can train 
students to be effective in writing outside our class, then all the work we do inside the 
class is moot. Having this dual do/jitsu perspective on the ways an individualized set of 
material forces can and does work allows us to inhabit the bind of error and correctness 
differently. Evaluating the efficacy of student writing in a particular situation, and 
therefore our instruction of them, is impossible: we don’t know who they’ll be writing 
for, when, where, or why. Training in writing must therefore provide an awareness of the 
material effects and limitations of writing: how it does work on others, and how it does 
not work. We need to teach our students how to enact force on (i.e. write for) others in 
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efficient and effective ways, but also develop their awareness of the histories and 
expectations that ground the ways in which their writing will be judged. If we’re training 
students to use their idiographolect, then we need both do and jitsu, both developing 
students’ self-awareness of their writing and their ability to use writing effectively.  
However, both do and jitsu require a solid awareness of what a particular tool-
become-weapon, weapon, or idiographolect can do. For example, a tonfa is made of 
wood, but only hardwood, oak or cherry, provides both the strength and flexibility needed 
for an effective tonfa. Likewise, we can’t just say that writing contains words, but the 
specific (kinds of) words matter. Words themselves have more or less strength, more or 
less flexibility. We need to familiarize the students with the material and affective 
differences among the words we have inherited from our history, using etymology to 
illustrate the effect of and need for precise expression. Words have different affordances; 
they are a product of the history of the language and the people that have used it. In short, 
there are no synonyms, and there never have been, but rather a multitude of different 
graphic parts of the tool-become-weapon of writing. 
 
V. Basic Moves: Tactical Barbarism, English’s Lexical Multiplicity 
Knowing how a tool-become-weapon can affect others is the first step in 
becoming reflective and critically self-aware in its use. Striking with a blunt stick only 
concusses an attacker, while a bladed weapon can penetrate armor and skin, making a 
blade more dangerous, requiring more attention in use and training. Traditionally, the 
expense of the sword meant it was only used (or usable) by those who had the wealth to 
afford it and the leisure to practice; the katana itself was considered the soul of the 
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samurai. However, a blade is more brittle, its cutting edge can be dulled, and its 
production is expensive and training is dangerous. The blunt stick is better for those 
without material resources, and it can certainly match a sword if used skillfully like the 
kobudoka does. Like sword and tonfa, English has both bladed and blunt weapons with 
different material affects understood through metaphoric of cost.  
That is, we have “expensive” and “cheap” words inherited from English’s history, 
specifically the defeat of the Germanic Anglo-Saxons by the French Normans at Hastings 
in 1066. In the subsequent Norman England, French was the language of the noble 
landowners, literature and poetry, as Latin remained the language of the scholars and the 
church, and “Anglish” was the language of the laborers and their bawdy popular culture. 
The effect of this Latinate dominance is reflected by the more Latinized Modern 
English—The Chancery Standard—adopted by William Caxton for his printing press 
centuries later (MacArthur). Hastings is a metonym for the affective mechanics in diction 
in the manifold English we teach students today. The class structure of nobles and 
peasants is reflected in the difference between “expensive” and “cheap” words, derived 
from their Latinate and Germanic origins, respectively, and this material economics still 
affect the way we engage with and teach students to use words. We can use this history of 
the language to help students gain the kind of attentiveness to the material mechanics of 
diction as the kobudoka has with their tool-become-weapons.  
As an exercise, I ask my students to imagine a party held in their honor in as full 
and vibrant detail as they can muster. Closing their eyes, I ask them first to see a “cordial 
reception,” and then do the same with a “hearty welcome.”lxxxiii The two phrases have a 
similar content, but communicate a class difference because “cordial reception” is 
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Latinate, while “hearty welcome” is Germanic. While these phrases even have very 
similar etymologies—cordis is “heart” in Latin and “-ial” is a adjectivizing suffix like “-
y”—the use of Latinate words are more expensive, more fancy, than Germanic ones, even 
if we do not recognize them as “borrowings.” The two phrases might be called 
synonymous, but they do not mean the same thing in the same way. Inevitably, my 
students describe the first party as “fancy,” with guests in dresses and tuxedos tastefully 
sipping cocktails and politely nibbling off cheese plates, while the second is usually more 
“folksy,” with beers and barbecue, laughingly eaten by guests clad in flannel and blue 
jeans. We can see this in many other instances: butchers cut, but surgeons make incisions; 
we eat pork, not pig, beef, not cow, and if you eat no flesh, then you’re a vegetarian. The 
barbarous words are those closest to the common people, tending and slaughtering the 
animals, while the proper words are those reserved for and indicative of higher class, 
eating food with proper manners and several forks. Barbarism is built into English, rather 
than imposed upon it. 
Like the blade, Latinate words require practice and awareness to use well and 
precisely, giving a sense of weight to gravity and a lightness to levity, for example. The 
distance from the “common” Germanic words makes them function more specifically; a 
blade only cuts because it enacts force on a smaller surface area than a stick. If the Latin 
words are bladed, then Germanic words are blunter. Because of their commonness, 
Germanic words seem to lack the precision (cutting) and specificity (kind) of their Latin 
cognates, but their wide accessibility (reach) and acceptability (takenness) means their 
skilled use would be more effective than a poorly wielded Latinate parlance for many 
audiences outside academia. One of the challenges for students learning academic 
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discourse is overuse of these “expensive” words at the expense of communicability and 
effective persuasion. While we all have access to a variety of different lexical choices, 
training students in their own idiographolect means helping them use the words they 
already know better, rather than filling their arsenal with lots of shiny, sharp words that 
are too expensive to use often and too dangerous to use effectively.  
Therefore, we must teach our students to recognize and reflect on their barbarism, 
their Germanic common words, and be more attentive to their use, even as we prepare 
them to acquire and hone Latinate words in future language education.lxxxiv From this, we 
might invent more etymological nomology exercises: what makes “anger,” “madness,” 
and “rage” different? How are “illegal aliens” different from “undocumented workers,” 
even if they are the same people? What’s the difference between “cardiomyopathy” and a 
“bad heart”? By helping students engage with their language use, production, and 
engagement in a more material way, not “putting thoughts on paper,” but wielding an 
arsenal, a complex field of forces that has been moving for millennia, we could help 
ameliorate these barbarisms in addition to further developing students’ facility with the 
language itself.  
While a tactical barbarism allows for deep awareness of diction as a choice of 
weapons with different material affordances, grappling with solecism requires attending 
to the brute facticity of English as an intersubjective material technology, with limitations 
on variation in the ways the language fits together. While the joint may be the unique 
strength of the tonfa, it is also a source of weakness in the weapon just like the joint 
between lexical elements in writing are both the strength and weakness of the 
idiographolect.lxxxv Diction is certainly limited by etymology, history, culture, and special 
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cases of jargon, using the “wrong word” is much easier to ignore or fix than improper 
subject-verb agreement. While students might have more freedom in choosing their 
weapons, the specific weapon of English grammar has material limits on how it can be 
used, like the jointed handle that is common to all the different instantiations of the tonfa.  
 
VI. Kote-Gaeshi: Moving Joints and Manipulating Material  
In tonfa training, students begin by identifying the different parts of and grips on 
the tonfa (Figure 3.1). Even though the tonfa has a handle, a front and back end, the 
entire weapon is a potential striking surface.lxxxvi That is, there are many different ways to 
grasp and strike with the tonfa, even though the material itself is fixed, and “flipping” 
from one grip to another, the kote-gaeshi, is an important practical technique rather than 
simply a stylistic flourish (Yamashita 226-231). That is, tonfa training begins with the 
various grips on the tonfa, practice transitioning from one grip to another, and developing 
the controlled motion of the weapon. In emulating this approach, we can help students 
develop a facility of prose by introducing them to and having them practice a series of 
basic grammatical arrangements, moving around the joints of English grammar. That is, 
we aim to develop students’ facility with language, the ability to let the words move 
easily and to manipulate the non-arbitrary grammatical connections of the language as 
case, context, and convention demand.  
While the parts of speech like the noun, verb, and modifiers are helpful in gaining 
a sense of the mechanics of English, these are merely the constitutive parts of any given 
clause, and identifying them is no more useful for our students than their being able to 
identify the handle, heads, and shaft of the tonfa. In writing, they are not really “parts” of 
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“speech” anyway. Although students should be able to recognize the things, actions, and 
modifications, words alone are not the base of language use, but rather they do work 
through their connection into clauses. Taking the foundational connection of verb and 
noun, independent and dependent clauses are more useful as a base than “complete 
sentences,” which are more formal than functional.  
Furthermore, because the simple sentence is simply a single independent clause, 
we have this basic formal requirement of “complete sentence” already considered, and 
clausal independence is itself a relational condition rather than an absolute one. 
Additionally, with the four kinds of clausal arrangements that constitute any given 
“complete sentence”—simple, compound, complex, and compound-complex—, we 
provide students a small set of rules for the arrangement of clauses together. We can have 
students flip between these basic grips on the sentence. Certainly, explicitly teaching the 
rules of conjunction is necessary in learning how to use them, but it is not sufficient. 
Instead, we must teach through repeated practice, like the famous copia exercises of 
Erasmus or “drill-and-kill” grammar exercises we have abandoned.   
For example, many teachers use daily, in-class writing assignments, and these are 
a perfect opportunity to practice such grips and flips at the beginning of a course. We 
might begin with a simple sentence, one independent clause like “Johnny kicks the ball,” 
pointing out the role each element plays, and ask students to join it with another 
independent clause, like “he has fun,” several times, using each of the coordinating 
conjunctions. After students have this set, we can have them reflect on the different 
situations and logical relationships between actions at work, why some compound 
sentences seem regular, “Johnny kicks the ball, and he has fun,” while others are strange, 
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“Johnny kicks the ball, but he has fun.” Others, like “Johnny kicks the ball, nor he has 
fun,” do not work at all. Next, we have students “flip” the clauses, one for each set, and 
again analyze the different relationships in each and the seeming sense of some, and the 
strangeness of others: “Johnny has fun, for he kicks the ball” and “Johnny has fun, nor he 
kicks the ball.” We could then repeat this with different clauses, different arrangements, 
and this exercise could be continued in groups or individually, allowing students to gain 
facility with manipulating language around the structural joints of the language itself.  
By forcing solecism, we give students an experiential basis in “errors” as specific 
choices with communicative and persuasive consequences, rather than etiquette rules 
with the penalty of exclusion. Rather than simply identifying “correct” sentences, this 
kind of solecistic manipulation gives students an experiential sense of the material 
limitations of English prose, as well as freedoms that might otherwise be prohibited by 
emphasizing “correctness.” It’s not a case of “bad grammar,” but ineffective 
arrangement. Imposition of dogmatic rules that are not reflected in many instances of 
professional writing could do more to alienate students, and hinder the development their 
skills. We might then further ask them to add on qualifiers, so that the nonsense might 
make sense.  
We could also include other grammar practice, like subordinating conjunctions in 
complex and compound-complex sentences, additional modifiers, as well as training with 
verbs, active/passive voice, tense, or even mood or aspect. Rather than a “drill-and-kill” 
activity, this “grip-and-flip” exercise can function as a “warm up” of sorts, but should not 
dominate an entire class, nor persist once students have gained facility and awareness of 
the limits and use of connection. Gripping and flipping does not a tonfaka make, and 
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mere grammar practice is insufficient for developing effective prose. Once students have 
an awareness of the material effects of words and the non-arbitrary ways they can be 
joined in various specific arrangements, we must put such awareness to use in practice 
with their own idiographolect. 
 
VII. Basic Techniques: A Furi of Tropes 
While tonfa practice begins with grips and flips, students next learn strikes and 
blocks through the same kind of repetitive practice, and so too, once students have a solid 
handle on the handles of their tool-become-weapon, they should begin using it. Basic 
strikes and blocks for writing are concussive and effective; when we teach students to 
attend to and practice the words on the page, we remain firmly within the realm of closed 
fist, sophistic, language-level concerns. Indeed, writing perhaps lacks the ability to truly 
operate in the style of the open hand. While it is certainly possible for writing to be gentle 
and irenic in orientation, in effect the words come to the reader as expressions upon them, 
either from the author or the text, and an inability to respond, to answer back, makes the 
grappling with writing itself —aside from grappling with ideas— much more difficult 
than we commonly assume. For present purposes, the basic strikes and blocks of writing 
are trope and figure; that is, the work of rhetoric is, in my view, giving students 
awareness of and practice in the work of words, not merely their meaning or 
communicating some content. 
One should hold the tonfa “loosely, yet firm” to both deal with any incoming or 
outgoing concussive force, but also allow for the characteristic “swinging” of tonfa 
striking techniques, furi, opening and closing it with a controlled, quick, and concussive 
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motion (Demura 15). The slippage of any writing and the ways we contain it means we 
have to be attentive to the words, clauses, and phrases as they move. Indeed, in the furi 
the tonfa itself turns or tropes in the hand, and the skill comes in making the trope 
controlled and precise. These tropic basics are both attack and defense, as statements and 
rebuttals, and the trick comes in fitting each to each. From classical antiquity, we have a 
preponderance of possible tropes and figures, but the limits of time and space in a single 
semester (or a single chapter) make such comprehension unworkable. However, we 
might select a manageable amount for the kind of repeated practice we are after here, 
ones applicable to many situations. I suggest four “master tropes” as basic moves here: 
Metaphor, Allegory, Irony, and Parrhēsia. 
Metaphor is a movement of “Carrying Across,” traditionally understood as 
carrying one thing from a “proper” domain to a “figurative” one. As a move, it includes 
weaker versions in the simile, and specific relational versions like synecdoche and 
metonymy. This is the Basic Strike of language; any expression is a naming, and what 
kind of name we grant something, what we say it “is” is making an argument about how 
we should feel about it, respond to it, and account for it. In concert with having students 
examine etymology and develop facility with grammatical connections, metaphors 
provide a basis for the ways language dictates and directs social action, as Lakoff and 
Johnson argue. That is, certain names have certain valences with certain people, and how 
we talk about something changes what it is, an extension of the “no synonyms,” 
nomological argument I made above. By examining the metaphors used by other writers, 
students can get a better sense of the values and commonplaces at stake in others’ 
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arguments, not just generating their own. Metaphor is not simply a device used in 
language, but the very mechanism of language itself.lxxxvii 
Allegory is a move to “Assemble Differently.” As a basic term for “story,” this 
move includes the tropes of anecdote, symbolism, parable, motif, theme, and narrative 
causality. This is redirecting attention, telling a story about something to make a point 
about something else. Unlike arguments, judged on rules of logic and evidence, stories 
are judged on “narrative probability” like internal consistency, and “narrative fidelity,” 
how closely it matches life experience (Spigelman, “Argument and Evidence” 80-1). 
Since we cannot ever engage with reality beyond the limited metaphors of our sense 
apparatuses nor with our own lives other than back-story for the present, both of these 
“figurative” devices of metaphor and allegory are integral to life experience in the world, 
not just the art of writing. Beyond the radically singular experience of each irreplaceable 
moment, we use names and stories to make sense of things.  
Using Irony, or to “Speak False,” is specifically “meaning opposite” of “literal” 
intent. As a move, this falsity includes dissimulation, satire, exaggeration, litotes, 
understatement, and euphemism. This is not always “misnaming” or “lying,” but a feint, 
a way of taking an opponent off balance. Feigning ignorance is an integral part of irony, 
and this requires the writer to be actually more knowledgeable than they appear. Irony 
therefore requires more of the reader, and needs to be matched to the audience at hand, 
like any other element of rhetoric. For example, most instructors I know who’ve taught 
Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal” spend more time disabusing students of the 
sincerity of his advocacy for cannibalism and baby-skin gloves than they expect. By 
anticipating the literal expectations of language and refusing them, students can gain 
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advantage in their own writing, and later in argumentation. Additionally, this makes 
students much more conscious of “truth.” Although, irony presumes that we can actually 
account for the truth of a given case in language fully and totally; if we cannot, then all 
language is ironic as it is metaphorical and allegorical. 
The last move is “truth” in its most pure and dangerous sense, Parrhēsia or to 
“Speak All.” While we commonly teach children to excuse “white lies” to maintain social 
relationships, parrhēsia is a truth told from one’s perspective regardless of its effect to 
the relationship between interlocutors (Foucault, Discourse and Truth). While a 
commonsense orientation might very well be honesty, parrhēsia pushes beyond the 
normative bounds, making truth hurt. Telling the truth, the whole truth, could be 
immensely damaging to the interlocutor, as well as to the rhetor themselves. In this way, 
the technique of parrhēsia and the “commonsense truth” have a similar relationship as 
the tonfa thrust, zuki, does with the punch. While they might feel the same for the user in 
terms of bodily mechanics, the force of a punch is more penetrating and destructive when 
striking with the zuki’s smaller surface area (the front head or zen atama). Truth is the 
most violent and dangerous weapon of all, parrhēsia a “death blow” of sorts, and in 
writing texts in which the opinions of the readers matter greatly in whether the text is 
effective, and when persuading the readers of the text’s efficacy is the point of the 
document, such as a dissertation, parrhēsia can be imprudent at best, extremely 
damaging at worst. 
Taken together, these four moves, however iterated and combined, provide a 
sequence of engagement: strike/block, redirection, feint/unbalance, and final blow. By 
having students learn and practice these tropes, in the same way they grip and flip 
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independent clauses above, they will be better able to use them unbidden, writing as a 
reaction, unconscious even, rather than a laborious and intensive effort. This is facility of 
prose; being able to write effectively as reflex: a laudable, yet difficult goal, one that is 
the goal of all writing instruction.  
 
IIX. Beyond Basics 
 As a series of discrete moves, basic training drills are not the totality of martial 
arts pedagogy, but only the first step. Like the nobles who practiced with empty hand 
(kara-te), masters of kobudo weaponry developed their technique through routines of 
stances, strikes, and footwork (kata). Such routines were often draped in costume and 
accompanied by music, allowing for the prying eyes of any Sho Dynasty official to be 
bemused by local peasant custom, rather than made fearful by a possible commoner 
uprising.  
Likewise, we need some form through which students gain not only facility of 
prose, but also of putting parts of the prose together, making paragraphs and essays out of 
clauses and words. Kata is the next level (up), and once students have internalized the 
basic positions, transitions, and techniques of their idiographolect, their tool-become-
weapon of writing, students will then continue repetitive recursive practice within the 
formal writing assignment. However, such an assignment should not be a mock-
disciplinary form, but a specifically pedagogical pattern practice aimed at further 
developing students’ abilities, but also, and more importantly, their disposition toward the 
art and practice of writing. For this, we look beyond the basics to the “form” of martial 
arts, kata.
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lxxiii Unfortunately, there is a base level of competency in English that is required for 
entrance into the FYC classroom. The scholarly and pedagogical focus on both “basic 
writing” and English language learners illustrate this point. However, these two groups 
are not equivalent. In the case of ELL students, the basic competency has to do with 
acquiring a facility in the English language itself, having come from a different language 
background. International and immigrant students must, at some institutions, gain this 
facility before they attend courses with the general student body. BW students, as 
illustrated by the groundbreaking work of Mina Shaughnessy, are generally those from 
traditionally marginalized backgrounds, and with the Open Admissions in CUNY, 
Shaughnessy saw many students whose own writing education did not prepare them for 
the work that would be required of them in college. While both groups might be included 
in the following pedagogical strategies, the difficulties in getting both BW and ELL 
students to “basic competency” are a whole other scholarly issue in itself. 
 
lxxiv One of the starkest examples is the practice of inflection, or modifications to a word’s 
shape that indicate a grammatical shift. Latin is heavily inflected, with verb conjugations 
well beyond English, noun and pronoun declensions (including cases we don’t have 
distinctive forms for, and other elements we don’t have at all, like grammatical gender), 
and even adjectives and adverbs have declensions as well. In English, we have eight 
inflections: possessive (cat’s) and plural (cats) for nouns, the past tense (-ed), progressive 
aspect (-ing), and past participle (-en) for verbs, and the comparative (-er) and superlative 
(-est) for adjectives. Because of this paucity of morphological changes, word order and 
the agreement between subjects, verbs, objects, etc. matter much more in avoiding 
solecism in English.  
 
lxxv In his acerbic critique of STROL, Jeff Zorn points out that “there is a single, non-
mythical Formal Standard, a level, not a dialect of the English language as no 
‘identifiable group’ uses it except, by circular definition, the literate.” (318) This Formal 
Standard English “grapholect” (FSEG) has no competitors, and therefore has “inherent 
superiority” over all “non-standard language,” because “street talk never suffices for 
intellectual complexity and careful policy argumentation.’ (319). However, in creating a 
hierarchy with Formal Standard above lowly “street talk,” Zorn reifies Standard English 
and puts writing back into the form of “written speech,” both of which limit and trouble 
his solutions to the limitations of STROL.lxxv While extremely problematic, Zorn’s 
critique shows that the FSEG is not simply the linguistic privileging of a particular 
identity (although it is this too), but a field of material forces with certain freedoms and 
certain limitations, which students must be able to measure and manipulate to be 
successful. Conversely, pointing out that the FSEG is not objective but the result of 
sedimented inequalities does not help our students use that FSEG to navigate these 
inequalities. While the tool of written English that is recognizable and acceptable to 
educated professionals requires me to give up rights to my own palaver, the tool itself is 
not neutral or regular. That is, the FSEG does not simply exist, but is the result of 
grouping sufficiently similar, but very different discourses into one single homogenous 
group, an accusation Zorn himself actually levels at the STROL as doing with AAE.  
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lxxvi In 1609, the Satsuma clan conquered Ryukyu for opposing the Japanese Shogunate 
and imposed another weapons ban, and yet another was imposed in 1879 following the 
Meiji Restoration and the dissolution of the traditional class system entirely. 
 
lxxvii Some kobudo weapons have histories as weapons in mainland Asia, e.g. China and 
the Philippines, illustrating some influence of nobility on Okinawan martial arts, even if 
it was not Japanese. For example, the trident (sai), the knuckleduster (tekko), and the 
machete and shield (tinbe-rochin) are all part of the kobudo arsenal, but they are not as 
widely practiced as the tool-become-weapons. They have corollaries, or relatives, in 
martial arts spreading back to India, and deep into unknown antiquity. Perhaps these tool-
become-weapons were even tool-become-weapons before they even reached Okinawa, 
possibly the case with the most famous weapon of kobudo, the nunchaku. In the 
traditional narrative, the nunchaku is said to have been a rice flail or a horse-bit, but this 
is troubled by the preexisting tools-become-weapons in other Asian cultures practiced 
well before the development of kobudo in Okinawa, like the Indonesian tabak-toyok. The 
nunchaku is extremely difficult to date and situate in the history and development of 
kobudo, even if it is the most prominent element of the art. First, there are no surviving 
nunchaku kata. While this does not mean that there were never nunchaku kata, it does 
mean that the nunchaku was not as codified in its technique as others. Some argue that 
the weapon was simply not popular and this may be due to the difficulty in using the 
weapon, if not an additional problem. The flexible middle means that the striking end of a 
nunchaku often swings back on the user, and the speed with which the weapon can be 
spun makes it ever more dangerous. I have several dents in my skull from my own 
training, and many schools only use the nunchaku to improve dexterity. Second, the 
nunchaku has the most contested origin of any practiced in kobudo, as even the name’s 
meaning is unknown. Third, the “chucks” have become so pervasive, so popular and 
closely associated with martial arts in contemporary culture, that they have already 
become a flashy, tool-become-weapon-become-prop. 
 
lxxviii It is ironic that a weapon that serves as a symbol of commoners fighting oppression 
has become the tool by which the power of the state is met out on the bodies of the 
people. However, that such a basic, common farm tool can become the truncheon of 
(in)justice illustrates the flexibility a specific fixed piece of material might have. English 
is a similar multiple object; similarly the tool of the oppressed and the truncheon of the 
oppressor. We need to teach students how to use it and deal with it in both ways, both 
with and against sedimented inequalities. 
 
lxxix Unlike the other kobudo tool-become-weapons, like the rice sickle (kama) or the 
nunchaku, the tonfa was not used directly on the body of the crop, which makes the 
process of its weaponization less obvious than its fellow tool-become-weapons. We 
might imagine a rice farmer attacked by several bandits, forced to defend himself with 
what is on hand. If I were the farmer, I would consider (quickly) two factors in deciding 
which object to use, its violent material potential and its violent proper use. The kama 
might be an obvious choice because of its sharp blade and the practiced threshing, cutting 
the crop from the ground, could be modified easily for human stalks, rather than just 
millet. The nunchaku (reportedly) was also a means of violence directed at the crop, 
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beating the wheat from the chaff, and so beating an assailant is also not that much of a 
stretch. In both of these cases, certain material aspects of the tool itself as well as the 
specific tasks for which it was “properly” used more “naturally” lend themselves to 
weaponization. However, the tonfa-as-tool lacks both the material aspects and violent 
proper use that tend to weaponization. Rather than being a discrete object, the tonfa or 
“toifa was originally a wooden handle fitted into a hole on the side of a millstone used by 
the Okinawan for milling grain” (Demura 7). Unlike the kama or nunchaku, the tonfa is 
not a thing in itself, but handle, a means of interaction with the proto-industrial 
assemblage of the grain mill. The tonfa would be inserted into the millstone, grain would 
be drizzled on top, and using the handle to rotate the stone, grinding the flour out into a 
catch surrounding the stone. These three tool-become-weapons taken together provide a 
rough trajectory of the agricultural process.  
 
However, by examining this process through the objects used, we can see that this 
process becomes “less violent” as it progresses. The kama is the “most violent” of these 
three objects since any blade is designed to thresh the stalks of rice, millet, and barley. 
Next, in both process and violence, the nunchaku would be the next object used on the 
grain, to beat out the chaff, and it too requires violent proper use, a repeated beating of 
the crop. The tonfa is the “least violent” tool-become-weapon of the three, since it has no 
sharp edges and its’ proper use was rather static. Even though it helps to grind grain, 
crushing it into power, a violent act as well, the weight of the stone and the monotony of 
the grinding motion make the weaponization of this handle quite curious. 
 
lxxx Demura features six variations alongside the “traditional” tonfa with square, semi-
circular, or cylindrical shafts, and there’s even one with sharpened ends and another with 
a wide and thin shaft, a “paddle” tonfa, which troubles the traditional narrative of tonfa as 
weaponized mill-handle (Demura 13). 
 
lxxxi We might also consider the continuing material corollaries between the weapon and 
the hand that wields it.  Like the tonfa extend the reach of the hand for strikes and the 
strength of the arm for blocks, so too does writing work to magnify the voice, taking it 
farther than airwaves might carry and brute fixedness of writing makes it difficult to press 
through in and onto the author. But, with the extension, the inability for the author to 
respond, the inability to feel the pain or impact of the tonfa is a form of affective 
weakness, and allows for interlocutors to disarm by simply disregarding the weapon 
altogether.  
 
lxxxii Both Fumio Demura (shito-ryu karate, aikido, judo) and Tadashi Yamashita (shorin-
ryu karate) are former All-Japan karate champions in their respective styles, and world 
authorities on the Japanese and Okinawan martial arts. Demura, who was trained by 
Kenshin Taira and Kenwa Mabuni (influential karate sensei) and was both the inspiration 
and stuntman for Pat Morita’s Mr. Miyagi in The Karate Kid, is especially important for 
introducing the weapons of kobudo to the West as a closely related art to the far more 
popular karate. Yamashita, who started training as a child after trying to fight a school 
principal, who was also a karate sensei, gained his fifth-degree black belt under Chosin 
Chibana, who learned from the students of “Tode” Sakugawa, one of the most important 
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figures in developing Japanese martial arts. Demura’s manual focuses more on the basics 
technique with the tonfa as a corollary and supplement to karate training, and 
Yamashita’s focuses more heavily on “advanced” and street defense techniques, although 
he does include the traditional kata, hama higa no tonfa.  
 
lxxxiii While I have used this discussion about the multilingual history of English, in her 
TED talk, “Did English Evolve?” Kate Gardoqui uses this example to illustrate the way 
language changes over time. I’ve been using it ever since. 
 
lxxxiv This awareness is also how we might grapple with barbarism as an “error,” word 
choices that inhibit communication and persuasion, like malapropisms. While “rarely 
does discussion dwell on why writers make errors, just that they do and that they need to 
be fixed,” engaging with the logic behind their use is part of the same attentiveness we 
gain by having students grapple with etymology and history of the English language 
(Crovitz 33).  Furthermore, developments in writing technology and the changing 
relationship students have with language produce other barbarisms worth considering: the 
Autocorrect, “spellcheck-sanctioned error” which is the result of unreflective use of the 
tools of a word processor, and the “Readerly” barbarism of mispronouncing words only 
seen in print.  While writing and speech have been separated in scholarship and teaching, 
their conflation in mundane discourse has only been intensified by the proliferation of 
digital technology, something our theory and pedagogy is still struggling to account for. 
 
lxxxv Both Aristotle and Quintilian identify solecism as errors of connection. That is, in 
Greek or Latin, there are ways that words fit together and ways that they do not. 
However, such connections are very important in more inflected languages like Greek 
and Latin, in which word order matters little as long as the subject and object are declined 
correctly and the verb has the fitting conjugation. In this way, Latin and Greek have more 
moving parts to be connected. However, because English has two verb tenses, very few 
inflections, and other elements of Greek and Latin, like grammatical gender, the 
connections are fewer, but even more important with things like word order, voice, and 
prenominal proximity. In English, word order is generally fixed (Subject-Verb-Object) or 
non-normative order is marked by punctuation or prepositions, making the single-jointed 
tonfa an apt comparison, especially recalling the bladed/blunt heuristic above. We’re not 
training students in specialized, Latinized discourse, but rather in FYC we’re preparing 
them to engage with the common words in a skillful way. It’s not a matter of making 
proper connections, but using the preexisting connections expected in the expected and 
needful way.   
 
lxxxvi In addition to “swinging” the tonfa in open/closed position, one can also grip it by 
the front or back head. Gripping the front head with the handle outward makes the tonfa 
into a functionally different weapon, a stick like that in other martial arts, like Filipino 
escrima, but also its modern descendant, the PR24 police baton. Gripping on the back 
head makes the handle into a hook, allowing for more control in redirecting attacks or 
even restraining the attacker. In addition, not all these swinging strikes hit with the sides 
of the tonfa, but work as extended “punches” or striking with the head itself. 
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lxxxvii In this, I draw from Nietzsche’s argument in “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral” 
sense, in which he makes the claim that all language is metaphor, derived from sensory 
input modulated through a constellation of concepts, but ones we have forgotten are 
metaphors.  
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Chapter 4  
Kata of Rhetoric: Student Disposition, Modal Writing, and Affective 
Development
The teaching of research writing has remained tied to a contrived and templated way of 
writing, and to the self-imposed charge of safeguarding the university's store of 
knowledge-from those who do not know, and may never know, the words and thoughts 
that will grant them admittance to the society of knowers.  
Robert Davis and Mark Shadle, "Building a Mystery" 425 
 
The form consists of various self-defense movements arranged in sequence and done 
throughout at the same rate of speed. The movements are often stylized and sometimes 
only faintly resemble the original fighting techniques. The form is done slowly, and the 
position and the movement of every part of the body receive careful attention. 
Herman Kauz, “The Aim of Individual Form Practice” 82 
 
I. Explication 
In this chapter, I outline a recent scholarly development in composition pedagogy 
in a shift toward focusing on the students’ dispositions toward writing, rather than the 
accumulation of specific written forms or mastery of writing skills. This dispositional 
shift accompanies a rejection of formalism and inauthenticity, the same rejection that 
motivated abandoning the formalist “current-traditional” pedagogy of the late 19th 
century. While the shift toward disposition is an important advancement in response to 
the rhetorical nature and transfer problems of writing education, the emphasis on 
“authenticity” is insufficiently rhetorically attentive of the composition class itself as an 
explicitly educational context. That is, because we cannot adequately perform either the 
material consequences, formal expectations, or affective motivations for “authentic” 
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writing in the composition classroom, aiming for authenticity will never be authentic 
enough to effect the dispositional change we are after.  
However, this dispositional change can be afforded by formulaic writing, and 
historically has been done so through exercises like progymnasmata, so I suggest an 
alternative “formalism” embodied in kata from Japanese martial arts. Kata is useful 
because it is an explicitly “non-authentic” educational exercise that fosters dispositional 
development through rigorous routines of techniques. Additionally, kata is not limited by 
Western logocentrism, affording a more affective orientation to disposition, and one free 
from the baggage of “current-traditional” rhetoric. In continuing to explore Japanese 
martial arts pedagogy, kata both builds on and is a form of practicing kihon, basics, but 
adds extension and complexity, requiring students not only to be skilled in discrete 
moves, but to be able to use them (when needed) in sequence. From kata students 
continue to hone their skills by practicing with a partner in sparring, kumite, as I will 
discuss in the following chapter.lxxxviii  
 
II. The Dispositional (Re)Turn and Students Themselves 
“At its essence,” the 2011 Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing 
suggests writing assignments work best from “genuine purposes and audiences” because 
“standardized writing curricula or assessment instruments that emphasize formulaic 
writing for nonauthentic audiences will not reinforce the habits of mind and the 
experiences necessary for success as students encounter the writing demands of 
postsecondary education” (3). Rather than discrete formal requirements, the Framework 
emphasizes the development of students themselves in terms of Habits of Mind, which 
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are “ways of approaching learning that are both intellectual and practical and that will 
support students’ success in a variety of fields and disciplines” (4). These are capacities 
of a particular person, rather than a collection of mere “writing skills.” Curiosity and 
Openness foster critical inquiry of the world and the self, and Engagement and 
Persistence concern the development and sustaining of interest in writing projects. 
Creativity and Flexibility work against a monologic notion of writing tasks, audiences, 
and goals, and Responsibility and Metacognition require students to consider their own 
actions and ideas from others’ points of view (3). This emphasis on Habits of Mind, 
working on the capacities of students themselves, is an increasing emphasis in 
composition pedagogy and scholarship, of which the Framework is only one example.  
Rather than Habits, Dana Lynn Driscoll and Jennifer Wells identify these 
“qualities that determine how learners use and adapt their knowledge” as dispositions. 
Whether it’s a matter of personal preference (“I’m not a writer”), ineffective or alienating 
previous writing instruction (“I’ve never been good at English”), or some combination, 
some students come to composition from a wide range of previous writing experiences 
with preexisting affective investments to writing, many of them negative. A productive 
pedagogy, Driscoll and Wells argue, would promote productive dispositions, Value 
(personal investment by students), Self-Efficacy (students believe in their own abilities), 
Attribution (students believe their efforts determine their success), and Self-Regulation 
(students set reasonable goals and hold themselves to them), and also combat the 
opposite, disruptive dispositions of students seeing writing as a mere school exercise, the 
result of talent, beyond their abilities, and ultimately out of their control (Driscoll and 
Wells 1).  
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Nancy Sommers and Laura Saltz echo this reflexive nature of dispositions 
through students’ seeing themselves as novices, “adopting an open attitude to instruction 
and feedback, a willingness to experiment, whether in course selection or paper topics, 
and a faith that, with practice and guidance, the new expectations of college can be met” 
(134). If students think they are experts, then they do not have the openness for growth. If 
students think of themselves as novices, then they understand that their capacities for 
success require time and effort to develop. Students must think of themselves as works-
in-progress, illustrating that disposition must be reflective and dynamic, not merely a 
matter of essence (Sommers and Saltz 134). Whether described as eight habits, four 
dispositions, or one dynamic and reflexive self-concept, this dispositional turn means our 
job as writing teachers is cultivating the students’ orientation to their writing, rather than 
simply focusing on their skills in writing. In turning toward the dispositions of the 
students themselves, we are also returning to the roots of Western education.  
In her work on the first Western professional educators, Debra Hawhee identifies 
the Sophists’ goal of rhetorical education as “physiopoesis” or the “making of a student’s 
nature,” the development of particular habits and dispositions (93). It is not that students 
are empty vessels, lacking a “nature,” but rather the instructor helps them develop a 
“second nature” through repetitive exercises, cultivating, heightening, and discouraging 
preexisting dispositions. Like the Framework, sophistic rhetorical training aims “not [at] 
a finished product, but a dispositional capacity for iteration,” a power to do, not merely 
having done (Hawhee 151). These exercises allow students to gain the proper nature they 
need, internalizing a set of moves and modes for the various rhetorical contexts and 
purposes they will encounter. These repetitive exercises became the progymnasmata that 
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dominated rhetorical education from Isocrates throughout antiquity (Fleming). While it 
might be tempting to return to Fable, Invective, Thesis, etc. these exercises were part of 
curriculum spanning a student’s entire life and are therefore not feasible for a single 
semester or school year.lxxxix However, the idea of formal repetitive exercises in writing 
education is itself a persistent form.  
More recently, the formal exercises appear in the 19th-century, as the current-
traditional “modes of discourse,” four types with four specific purposes: Narration of 
events, Description of imagery, Exposition for the presentation of facts, and 
Argumentation for the proving of claims (Connors “The Rise and Fall”). Drawn from the 
classical curriculum, these modes were dominant during the “current-traditional period, 
but fell from popularity, as thesis-driven expository writing became the dominant form, 
the “traditional research paper,” which inherited the “objective, scientific model [that] 
dominated nineteenth-century Germany, as scholars published their empirical research,” 
and literary scholars adopted this form to seem more legitimate (Spiegelman 66).  
However, in composition this reductive assignment limits research as “going to 
the library” and “finding evidence,” which inhibits students learning multiple research 
methods or research-as-inquiry, as Richard Larson argues (812). This rejection of 
reductive formalism led us to move toward alternative assignments, like a “researched 
argumentative essay,” multimodal assignments, personal writing, and others (Davis and 
Shadle). Each of these alternatives rejects the formulaic tendencies in expository writing, 
as the disinterested stance promotes the presentation of preexisting facts in a formulaic 
fashion, doing little to cultivate students’ rhetorical flexibility or engagement with the 
work of writing.  
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Ironically, the drive to be seen as producing ‘authentic knowledge” is what led 
literary scholars to adopt exposition in the first place, modeling their own scholarship on 
that of empirical science. Once one mode is elevated as the only legitimate means of 
writing scholarship, producing and presenting knowledge, formalism becomes the best 
way of training students. Rather than mastering specific “skills” or dictating particular 
assignments, the Framework accounts for this risk of formalism by outlining Experiences 
in “rhetorical knowledge,” “critical thinking,” “writing processes,” “knowledge of 
conventions,” and digital composition through which students cultivate their Habits. By 
emphasizing experiences students might undergo, rather than specific tasks to be 
accomplished, is an explicit rejection of formalism embodied in the “traditional research 
paper.”  
The Framework is therefore a call to invention, rather than a prescription. The 
goal is dispositional development, not merely of the students-as-students, but as learning 
subjects who exist beyond the classroom. That is, Habits are “cultivated both inside and 
outside school,” which allows the Framework to reframe the goals of writing instruction 
against the pervasive divide between “school” and “real life” espoused by many students 
(Framework 4). Therefore, part of our job as instructors is creating assignments that help 
students develop themselves. Recalling that “authenticity” is central to the Framework’s 
prescriptions, we might then have assignments in which students practice rhetorical skills 
to make “real change in the world.” However, the emphasis on “authenticity” troubles 
such “authentic” assignments.  
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III. Interrogating Authenticity: Reality and Disciplinarity 
For example, we might give students practice in using their rhetorical skills to 
make real, material change in the world, having them write their essays about local, 
campus, or municipal issues, from something as persistent as parking availability to 
something weightier like sexual assault, to someone who can enact material change. 
However, if a student writes to her university president about reducing sexual assault on 
campus, and he does nothing, then her writing would be a rhetorical failure. If her writing 
for a real situation fails, are we as instructors then bound by authenticity to fail her as 
well? It would be a disservice to have one standard for “real” rhetoric and another for our 
students, especially if the goal is “authenticity.”  
By claiming authenticity, and then rewarding failure with a C for competent, we 
are not preparing students for the failures of writing in the world. When compared to a 
professional essayist writing for money or social justice, the student writing a graded 
assignment to an “authentic” audience must necessarily be a fiction. The emphasis on 
“authenticity” runs into reality, and must retreat into the safer space of the classroom, 
which is the actual rhetorical context in which composition students write. For many (if 
not most or all) composition students, the grade is their paramount motivation, and 
writing serves as a way to pass the required 100-level course, and move on to “real” work 
in their major. If we acknowledge first-year composition as an educational context, an 
“authentic” audience might then be the imagined real peers of a discourse into which 
students hope to enter, the members of their chosen major discipline.  
Ideally, students would have several years of writing instruction, with increasing 
disciplinary focus, a “unified writing curriculum” with instruction integrated both 
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vertically (from first to last year) and horizontally (across disciplines) throughout a 
student’s academic career (Hall 6). In such a curriculum, first-year composition serves as 
a foundational course in writing in general, specified and developed in more 
disciplinarily-specific ways in future courses. Students would then practice the genre of 
academic and professional disciplines, and such generic exposure is important because 
“communication is most likely to succeed, to generate understanding rather than 
misunderstanding, when writer(s) and reader(s) know and use the same forms” (Coe 19). 
Indeed, a necessary condition of effective writing is being recognizable through the 
preexisting formal expectations of a discipline; writing for businesspersons means writing 
like businesspersons, using the forms they recognize and accept.  
However, such disciplinarily “authentic” assignments require the instructors to 
have deep and thorough knowledge of a wide variety of disciplinary forms, prose style 
expectations, modes of proof, and types of argument required by the various major fields 
of students in the class. While disciplinary specific writing might be the ideal, unless 
first-year composition functions within a larger writing curriculum, a single year, or 
single course, of writing instruction in a kind of “generalized writing form” is insufficient 
to prepare students for all the academic, professional, and civic writing genres that 
students will encounter. However, because of the wide variety of major fields of students 
in a first-year composition course, any given instructor would therefore be unlikely to 
have the background and experience to teach all the students in her class all the various 
disciplinary forms they would need. We cannot expect instructors to learn writing for 
natural sciences, humanities, social sciences, arts, business, or medicine, in addition to 
the composition background they are learning in order to teach composition (Wardle, 
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“Intractable” 1-3). This complexity and contradiction of what “writing” is and does in 
various disciplines is part of increasing critiques of transfer, an educational commonplace 
that is problematic for writing education.  
One of the most pervasive commonplaces in education, transfer assumes students 
gain knowledge, learn skills, and develop sensibilities in one context and use that 
knowledge, those skills and those sensibilities in another context, which is vital for 
education as “job training.” Transfer is complex and difficult to evaluate, especially so 
for the discipline of writing, so when it does happen it is “to the extent that students can 
bring habits of mind (what Bereiter calls “dispositions”) learned in one environment to 
bear on learning to function in a new one” (Brent 42). Indeed, transfer does not account 
for the different and sometimes contradictory conventions in each specific context 
because what constitutes acceptable form, expression, argumentation, and research varies 
widely from discipline to discipline, field to field, and job to job (Framework 2). Indeed, 
Driscoll and Wells argument for dispositions is also based in part on rejecting the above 
notion of transfer, which passivizes the learner as a collection of behaviors that respond 
to contexts in “better” ways that those unlearned (2).  
Because there is no “effective writing” as such, but only specific efficacies for 
specific situations, audiences, and purposes, “writing” as a practice is not simply a 
collection of declarative knowledge, specific content, but also includes the more 
complicated procedural and conditional knowledge, how and when to apply that 
content.xc By turning to disposition, we might better account for the relationship the 
students have to their skills and their active response to contextual demands, rather than 
simply whether they have the skills or respond to context appropriately. However, this 
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(re)turn to disposition illustrates that the progress of composition pedagogy is rooted in a 
problematic tension between the need for form and a desire for authenticity. Just as 
process pedagogy was rooted in the rejection of formalism in the “current-traditional” 
period, so too the move toward dispositions is rooted in the rejection of process’s own 
tendency toward a formalist need for forms. 
What the writing assignment is has been a major source of contention, but what it 
does remains constant across composition courses: provide an opportunity to practice 
writing. Beyond the specific education exigence of writing practice, the fact remains that 
at the end of a writing class there is some product required. However, the form of this 
product always risks reification, which necessitates a move away from “mere form” into 
something more “authentic.” When we moved away from modal writing to emulating the 
scholarly writing of 19th German researcher-scholars, it was to make literary scholarship 
more “authentic” as knowledge. When we moved away from disinterested exposition 
toward more disciplinary specific forms, it was to make writing instruction more 
“authentic” to disciplinary needs.  
When we realized that “writing practice” does not transfer among disciplines 
easily or obviously, we moved to dispositions, as a more “authentic” way to evaluate 
educational development. Indeed, the Framework has even been criticized on the grounds 
of authenticity as well, whether ignoring the economic-ideological realities of academic 
labor or lacking emphasis on the “authentic” goal of writing instruction: writing skills.xci 
Any form risks formalism, and each rejection in favor of authenticity can never be 
authentic enough. The problem isn’t formalism per se, but the uncritical dominance of 
particular forms, as well as an uncritical rejection of formalism on the basis of those 
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forms motivated by a drive to “authenticity,” until, of course, these new forms are found 
to be insufficiently authentic, too formalist, and we move on again, or perhaps 
backwards, as in this case.  
However, Douglas Brent argues that this year-in-year-out, semester-to-semester 
grind of composition is itself a recurring situation to which students and instructors 
respond (36). The genre of first-year composition is not the image of some other “real” 
form and exigence, but the first-year composition writing assignment is a genre that 
responds to the need for there to be a first-year composition writing assignment. As 
educational writing, these assignments exist between the disinterested exposition of pre-
existing facts in a disciplinarily acceptable way, training students in proper forms, and a 
personally invested exploration of a specific idea or conversation, through which students 
engage with writing as a method of thought, self-reflection, and knowledge-generation, 
which can be limited by the imposition of form (Heilker 192). Rather than the writing 
assignment’s generic unreality being “not up to” some imaginary “real” standard, we 
might use this unreality to transcend such standards through the fictionality of writing in 
an educational context. That is, we do not need to seek or create a genre for the genreless 
first-year composition writing assignment, so that it might be more “authentic,” 
applicable to real writing tasks. Rather, a formalist assignment might be a space for 
experiment and invention, rather than failure and marginality. 
Therefore, I propose thinking about the “form” of the composition writing 
assignment differently: form-as-kata from Japanese martial arts. While not limited to 
Japanese arts, kata presents an interesting contrast to contemporary composition 
pedagogy. It specifically uses rigid formalism in nonauthentic situations as the best and 
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most efficient way to effect dispositional development, similar to the practices of the 
sophists, progymnasmata, and modal writing. That is, kata allows us to train students as 
writers, rather than merely in writing or on specific written forms; disposition rather than 
skills. It can certainly resemble “real” combat situations, but the kata itself is not 
concerned with authenticity-as-application; kata is unreal in the same way first-year 
composition writing is a genre onto itself. While kata emphasizes the same dispositional 
development outlined by the Framework as Habits of Mind, as a non-Western pedagogy 
it is not limited by Western logocentrism, and its different cultural history presents a 
valuable and untapped pedagogical resource. 
 
IV. Different Forms, Different Formalism: Kata Background  
Like any translated term, kata is lexically complex. Not merely “form” or 
“shape,” it is “a kind of ritualized combat, exercises in aesthetic movement, a means to 
sharpen fundamentals such as balance and coordination, a type of moving meditation, or 
a form of training akin to shadowboxing,” but all the above together don’t quite articulate 
the actual exercise, so Karl Friday prefers the term “pattern practice” (164). As a 
pedagogical exercise, kata has seemingly paradoxical connections to both “Confucian 
pedagogy and its infatuation with ritual and ritualized action,” very similar to classical 
Western imitation pedagogy, and to Zen’s “mind-to-mind transmission” (ishin-denshin), 
which rejects didacticism in favor of learning through experience (166). This experiential 
focus has led kata to be considered the “most efficient vehicle for passing knowledge 
from teacher to student,” since through repetition, students internalize the principles 
without requiring their explication (Friday 164). This efficiency is a reason why kata is 
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common in not only Japanese, but “Chinese, Okinawan, and Korean martial arts” as well 
(164 n. 1). That is, spanning many East Asian martial arts, kata is a ritualized imitation 
that allows students to internalize the “postures, techniques, strategies, and philosophy” 
that comprise the specific art through repetitive exercise (164).  
However, in karate, for example, before students learn any kata, “countless hours 
are spent in moving forward and backward over the floor while delivering punches, 
blocks, and kicks,” which allows students to internalize these basic moves as Herman 
Kauz explains (81). I argued for such practice in the previous chapter. Next, kata 
integrates these basic moves in sequence, “the performer blocks and counters various 
attacks delivered by a number of imaginary assailants located at different spots around 
him” (81). Rather than simply linearly, in kata “the students learn to relate to all 
directions” (81). Through repetitive movement in multiple directions, kata teaches a 
bodily awareness and connective-transitional moves between moves, a vital element of 
kata, beyond the specific techniques included.  
While kata might be described as “fighting imaginary opponents” and thus an 
imitation of a “real situation,” kata is an explicitly inauthentic form of reflexive practice 
and dispositional development. Although each kata contains applicable moves for 
particular situations, bunkai, and the pattern makes specific techniques reflexive, kata is 
not a practical response to a combat situation. Rather, they are ritualized performances, 
some even performing a theme or narrative. In excellent kata performance, students 
execute “techniques in combination with the almost simultaneous application of block 
and counter characteristic of freestyle sparring” or actual combat, even though kata is not 
“authentic” combat (Kauz 81). In order to prepare students for a wide range of situations, 
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to grow their repertoire and hone their abilities, some martial arts have students learn 
several different kata over the course of their training.  
For example, in Shotokan karate, students begin with the numbered basic Heian 
(Peaceful) kata.xcii These kata are recursive and comprehensive, rather than linear-
progressive; when someone begins learning Heian Nidan (Peaceful #2), they do not 
simply abandon Heian Shodan (Peaceful #1), nor is Heian Nidan an “extension of” or 
“addition to” Heian Shodan. Rather, each kata works to supplement and complement the 
others in the sequence, each “advancement” is built on skilled performance of the kata 
and demonstrated application of particular techniques within it. Advanced students 
learning Bassai Dai (“Storm the Fortress” or “Small Leopard-Lion”) thus need mastery 
of the Heian forms, because a sequence in the middle of Bassai is very similar to one in 
Heian Godan (Peaceful #5) (James). The techniques and combinations vary, and overlap 
among kata, and each kata presupposes skilled practice in the preceding ones, just as kata 
itself requires basic techniques to be reflexive. In addition to adding techniques to a 
student’s repertoire, each specific kata teaches a specific theoretical concept, in addition 
to honing moves and theories of previous kata.  
Kata is not simply a collection of specific techniques, but contains the three-fold 
core of each specific martial arts style. These are strategy (heiho), the principles of 
approach to combat; offensive/defensive rationale, distance, angles, and specific goals, 
skill (te-no-uchi) is “timing, posture, the generation and concentration of power,” and 
tactics (waza) are “situationally specific applications” of the strategies and skill (Friday 
165, 166). In addition to the specific tactics in each individual kata, and the strategy 
central to each, practice in many kata develop the application of these tactics and 
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strategy, training the skill as well. While the Japanese terms for strategy, tactics, and 
skill, might be confusing, we have this same three-part core in composition pedagogy as 
well: declarative (tactics), conditional (strategy), and procedural (skill) knowledge.  
In both composition and martial arts, we aim to teach students the specific, 
discrete, and applicable techniques that they will need in future situations, as well as 
when to use such specific techniques, and details of the specific mechanics involved. 
While students might name the specific techniques, like tropes or fallacies, strikes, blocks 
or stances, students also need to know how and when to use them, what they work and do 
not work for. That is, not only knowing what, but the how and when of successful writing 
and rhetoric is more important than having the proper content readily available for 
regurgitation, just as knowing how and when to fight is more important than knowing 
ten-thousand strikes.  
However, completing the right prescribed sequence of moves in itself is not a 
sufficient performance of the kata, in much the same way that a perfectly correct essay 
may not actually say anything at all. When we want students to write as authentic writers, 
we want their writing to have the force and flow; it needs to “do” or “mean” something 
worthwhile. This three-part benefit in kata training requires “the student to correctly 
perform each technique with maximum speed and power” (Kauz 81). Students must 
practice kata diligently and sincerely. This requires students to be strict with themselves 
to develop self-control, self-awareness, and self-discipline, fostering a dispositional shift, 
rather than simply reflexive technique, or a mastery of skills (Kauz 83). Kata as a formal 
exercise affords an observable, bodily effect to this dispositional change, “a low center of 
gravity” (Kauz 84). 
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A lowered center of gravity is a change in bodily disposition, “a gradual sinking 
or settling of the center of [the] body, or [the] conceptions of [a] center…at a point a few 
inches below the navel” (85). Lowering the center of gravity is not superficially bending 
the knees, but the realization that power comes from the largest and most powerful 
muscles, the legs and hips rather than the arms and shoulders. Moving from a lower 
center of gravity not only increases power of striking and stability in blocking, but makes 
the stances stronger as well. This “center” is not some mystical Eastern idea, but an 
ancient Western one too. Ancient Greek sophists and philosophers, Chinese monks, and 
Japanese warriors all saw the center of the body and source of life as the same spot. In 
Chinese, this lowered center is called tan tien, in Japanese tanden and in ancient Greek as 
phrene. In Chapter 2, I described the Warrant in these same bodily terms. In each of these 
instances, it is not only the center of physiological force, but metaphysical force as well: 
of chi, life energy in Daoism, of hara, Japanese for “humanity or compassion” and of 
psukhe, soul from ancient Greek philosophy. Acting from the hara is the same virtue as 
Aristotle’s greatness of soul, magnanimity or megalopsukhia, the perfection of all other 
virtues from the Nicomachean Ethics (Bk. IV).  
Lowering the center of gravity is a shift in awareness of the composition of the 
body itself, but also to our bodily sense of self and comportment toward the world. A 
lowered center of gravity is as much the development of humanity and compassion as it 
is development of the body itself as an engine of violence. This two-fold paradoxical 
training is therefore a powerful alternative to training in skills or ethical use of those 
skills, and kata accomplishes both technical expertise and ethical mindfulness at once. 
While mindfulness, self-reflection, and metacognition might all approximate the 
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dispositional change afforded by kata, these are strictly mental, intellectual, and 
logocentric. In training students in kata, we are not effecting dispositional development 
of “mind,” but body. 
If we are trying to develop student’s dispositions, we do no better abstracting to 
some nominalization of electro-chemical processes in a squishy skull-organ than we 
might abstract the center of life-force in the gut. Furthermore, the Framework’s Habits of 
Mind are actually not the effects of some supposedly neutral, technical rationality, but the 
differences real people feel in response to others. The habit of Engagement means a deep 
care about the project and process. Persistence is keeping at a task that feels tedious, 
pointless, and painful. Openness is about being able to entertain various viewpoints, even 
if they are different or even repugnant. The shift of focus from a cogito to the hara would 
be a more explicit and direct means of affording the opportunity for dispositional 
development, since these dispositions are affective, rather than logical. Indeed, “gut 
feelings,” as the core of pathos, are much more powerful than the “rationality” of logos, a 
problem since Aristotle first complained about the Sophists.  
Rather than “logical thought” and “appropriate feeling” as often-conflicting 
aspects of a subjectivity, this bodily-affective notion of subjectivity accounts for both a 
technical proficiency and an ethical orientation without discarding either. This affective 
focus, lowering the center of gravity is achieved through rigid repetition in kata, which is 
useful as an educational exercise that is not limited by the drive for “authenticity.” We 
can therefore rethink the form of the composition assignment as a kata: a specifically 
formalist pedagogical exercise that uses repeated pattern practice as a way to train 
students in particular moves and their connections, helping them become reflexive, to 
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develop a rhetorical orientation toward the act of writing, and develop their affective 
disposition toward themselves as engines of force and others as subjects of ethical 
consideration. That is, using kata in composition would help students learn to write from 
a lower center of gravity, being calmer, more compassionate, and more reflective. 
 
V. Rhetoric Kata: Multi-Mode Writing in Pseudo-Classical Form 
If we’re aiming to lower students center of gravity in writing, I suggest we have 
students write on something in which they are already invested, an aspect of the student 
themselves, and using this engagement to motivate students’ effort in the challenges of a 
writing assignment, similar to the focus of Writing about Writing pedagogy (Downs and 
Wardle). However, rather than Wardle’s strategy of having students work through 
“writing studies,” I suggest a focus on political conflict. For example, a student could 
write himself as a gun rights advocate, arguing that any law inhibiting the sale, purchase, 
or possession of firearms violates the Second Amendment.xciii In this, we force students to 
use writing as self-reflection because their position in a political conflict is the content of 
the essay. While they are experienced individually, political beliefs function as 
identification with a particular community or group.  
Furthermore, politics is a social arena, and any particular individual belief is a 
belief about what others should do, meaning it is both individual and social. Political 
conflicts are so affectively fraught, more about feeling than thought, that in thinking 
about their feelings through a rigorous regime of writing practice we might disarticulate 
the animus from disagreement, as well. That is, through kata, we might teach students 
how to fight from a lowered center of gravity and a greatness of soul. If the goal is the 
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dispositional development of the students themselves, then we could do no better for a 
writing topic than the students themselves as nascent political entities entering into the 
world of supposedly civic adulthood, which returns us to the earliest goals of rhetorical 
education. Therefore, students would first need a basic understanding of ancient 
rhetorical principles as a frame for the class, just as the karateka learns basic techniques 
in advance of the kata.xciv Three forms are vital here: enthymeme, dissoi logoi, and 
classical arrangement. 
Because we are focusing on preexisting affective investments, many students may 
have uncritical political opinions rather than evidence-based position. Therefore, the 
central move for our kata is the enthymeme, the bodily form of the argument. While 
many students might hold particular political opinions, a vital first step in lowering their 
center of gravity is asking for evidence, for a foundation; our gun-rights student would 
need to provide a reason in support of his claim, where the strength in his stance comes 
from. He would likely cite the Second Amendment. Additionally, the enthymeme relies 
on an unstated claim with its own evidence, Toulmin’s warrant and backing, which we 
would also ask of the example student; how does the Second Amendment guarantee 
unregulated gun sales and ownership, and how is that claim supported? This double 
questioning is very important in disarticulating the animus from disagreement. This gives 
students a heuristic with which to engage any particular position, and for helping students 
rethink their own political opinions, unquestioned and unquestionable, as political 
positions, supportable and supported. Additionally, enthymemes are not limited to one 
discipline or another, but provide a frame for inquiry and argument in any number of 
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fields, as it is abstract enough to work with the specificity in each case. This structure of 
claims also allows for dissoi logoi as a form of self-critique. 
As we glean from his oft-quoted fragment, Protagoras argued that “two contrary 
reports [logoi] are true concerning every experience,” meaning truth is not intrinsic or 
objective, but constructed through accounts of that experience (Schiappa 100). By 
applying this attitude to the enthymeme, we have a heuristic that can help students see 
arguments not merely as “right” or “wrong,” but specific positions with their own reasons 
and logics, even if we might disagree with them. By combining Aristotelian enthymeme 
with Protagorean dissoi logoi, we have a powerful heuristic to generate and interrogate 
claims along the same terms. Because students would be writing from their own 
perspective, the dissoi logoi would require students to see that they can be and are indeed 
wrong from another perspective. Identifying whether this “wrongness” is due to 
contradictory evidence, a weak warrant, or insufficient backing would be part of the 
students’ work in articulating their belief.  
Returning to our example, we might have our gun rights advocate rehire Peter 
Elbow’s internal editor to ask “why?”, “details?”, and “how are you wrong?” (Writing 
without Teachers). This self-questioning is important to help students be more open and 
dynamic in their position, but we still need to prepare students to articulate their positions 
and defend them, as they will be expected to do in future writing tasks. However, we do 
not have the luxury of time in a single semester to teach many forms. A first-year 
composition kata would need to be manifold; training students in multiple modes within 
a singular kata could allow us to teach students the same kind of power and flow that 
they might need in any given writing assignment (Davis and Shadle 432). However, 
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because we cannot adequately model specific disciplinary instantiations of these modes, a 
first-year composition kata would work through explicit abstraction. This rhetorical 
abstraction is necessary to allow students to see writing as an act in the world, something 
they can do with practice and effort, and something present in almost all human 
interactions, even if what that “writing” is in each given case is very different. We are 
training them as writers, engines of force, rather than simply walking collections of 
techniques and talking catalogues of forms.  
While there is no “general academic discourse,” there are common kinds of meta-
discursive modes that are general, like argumentation as particular styles of enthymeme. 
Two others can be understood as two “pure forms” on a spectrum, the forms of “article” 
and “essay” (Zeiger 456). On the one hand, pure exposition is the kind of writing we 
abandoned in the “traditional research paper,” because it leads to formulaic presentation 
of preexisting facts in a predetermined order writing, challenging students’ investment in 
the writing, leading to formulaic essays. On the other hand, pure expression is “free 
writing” that does not, nor needs to, account for others, preexisting facts, or anything 
other than the student’s voice. Indeed, this spectrum too is that between Confucian rigid 
“divine order on earth” and Zen formlessness. These are not two mutually exclusive 
forms, but ends of a spectrum that all writing occupies in various ways, exposition as 
writing about facts for others and exploration as writing about the self for the self 
(Heilker 192). Because we are training students how to write about things for others, and 
to write from and for themselves, we need both of these modes in our kata, which itself 
relies on the confluence of Confucian and Zen pedagogies.  
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Rather than consider these modes formally, we might better integrate them 
functionally: the expository “proof” is demonstrating the validity of a position through 
objective facts, while expressive “proof” in an essay is expressing an idea by exploring it 
through lived experiences, as Montaigne did in his innovation on the essay form (Zeiger 
456). Even though lab reports tend toward exposition and personal essays are more 
expressive, all writing makes use of these modes. Knowing how to use which, and in 
what proportion, is part of the experiences in different disciplinary genres students will 
gain in writing them. In addition to exposition and expression as particular modes of 
proof, writing from research “gets at the heart of the entire academic project,” and so 
information literacy is a vital discipline for composition students (Brent 50).xcv However, 
as with “generalized writing,” any notion of research “in general” needs to be explicitly 
abstract enough for students to see it across various specific situations. Rather than 
pretend these moves are directly applicable to any writing situation, we foreground the 
necessary fictionality of such abstractions and emphasis the importance of contextual 
awareness of any given encounter.  
Recalling the genealogical connection between the progymnasmata exercises and 
modal discourse, we might then re-deploy modal writing as movements within the 
“classical arrangement,” as outlined by Crowley and Hawhee in Ancient Rhetoric for 
Contemporary Students, to serve as specific pattern practice in our first-year composition 
kata. Exordium functions as Explication, the folding out of the structure of the text from 
the beginning. Narratio is an essayistic mode of Expression, and the Partitio focuses on 
Exposition, delineating facts and defining specific areas of concern. These two parts 
function enthymematically; while the Expression outlines a narrative of the position and 
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its details, the Exposition works to support those details with evidence. The 
Argumentation section includes both confirmatio and refutatio, dealing with counter 
arguments, but also the “alternative” concession toward consensus. Peroratio functions 
as Implication, ending the text by folding into a larger issue. By reducing down the 
classical arrangement into a modal structure of Ex/Implication, Expression, Exposition, 
and Argumentation, we have a set of discrete patterns of writing through which specific 
techniques are executed. By maintaining the rigidity of the classical form, even while 
modifying the specifics, we have a collective base for repetition.  
While composition pedagogy has been motivated by a rejection of formalism 
regarding specific assignments, the formalist assignment sequence has persisted: a final 
stage in a semester-long process of research, proposal, drafting, revision, and 
presentation. While this traditional assignment sequence may be useful for future work in 
humanities research, the vast majority of students will not use this process for anything 
more than class. Rather than building up to a mock-version of something almost none of 
them will do again, a composition kata aims to develop the students as writers through 
intensive writing and repetition. Rather than a linear series of different assignments that 
progress toward the final product, this kata has students start with the “final product,” in 
small scope of course, and build on it, rather than up to it, through a series of recursive 
iterations. The kata approach has students do everything all at once from the beginning, 
and the progress of the class is the repetition of this process, additively on a single 
document until it becomes something commensurable to other alternative assignments. In 
a kata approach, students learn all the moves in sequence, completing the whole is a 
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starting point, and the work of repetition develops those movements as reflexive, and the 
eventual goal is execution of the pattern with grace, power, flow, and precision. 
After some initial class time training in basic moves and gaining rhetorical 
concepts, students would start with a three-page version of their kata, generating the 
necessary elements from their own self. Explicating the structure of the belief, then 
relating the expressive basis for it, outlining specific facts and details, and then dealing 
with contentious points, counter claims, or concessions, before situating the belief within 
the larger debate. Having written a substantial document expressing a political belief, 
students would need to engage with their peers in critique, explore and inquire about the 
conflict and disagreements concerning their opinion. They would learn that the belief is 
not merely theirs, but a particular position within a particular conflict, as Gerald Graff 
suggests in Beyond the Culture Wars.xcvi Next, students would develop their position 
through research-as-inquiry, taking their preexisting belief, and honing it through 
comparison with other and different beliefs presented by their peers, using the peer 
feedback to direct their research. The following week, students would then integrate these 
other texts into the next revision of the essay. This revision might be altering details or 
the belief entirely, and would feature the typical integration practices of summary, 
paraphrase, and quotation.  
However, the document itself would need to remain the same number of pages 
and retain the same formal structure; a kata is the same sequence every time. At this 
point, students may have little sense of their own writing as it appears to others, so we 
would need partner practice, a necessary accompanying pedagogy to kata that I outline in 
Chapter 5. Each would practice attack and defense in turn, allowing students to gain 
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practice not only in attempting critique, but also in defending themselves and conceding 
aspects as well. Students would then revise to account for the week’s partner practice and 
development of their position, again writing “more” in the same space. In three weeks, 
students will have written the same three-page essay three times, and each version would 
be more robust with the addition of research and counterargument. Because of the strict 
limit, students would be unable to extensively develop their writing through “fluff,” but 
forced to be precise, concise, and powerful. All of the energy students might spend in 
expansion would be focused on intensifying the essay itself. However, this recursive 
cycle of revision is only one iteration in a still larger assignment sequence, a set of 
recursive rounds that take up the bulk of the semester.  
Through each successive iteration, we would lengthen the essay, students building 
onto and out from their previous document to make the required length. For example, 
Round 1 is three pages, so Round 2 would be six, Round 3 ten, and finally Round 4 
would be fifteen pages. While the initial drive to three pages may be difficult, as students 
gain experience and practice in the recursive cycle, each subsequent iteration would be 
easier, and made more so by the diminishing proportional increase of page length: first 
doubling, and then adding 60%, then 50%. The goal is not having students merely write 
10 pages about some topic, but to write 15 finalized, effective pages out of nearly 100 
that were written. Kata are difficult purposefully, and since the first-year composition 
assignment is a pedagogical exercise in the same vein, making it difficult on purpose 
would make eventual “real” writing tasks easier.  
While initially having students find something is enough, as the class progresses 
we could become more and more rigid, requiring particular types or disciplines of 
 161 
scholarship. Counterargument would become easier as well, as students become more 
experienced and skilled in the practice, more comfortable with each other as writers, as 
well as understand their own position and its strengths and weaknesses more deeply. 
Rather than revising as a specific step, students revise every week until the end of the 
term. Instead of researching once or early on, students research throughout the term. This 
kind of recursive repetition would more closely model the recursive writing process of 
“real writers” and produce a productive difficulty that would not be expected from other, 
“real” writing tasks like higher division courses and future employment. In short, by 
using this recursive method, by making it harder on the students, we will be making it 
easier on them in the end. Also, beyond the intensive writing cycles could be down time, 
consisting of student conferences, grading, and the day-to-day activities would consist of 
free-writing and discussion, practice in terms and methods, and response and discussion 
to the political conflicts of the day. Rather than writing merely, students would be writing 
themselves with force, precision, and flow. 
 
VI. Implications 
While it is certainly noble to aim for authentic writing experiences as a way to 
train students in future writing tasks, the rhetorical situation of the composition class 
makes such authenticity problematic. Not only are the writing tasks within first-year 
composition specifically for a grade, but the implied audience of the instructor and even 
classmates thus fictionalizes any authentic writing task students might attempt. Ideally, 
while students would write for more than a grade, the grade itself is an undeniable 
exigence. Also, because the specific forms and moves that students require in their 
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specific academic and professional disciplines vary so widely, no single “academic 
discourse” can prepare students for their disciplinarily-specific future goals and writing 
tasks. While it would be ideal to prepare students in writing both in their disciplines and 
across the curriculum throughout their collegiate career, in institutions lacking robust 
curricula, when first-year composition attempts to accomplish a full college writing 
curriculum in a single semester, we end up doing very little. However, in training 
students in particular writing moves, we can allow students to reflect on their own writing 
practices, and improve their dispositions, making the variety of future writing tasks more 
accessible. This is not “general academic discourse,” but training in meta-discursive 
reflection and practice in patterns of discourse common to all writing in academic, 
professional, and even personal contexts. 
While The Framework rejects the notion of formulaic writing for inauthentic 
audiences as conducive to dispositional development, the actual situation of composition 
makes such writing a necessary mode of instruction (Wardle, “Intractable Problems” 2). 
Until the material and ideological conditions that hinder instructors radically change, 
formulaic writing for inauthentic audiences could be the most workable pedagogy some 
of us have, and we can do it differently though the practice of kata. By focusing on the 
student dispositions, through writing, we can allow them the chance to develop 
themselves as writers, not merely improve their “writing” or collect the specific written 
forms they will need. This is especially the case if we focus on dispositional 
development, helping students lower their center of gravity; training students through 
writing as compassionate and reflective affective subjects, rather than technically 
competent collections of transferable skills. 
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However, kata alone is insufficient for the kind of fully involved rhetorical 
training we need to promote. Indeed, in martial arts practice, the kind of individual 
performance in kata is complemented by a different kind of kata as well as a 
contradictory practice: kumite in karate, and randori from judo. In contrast to individual 
pattern practice, we also need free practice, not just for the students themselves, but also 
for the students with each other. In working with a partner, the student defender (shite) 
gets a real-if-tempered experience of using the technique, movement, or strategy on a 
live-if-cooperative, partner (uchite/ukete) (Friday 164). While early on, instructors might 
require student partners to be especially cooperative, more experienced students would 
require less cooperation, more closely mimicking the aggression of an actual attacker or 
competition opponent. Without a partner, students’ abstract internalization fails to 
account for the weight of reality
lxxxviii In turning to kata, I am emulating and complicating an approach developed 
independently by both  Barry Kroll and Alex Channon, who use a similar turn in their 
works The Open Hand and “Moving Lessons: Teaching Sociology through Embodied 
Learning in the HE Classroom” respectively. While Kroll comes from a writing 
background and turns to martial arts and Channon comes from martial arts and physical 
education and turns to writing, the confluence of these two disciplines from each side 
illustrates the tenability and productivity of this approach. However, while my approach 
also turns to kata as a way to teach students the argumentative essay as a series of moves, 
I depart from them by engaging the questions of authenticity and developing my own 
kata-based approach to the classical arrangement form.  
 
lxxxixThere is, however, more reason to return pre-post-secondary education to these 
exercises as models of rhetorical practice. Jim Selby, of the Whitfield Academy and the 
Association of Classical and Christian Schools markets such a curriculum as part of their 
home-school or in-school materials. While it is heartening to see the continued use of 
these ancient exercises, besides those of us interested in classical rhetoric in the academy, 
it is a shame that such practices would only be the purview of parochial, and perhaps 
problematically conservative (anti-sophistic) pedagogues. 
 
xc On these three types of knowledge in composition, see Elizabeth Wardle, “Intractable 
Writing Program Problems, Kairos, and Writing about Writing: A Profile of the 
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University of Central Florida’s First-Year Composition Program,” Composition Forum 
27 (Spring 2013): 1-15, and Mark Wiley, “The Popularity of Formulaic Writing (And 
Why We Need to Resist),” The English Journal 90.1 (Sept. 2000): 61-67. 
xci See Kristine Hansen, “The "Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing": Better 
than the Competition, Still Not All We Need,” College English, 74.6 (July 2012): 540-
543 and Carol Severino, “The Problems of Articulation: Uncovering More of the 
Composition Curriculum” College English 74.6 (July 2012): 533-536 
 
xcii However, karate is only one example of pattern practice, and there is a similar 
practice in the Chinese art, tai chi chuan. This difference illustrates that even a strict 
formalist practice; there are multiple ways of performing a rigid form. Herman Kauz 
explains that in tai chi “the form is done slowly, and the position and the movement of 
every part of the body receive careful attention…knees remain bent throughout and the 
back is held perpendicular to the ground… the body remains as relaxed as possible and 
only the very minimum of strength is used” (Kauz 81). However, in karate, kata “are 
usually performed with much greater speed and less emphasis on exact placement of 
various parts of the body…at the moment of focus the performer simultaneously tenses a 
large number of muscles” (Kauz 81). While both styles seek executing the movements 
with grace and flow, in karate the emphasis is on power, but tai chi trades power for 
precision. Despite how it is characterized in Western depictions and media, tai chi chuan 
or “Supreme Ultimate Striking” was created as the best possible fighting art. Legend has 
it, it has never been defeated in mixed martial arts. However, because the monk who 
popularized tai chi in the West was unable to perform the movements with the proper 
force and speed, the form was slowed down, leading to the image of slow moving people 
in a park. These two “hard” and “soft” approaches to the same kind of routinized 
individual striking practice present two different ways of executing the movements, the 
emphasis on speed and power can be applied to kata of any art. That is, a tai chi 
practitioner could train with power and speed, as easily as a karateka could focus on 
precision. This attitude difference also illustrates the stylistic character embodied in each 
art’s specific form.  
 
xciii This is not to promote one political identity over another, but provide all students with 
an opportunity to practice reflection on beliefs that are personal, but concern others as a 
matter of fact. This kind of self-reflection necessitates an environment of safety and 
compassion in the classroom. This is especially the case now with hyper-partisanship 
being the dominant style of political engagement in social media or public spaces. 
Actually, the virulence of partisan politics, and the accompanying discomfort many feel 
in talking about it, is evidence for this kind of discussion and disagreement in the safe 
space of the classroom. Because political discourse has become more factional, 
discussion between students on questions on which they differ is more important than 
ever. First-year composition is also particularly suited for this kind of discussion because 
it is generally the smallest class for many first year students, and the instructor more 
approachable than those in large lectures. This is not very different from the “current 
events” content that I’ve certainly employed, but thinking about it through the individuals 
in the class, rather than through some distant place called “politics” would provide a 
different, individual perspective on issues of social concern. 
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xciv Because the ancients worked in a much less technologically advanced context, 
disposition was the only medium of education, and they lacked the thousand years of 
academic baggage that haunts and directs contemporary writing education. Also, while 
the ancient rhetorical arena was homogenous in comparison to the contemporary student 
body, the presumed value of equality of students, men and women of varying skin-tones 
and nationalities, means the ideological space of equality is still useful, even if it is a 
creative reimagining of the actual ancient context. While we’re not training students to 
orally defend themselves in court (since the technology of lawyers has since taken over 
that need), we’re training them to speak and write (read and listen) to other real people in 
real circumstances, rather than mock-disciplinary forms and preparing students for 
assumed future careers in academics. 
 
xcv While I think information literacy should function as a course on its own, a First-Year 
Researching course, this would fall into the same problems as WAC/WID, an inability 
for a single course to prepare all the various students adequately in the research practices 
and expectations for their disciplines, requiring more robust Research-across-Curriculum 
and/or Research-in-Disciplines. While such information literacy has been the purview of 
writing courses, whether or not first-year composition is the appropriate or practical place 
for is another argument altogether. 
 
xcvi The rhetorical basics are useful here as well, functioning as an interpretive frame or 
heuristic for research. Ethos, pathos, and logos are also certainly basic, but instead of 
considering them as the discrete elements, I prefer pluralistic valences of persuasion. 
That is, we are persuadable and persuaded because we believe, feel, and think. Using this 
heuristic, we can require students to reflect on the plural modes of persuasion at work in 
the text: How does it make you feel? What does it make you think? What does it want 
you to believe? How? Also, specific identification of the enthymemes, including endoxa 
(commonplaces), and examples used by a text would also allow students to see not only 
that and how other writers make claims and support them, but also that such support is 
not singular, but can function rhetorically in different ways. In maintaining the rigidity 
characteristic of kata training, we might require students to repeat the same analytic on 
each text they encounter.  
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Chapter 5  
Kumite of Rhetoric: Weight of Reality, Peer Critique, and the Sparring-
Centered Classroom 
Once an apprentice fighter had learned the basic moves and combinations of the art, he 
would be permitted to engage in open sparring with other trainees. 
Grandmaster Jim Arvanitis, Pankration 15 
 
Some students may be hesitant to critique, and will only tell their writing group what they 
think has been done well. Remind students that even when a paper is good, it can always 
be improved. 
NCTE’s “Guidelines for Writing Groups” 
 
I. Transition and Explication 
Building on the kihon approach to the “basics” of diction and syntax and a 
recursive kata approach to the “form” of the writing assignment, in this chapter I 
approach “peer review” as a form of kumite or “sparring.” In both martial arts and 
composition, students learn through such “partner practice,” working with other students 
to improve their abilities in responding to a real person. If students only practice their 
skills individually and alone, shadowboxing or writing for a “general audience,” they will 
be unable to develop the abilities to respond to the dynamic realities they will encounter 
in practicing their writing or martial arts out in the world. However, just like the 
situations in which they will be used, practicing with partners requires an openness and 
vulnerability that can be difficult because of the risk of harm that comes in working with 
others. While kumite directly accounts for and directs this risk, peer review has had a 
difficult time with it.   
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That is, many students already (mis)understand peer critique as an antagonistic 
exercise, leading some to be cruelly brutal and others to not engage at all. This pervasive 
sense of “critique” being cruel and antagonistic leads many teachers to reduce or 
eliminate the risk of conflict from the exercise, even if the result is a blithe, apathetic lack 
of engagement altogether. Rather than try to “fix” this risk, and inevitably fail to do so, 
we should instead direct and intensify this risk of antagonism, not changing students’ 
conceptions of it as a fighting exercise, but changing their conceptions of what fighting 
exercises are and can be. To do so, we can look at kumite, the corollary partner practice in 
martial arts, in which sparring partners work together to hone their techniques, experience 
the effects of such techniques, and reflect on their skills in both technical and ethical 
terms, rather than brutalizing each other or patting each other on the back. Therefore, 
examining kumite allows us to see the fundamental challenges of “peer review” in 
general, and peer critique specifically, in a different way: not as a problematically 
conflictual exercise we must do peacefully, but a necessarily conflictual exercise that is 
not necessarily violent.   
Rather than forcing a faux peace upon a necessarily contentious exercise, we can 
complicate and intensify students’ conception and practice of conflict, giving them space 
and experience in safe and productive disagreement. To cultivate productive 
disagreement, I suggest that peer groups serve as audience and exigence for whom and 
with whom students will be writing, rather than peer critique merely serving as a way of 
improving papers. That is, rather than students critiquing each other to make their papers 
better, this sparring-centered classroom has students write papers only so that their 
partners will have something on which to practice their skills of critique. By finding their 
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audiences and then writing to them, students will be more realistically preparing for the 
audience/exigence-driven writing they will be doing in the future, which places “partner 
practice” at the center of our pedagogy, rather than its current peripheral position, highly 
valued though it is. At the end of this chapter, I outline a specific example of a kumite 
peer critique exercise, one of any number of possibilities.  
 
II. The Abundant: Benefits and Pervasive Challenges of “Peer Review” 
a. No More Cats and Coffee  
Over the last forty years, we have moved away from the image of the Romantic 
Author, a solitary genius toiling away in the “company of cats and coffee,” toward a 
more rhetorically-aware concept of writing and a more socially-oriented concept of the 
writer (Sperling 55).xcvii Central to this shift is the work of Soviet sociologist Lev 
Vygotsky, who coined the “zone of proximal development” (ZPD), which is “the level of 
potential development as determined by problem solving under adult guidance or in 
collaboration with more capable peers” compared to the ability of an individual student to 
solve problems on their own (Vygotsky 86). Building on Vygotsky’s ZPD, it is now 
pedagogical commonsense in composition that students practice with peers to build on 
what they already know and can do to develop toward what we want them to learn, but 
are not yet capable of doing.xcviii Through collaborative activities like peer review, 
teachers grant students more power over their own learning, prepare them to eventually 
learn better on their own, and prepare them for their future collaborative writing 
situations, like the workplace.  
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However, because it is so foundational, pervasive, and highly valued, many 
scholars and practitioners of collaboration assume that everyone knows and agrees about 
the benefits, uses, and challenges of this exercise. However, this pedagogical lore means 
very few works on peer review engage with the complexity, history, and wide variation 
of this practice, since “everyone knows peer review.” However, both “peer review” and 
kumite share four features as “partner practice”: 1) immense benefits, 2) complexity of 
practice and variation of practices, 3) necessarily specific and explicit methods, and 4) 
technical and ethical modeling by the instructor. Therefore, before I shift to my own 
intervention of peer critique as kumite, and the critique inherent in peer review, I must 
first treat “peer review” in a comprehensive, if lengthy manner, which will be repeated 
and intensified when turning to kumite, which is the way kumite, itself, is practiced.  
b. The Copious Benefits of Collaboration 
Overall, peer review is said to help students learn more, learn better, and generally 
improve student writing in various ways.xcix It helps students develop a better sense of 
writing for an audience by providing them a real one to write for, rather than either just 
writing for themselves, what they think the teacher wants, or to the imaginary “general 
audience,” which is really writing to no one at all.c In writing for various peers, students 
get a wide variety of audience perspectives along with the instructor’s, see how their 
same text can be read many different ways, and in turn students are not just exposed to 
the intimidating work of established professional authors, but to the different writing 
styles of more relatable peers as well, even if students vary in ability and experience.ci 
Furthermore, this peer interaction makes the class into a community of writers all honing 
their craft together, a group of motivated learners all working toward the same goals, 
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albeit at various levels and varying speeds.cii This difference in students’ abilities and 
speeds of development motivates the ZPD, and it is an inexorable element of teaching a 
diverse student body. This improved communality also makes them more comfortable 
sharing their writing, a deeply personal and socially risky act, which generally improves 
the affective classroom environment and makes future collaborative learning more 
effective.ciii  
While we usually focus on the benefits of feedback for the writer to improve their 
own writing, in fact the activity is mutually beneficial for both writer and reviewer, who 
learn by both giving and receiving feedback.civ One benefit for reviewers is practicing 
critical analysis on more accessible texts and engaging with the authors themselves rather 
than anxiously searching for “the answer,” which is often their approach to assigned 
readings (Paulson et.al. 306). Additionally, Lundstrom and Baker cite Graner to argue 
that “the act of providing feedback may also improve student writing and may be the 
most beneficial aspect of peer review,” while merely receiving feedback might be 
negligible in terms of overall writing quality; in peer review it is better to give than to 
receive (38, Graner 42). Without feedback, students would have little sense of how their 
own writing comes across, negating the benefits of audience awareness, which is not only 
true of first-year undergraduates, but doctoral candidates and professional writers too.  
Furthermore, peer review doesn’t just help the students, but the teacher as well. 
By granting more power to the students, collaborative writing changes the role of the 
teacher from an authority figure who inputs data and evaluates output to a facilitator who 
establishes, directs, and monitors situations in which learning happens.cv Peer review also 
reduces the teacher’s grading and correction work load, allowing them to focus more 
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individually on more students, improving the overall quality of instruction.cvi This easing 
of teachers’ labor may actually be the origin of the peer review in composition, rather 
than the collaborative writing practices of literary societies or elite education.cvii It even 
helps address disruptive behavior or bigoted perspectives —e.g. a student writing that all 
people of color are poor and illiterate—, by exposing students to a social situation of 
peers, which is far more effective in addressing these problems than the censorious 
rebuke of a teacher, regardless of how understanding they might be, or claim to be.cviii  
Despite the copious benefits though, peer review, our most pervasive and valuable 
exercise is far from perfect. Indeed, the widespread dislike, distaste, and distrust of the 
practice, by students and instructors, is just as pervasive as the celebration of its benefits. 
There are three central challenges for “peer review”: the multiplicity of “peer review” 
practices, the mismatch between the instructors and students in ability and expectation, 
and the tendency for students when engaging with their peers to be either bloodthirsty or 
cuddly-wuddly, either attacking their peers and exerting power over them or only 
providing objectifying platitudes and facile encouragement. Both affective extremes, 
over-aggression and objectifying passivity, as well as the challenge of a contextually-
fitting structure, characterize and motivate ineffective peer review.  
c. Some Challenge(r)s: a Manifold Spectrum, Ability Mismatch, Affective Extremes 
First, beyond “working with others on writing” or partner practice, there is no 
“peer review” as such, as students can write with each other in varying ways to varying 
degrees.cix Rather, this term is used among many others for all the various, conflicting, 
and contradictory forms of partner practice invented and implemented over the past 
century with varying levels of success and replicability.cx That is, teaching, writing, and 
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especially teaching writing are all radically contingent on so many situational factors that 
what works at one university may fail miserably at another, or even the same activity by 
the same teacher may have widely differing results semester to semester, institution to 
institution, and even course to course.cxi Because of this multiplicity, peer review’s value 
and efficacy has mixed results in scholarship, ranging from “no noticeable effects on 
student writing” to “peer evaluations [being] as effective as teacher evaluation,” and there 
are always more and different aspects, angles, situations, applications, or even methods of 
inquiry for peer review that have not yet been accounted for (Harris 377).cxii Perhaps, 
ultimately the question “what is ‘peer review’?” cannot be totally or finally answered, but 
this undecidability doesn’t mean all “peer review” practices are therefore the same or that 
this multiplicity of practices is a homogenous mess, lacking structures, features, and 
patterns.  
In fact, there are several recognizable models along a spectrum of “peer review” 
that provide guideposts to engage with this complex and multiple practice.cxiii On one end 
of the spectrum are “peer editing” or “peer evaluation” in which students approach peer 
review as an “error hunting exercise” or use a teacher-designed rubric or set of criteria to 
render a judgment about the quality of peers’ writing.cxiv Restricting writing to a discrete 
set of qualities on a work sheet often reduces all peer engagement to mere correction rife 
with class, gender, and race prejudices, often encourages overcorrection that can make 
students’ writing worse, and often inculcates a restrictive, formulaic, and ineffective 
notion of writing itself.cxv In simply correcting, students approach the text as a brute 
mechanism to be “fixed” or a dirty window to be wiped clean; once clean and fixed, the 
writing is understood to be “good” (Vatalaro 23). In teaching students that there’s “good 
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writing” that has six or seven qualities, teachers fail to account for the various rhetorical 
factors that affect an individual text’s efficacy and how such factors determine whether a 
text is recognized as “writing” at all. In sum, this strict form of peer review doesn’t help 
students improve their own writing on their own, but only demonstrates their ability to 
follow orders with a teacher-mandated rubric to meet teacher-mandated expectations.  
However, on the other end of the spectrum, “peer response” and “peer 
conferences” challenge the drive toward formulaic writing. These freer models can take 
the form of small groups, meetings with the instructor, or whole-class workshops, with 
varying degrees of formality and structure, including open-ended verbal response, 
dialogic discussion, and written memos.cxvi Rather than using a preconstructed set of 
“qualities of good writing” or reducing “good writing” to mere correctness, these models 
have students grapple with more holistic elements like coherence, tone, content, and 
structure in a deeper and more productive way, the solution to archaic and reductive 
“peer editing.” However, a worksheet can be equally reductive even if it emphasizes 
higher-order-concerns over lower-order ones, which can exacerbate the difference 
between students’ writing abilities. Furthermore, rejecting peer editing altogether risks 
students not learning “the basics” that will be expected by future teachers and employers 
as well, putting students from “nonmainstream” discourses at a severe disadvantage 
(Sperling 74). We need to find a balance here, which is not some ideal “middle ground” 
between too strict and too free, but inventively responding to the situational factors that 
make “peer review” a manifold and complex practice in the first place.   
Second, as teachers often bewail, many students cannot review, evaluate, or even 
edit their peers’ work well or fairly. For example, Newkirk found that rather than 
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suggesting that the author expand on unclear ideas in the text, student reviewers were 
“more willing to do some of this elaboration as readers” (306). That is, they intuited what 
they think the author “intended,” based on their identification with the author’s 
experience, and credited such intuited intention rather than the writing itself, as teachers 
did, producing a large discrepancy between students’ and teachers’ evaluations of the 
same text. Also, what to us instructors is “‘simple’ is…‘really complex” to our students, 
who are far more generous due to their comparative inexperience with writing and 
unawareness of conventions, such as their seeing a simplistic metaphor as a nuanced 
description and a common generic trope as an original idea (Newkirk 306). Furthermore, 
students also have challenges even identifying whether a text meets the terms of an 
assignment, which leads some to see a failing text as not only adequate but even “really 
good” (Paulson et.al. 321). But conversely, we might also underestimate our students, not 
assuming them willing or capable of what we see as “complex,” an infantilization that 
can be just as ineffective as being too difficult. This mismatch between students’ and 
instructors’ abilities and expectations means “peer review” might not only feel like a 
waste of time but actually be a waste of time that creates bad habits, bad attitudes, and 
bad writing.cxvii  
Additionally, this mismatch persists across the spectrum, manifesting differently 
for “peer editing” than “peer response.” A more restrictive “peer editing” model teaches 
“that conforming to norms is what matters” and encourages students to complete the 
work merely to “satisfy the teacher,” privileging the writing of already-privileged 
students (Woodward 40, Freedman 87). A freer form, however, encourages “social 
loafing” with more able students doing more than those less able, which only exacerbates 
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the mismatch between students and instructors by intensifying the mismatch between 
students themselves, breeding laziness and resentment (Louth et.al. 221). Being overly 
rigid and restrictive might inculcate students with correctness and propriety, but will 
benefit those least in need of it at the expense of those in most need, and being too lax 
and permissive likewise allows for the preexisting differences between students to persist 
and even become worse. A bad experience with peer review might sour the students 
toward their peers, their instructor, the class, and perhaps even writing altogether. 
While the specific structure of “peer review” must be contingent on and 
developed from the institutional context and student body on whom it will be used, 
navigating extremes and finding the proper balance is not simply a technical question, but 
an affective one as well. In addition to the first challenge of establishing a balance 
between structure and freedom, and the second challenge of managing the mismatch in 
ability between students and instructor, the third challenge of peer review is that students 
often tend to become “sharks or teddy bears,” either aggressively and groundlessly 
attacking their peers or avoiding saying anything critical to avoid hurting anyone’s 
feelings, with both extremes leading to inadequate students inadequately responding to 
inadequate essays (Hall 3). Like the mismatch, these affective extremes persist across the 
spectrum of peer review practices, and must be addressed along with, but perhaps 
differently than, the challenges of structure and ability. 
If students become “teddy bears,” then neither partner gains the useful experience 
of reviewing writing or having their writing reviewed. For example, Paulson et.al. found 
that even though the student-writer was anonymous, students used recognizable and 
familiar “safety language”: “I liked this” or “I thought it was good” (322). Because 
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language is used to “establish, maintain, and reshape relationships as much as to share 
ideas and insights,” such safety talk that demonstrates good faith and charitable 
understanding is a “precondition for communication” (Danis 356, Porter 586). Certainly, 
we want to promote compassion among our students, but “to assume that the author can 
do no wrong” produces ineffective “feedback [that] is superficial, overly flattering, vague 
and very brief” (Porter 597, Vatalaro 2). Safety language may even be a way of avoiding 
the difficult task of substantially engaging with writing altogether.cxviii  
The facile, objectifying “I thought it was good” in place of more substantial 
feedback relates that a partner couldn’t be bothered to engage with the text at all, or at 
best, telling peers what they want to hear because the mandatory exercise is pointless and 
futile anyway. The “teddy bear” isn’t simply warm and fuzzy, but an unresponsive, 
inanimate object, smiling at us with soulless eyes. This “safety” then, is not necessarily 
(or even perhaps often) the result of caring for others and not wanting to cause pain, but 
an assumption of pain inherent in any engagement, for both writer and reviewer, an 
apathetic performance of “living and letting live.” Certainly, everyone may leave the 
class feeling good about themselves, but students letting their peers go forward with a 
false sense of their writing would be a disservice to them, and regardless of how nicely it 
is committed, instructors would be complicit accessories to this violent neglect. 
Alternatively, if students become “sharks,” the tendency of humans to react to 
aggression with aggression would escalate the conflict beyond the productive bounds of 
pedagogy or students might shut down entirely, rendering the exercise ineffective as well. 
For example, Berkenkotter had one student, Stan, whose “aggressive behavior and his use 
of expletives suggests that he enjoyed the feeling of power” afforded by reviewing 
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another’s writing, while receiving such criticism “upset him” (314).cxix Believing 
“everyone has their own opinion” that cannot be questioned, Stan saw any critique as an 
ungrounded, personal attack, and this common belief among many students turns them 
“into the kind of harsh, antagonistic reader that they would otherwise resent” like Stan, 
whose ruthless criticism was “frequently unsupported by evidence or constructive 
suggestions for revision”  (Porter 577, Berkenkotter 315).  
Contrasting with Stan’s aggression, another of Berkenkotter’s students, Joan “lost 
confidence” when critiqued by her peers, allowing herself to be overwritten, and doubting 
her own abilities as a writer (318).cxx Rather than bolster her own prose or viewpoints, 
Joan instead took the feedback from peers more seriously than she took her own writing, 
bending to their views, their suggestions, and writing what they seemed to want rather 
than what she wanted to say, preventing her gaining practice in articulating and 
developing her own ideas in a text. Both examples illustrate the more complex, two-fold 
responses possible for sharks: they can eat or be eaten. This means that sharks, while 
more distasteful, move and do more than the idle, inanimate teddy-bear that does not 
respond to anything. After a bloodbath, no one is left unstained, whether they were 
relishing in the glory or were struck by the horror, and the blood is ultimately on the 
instructor’s hands.  
For my own part, in diagnosing these problems with “peer review” I have seen 
my own past practices in a stark light. That is, I have been a complicit accessory to 
bloody massacre after bloody massacre. Rather than the well-thought out and justified 
practices of the scholars I have outlined above, my own success has been perhaps more 
emergent and accidental than purposeful and intentional. However, I have found that 
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sharks are preferable to teddy-bears. The challenge for sharks is not dulling their teeth, 
but directing their appetites toward targets that would allow others to benefit greatly, 
while teddy-bears just sit there. The core challenge is the concept of conflict, and what it 
allows us to do. However, by having an explicit method and effectively modeling 
engagement with texts, any form of partner practice, whether intentional and well-
developed or poorly-formed and haphazard can offer some of the benefits of 
collaboration to student writers.  
c. How to Peer Review: Explicitness, Specificity, Modeling, and the Necessity of Critique 
While conflicting evidence and methodological complexity makes choosing “best 
practices” for peer review difficult, there are a few common agreements outlining how 
students should engage one another, how to mitigate the instructor/student mismatch, and 
how to avoid the affective extremes of sharks and teddy bears. First, students should not 
make brief verbal comments about their peers’ writing, but provide specific and detailed 
written accounts, ask questions about the text, pointing out problems and suggesting what 
the writer might do differently.cxxi However, “be specific” is also perhaps one of the 
vaguest suggestions one can provide: how students must be specific in responding to their 
peers depends on what needs specifying, how they should do it, as well as the specifics of 
the place and purpose of the moves in the text that need to be specified. That is, “specify” 
is a generalizable suggestion, but the specific specifics are radically contingent. 
Second, while practices can range from the restrictive and reductive “peer 
editing” to open-ended and precarious “peer response,” we need to choose some mode, 
model, and method, although it doesn’t ultimately determine the success of the exercise. 
A poorly executed “peer review” is not better than well-done “peer editing,” simply by 
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having more “freedom,” but rather, we need to be attentive to circumstances, responsive 
and reflective of our own practices. Whatever practices we employ in each case need to 
be planned and explained to our students explicitly and in detail. After explicit 
instruction, students’ comments become more specific, and the writers find these 
comments more helpful.cxxii Obviously, teaching students what to do makes it easier for 
them to do it and do it well; the more direct and specific feedback is, the more students 
will be able to apply it to their writing and feel better about their abilities to do so. 
In addition to explicitly instructing what to do in engaging with peers’ texts, we 
must model “the perspective [students] are being asked to adopt while peer-reviewing” 
from the beginning of the course in all our interactions with all texts to help “students to 
learn not only how to do the work…but also that what we’re doing is important enough to 
devote substantial class time to the task” (Paulson et.al. 327, Hall 5). It’s not enough to 
model this merely in a preparatory lecture for “peer review week” because “if we just go 
through the motions, perhaps passing out recycled handouts, our students will pick up on 
our lack of dedication and act accordingly” (Brammer and Rees 81). Not only should we 
demonstrate the technical methods of questions and substantial engagement, but also the 
affective manner of approach: an assertiveness that is neither vicious nor laudatory, 
neither aggressive nor apathetic. If we want students to perform peer review as something 
worthwhile then we need to show them that it’s worth doing and model how to do it both 
technically and affectively, perhaps even exposing our own writing to feedback and 
criticism as well, showing that we are writers too.  
However, regardless of how much power we give students, the different names 
and spins we give to “peer review,” or how well we model engaging with a text, students 
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and administrators still expect grades at the end of the term, and many students inevitably 
“may be guided by the sole purpose of getting a higher grade rather than improving their 
writing,” especially for students in a required first-year composition course (Beck 417). 
Producing this grade through evaluation means not just noting what was good and well 
done, but pointing out what was not good nor done well, because “even when a paper is 
good, it can always be improved,” making instructors necessarily judges (krites) or critics 
of students (NCTE 1). If we’re preparing students for writing beyond the safe space of 
the composition classroom, we need to prepare them for critique because “models for 
critique exist in every field,” even if we don’t call them “critique” (Soep 750). We have 
moved away from “critique” as a term, but we cannot abandon it as a practice and must 
therefore qualify it, as “constructive” or “productive,” because students see “critique” as 
only destructive. The critic has always had a negative sense as “‘censurer, faultfinder’” 
(OED). Critique is therefore inherent in writing instruction, and however much we may 
want to avoid it, an inherent element in peer review, and therefore a potent element of 
students’ interactions with each other. 
While in critique there is a “sense of exposure that can be uncomfortable, and if 
abused, downright damaging,” this violence should not lead us to abandon this exercise 
nor should we condescendingly think students are incapable of dealing with it or even 
doing it in productive ways since “students are not as fragile as [and far tougher than] 
they are frequently represented to be” (Bickford 149, Porter 588). Therefore, instead of 
trying to fix the antagonistic concept of critique by reducing the risk of antagonism, we 
should instead use this risk, pervasive as it is, to our benefit. We can use a notion of 
fighting that isn’t simply brutality, but look to actual practices of fighting that counter 
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such brutality, fight against it, and embody an ethical alternative. That is, what I am 
suggesting is not a new or different alternative to what we already do, but rather a 
different way to inhabit and direct the preexisting tensions at work in peer critique. 
Students already think critique is sparring, so let’s explore sparring to see how critique 
could be otherwise.  
 
III. Enter Kumite: The Peer Critique of Martial Arts   
a. Another Spectrum: Kata, Randori, Kumite, Sparring  
Kumite or “sparring” is central to Japanese martial arts and shares several features 
with “peer review” in composition. First, kumite offers many of the same benefits as 
“peer review”: students practice with a real person to hone their ability to react to one, 
gaining feedback on their own abilities. Students also get a wide range of experiences 
with different opponents, learning from opponents and instructors, and cultivating and 
enacting a relationship of honor to their fellow fighters.cxxiii Students must first practice 
on their own, but partner practice is vital and integral from students’ earliest training. If 
students are to use what they learn with real people, then they need to practice what they 
learn with real people. Just as writing for a “general audience” is writing for no one, 
fighting an ideal opponent is not training to fight anyone at all.  
Second, “sparring” names a manifold spectrum of partner practices, with the 
intensity, formality, curricular value, and even the name depending on the specific style 
in question (just as we saw with peer review). On one end is formal sparring (kihon 
kumite or “kata”), the traditional practice that is used for evaluation and advancement in 
aikido and beginning students in karate, in which students practice a single technique or a 
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series of techniques, taking turns at offense (uchite) and defense (shite), with each partner 
practicing both roles to allow both partners to both hone their technique and help their 
partner hone theirs (Friday 164).cxxiv On the other end is free sparring (jiyu kumite or 
randori), a more dynamic practice that mimics a competitive match (as in judo, which 
uses it for evaluation and advancement) or the life and death situation of the battlefield or 
self-defense on the street (in aikido, randori refers to practice against multiple opponents) 
(Friday 171).  
Third, just like “peer review,” the place and importance of, as well as the “best 
practices” for kumite are debated and debatable, from the very beginning of Japanese 
martial arts as distinct from explicit military training. Furthermore, the spectrum of 
practice has allegiance to certain camps within the field, some valuing formal sparring 
over free, some more invested in tradition and some in practical application. Just as “peer 
review” and modern composition more broadly develops out of and in response to 
current-traditional rhetoric, Japanese martial arts and the debate around kumite developed 
in response to the aftermath of the Sengoku or “Warring States” Period (1467-1603), 
when “the teaching of martial arts began to emerge as a profession” (Friday 170).  
b. The 17th-century Kumite Debate 
During the Sengoku Period, a long period of military conflict between regional 
nobles and their armies that ended with the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
martial arts were taught by samurai for the explicit purpose of, and in addition to their 
main occupation, with samurai men serving their daimyo (lord) in battle and samurai 
women defending their home castle. Afterwards, without battles to fight in and get paid 
for, warriors had to find employment elsewhere, establishing schools and training anyone 
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in the combat arts full time, provided they could pay the fees, of course (not unlike the 
Sophists of ancient Attica) (Friday 170). In addition to the samurai themselves being 
restricted to their home districts, “contests between practitioners from different schools 
became frowned upon by both the government” and various masters themselves, which 
led to an increased number of increasingly insular schools (Friday 170). Without 
experience in combat or dueling, formal sparring was the “only exposure to martial arts” 
for this new generation of students and (then) teachers, their forms becoming “showier 
and more stylized,” even “fossilized” with only a passing resemblance to the practical 
combat techniques from which they were derived (Friday 170). However, some schools 
began using protective gear as a way for students to practice sparring at full speed and 
power without the dire and deadly physical consequences, sparking a debate about the 
purpose of and emphasis on formal and free sparring within the training curriculum 
(Friday 171).  
Proponents of free sparring argued that formal sparring “alone cannot develop the 
seriousness of purpose, the courage, decisiveness, aggressiveness, and forbearance vital 
to true mastery of combat. Such skills, they said, can be fostered only by contesting with 
an equally serious opponent…who is actually trying to strike them,” training students to 
react in real time with real consequences (Friday 171). If students only practice a series of 
rigid and predictable sequences, like a formalized writing rubric, they will then be 
unprepared to improvise in dynamic, rapidly-changing live situations. Other teachers 
promoted formal sparring, arguing free sparring “inevitably requires rules and 
modifications of equipment that moves trainees even further away from the conditions 
[and mindset] of duels and/or the battlefield,” and therefore was not “any more realistic a 
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method of training” than formal sparring, as even the most “realistic” writing assignment 
will never be realistic enough, as I argued in the previous chapter (Friday 171). 
Additionally, free sparring, especially early on and in place of formal sparring, can also 
lead students to gloss over the basics of proper technique, and it does not cultivate the 
ethical awareness and philosophical appreciation afforded by extensive practice.  
This 17th- century debate allows us to see that restricting ourselves to one end or 
the other will not guarantee success and each particular practice needs to be suited to the 
instructor and style in question, just like peer review. We cannot expect students to be 
able to accomplish difficult and complex work—on the job/in battle—without allowing 
them to develop their skills safely, but if we coddle our students too much, they will be 
ill-prepared to deal with the harsh reality of the risky situations they will encounter once 
they leave our class.cxxv Too much structure and not enough intensity leaves students with 
simplistic and reductive approaches to the dynamic complexity of the world they will 
encounter and the work they will be expected to do. Too little structure and too much 
intensity might lead students to irreparable harm, simply training them to be better at 
brutality, and either pushing them away from the practice altogether, perhaps being 
beaten down so badly they never come back, or get up, again. Because kumite deals 
directly with the risk of violence and works effectively against encouraging it, the 
manifold partner practice of martial arts can provide a useful way for the manifold 
partner practice of composition to deal with that same risk, one from which writing 
instruction all too often shies away.  
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c. Ethical Roles for Writing Attack and Defense  
In formal sparring, students take turns practicing individual techniques or series of 
techniques of attack as “uchite” and defense as “shite,” then they switch roles and repeat 
the exercise, and repeat, switch, repeat until the instructor directs them to practice a 
different sequence, gaining better training for a live opponent than a stationary dummy or 
just punching the air (Friday 164, n.1). Students know what is coming and how to 
respond, the explicit instructions required for any partner practice to be effective, which 
prevents anyone from being unprepared or confused. Furthermore, students take serious 
care to not injure their partner, but also provide a modicum of resistance to help them 
develop a sense of the weight of reality.  
In karate, for example, one uchite might attempt to punch their shite’s face, and 
the shite in response practices a block-redirection-counter attack sequence, only making 
light contact when blocking and striking, if at all. That is, the shite stops their blow 
before contact, preventing the harmful effects of the technique. Indeed, stopping an inch 
before delivering a powerful, painful, even deadly blow requires developing even more 
control than simply aiming a properly executed technique at the correct target would. 
Because developing such control takes time, students begin slowly and gently, increasing 
speed and intensity, eventually moving at full speed and with full power without touching 
at all. While “pulling punches” might train students to not make contact, a critique by 
free sparring advocates, actual contact simply requires students to aim one inch past their 
target, delivering the precise blow with maximum force. 
In grappling arts like judo, kumite is even more important because grappling 
cannot be practiced alone, and this mode likewise requires strict control and repetition. 
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Practicing with a partner, students begin with the individual steps of a throw, body 
positioning, balance, and leverage, progressively working up to a full smooth execution. 
Just as the karate student pulls their punches, the judo student slows their throws to 
lessen their impact and prevent serious harm. Judo also includes submission holds, 
chokes and joint-locks, so the thrower stops before applying too much pressure and the 
thrown taps out once they feel that pressure. While being-hit is an avoidable consequence 
in karate, in judo being-thrown is a necessary element of training, and so in preparation 
for any partner practice, judo students must practice being-thrown by falling extensively 
because the force of gravity is unavoidable. cxxvi  
In training students in writing and critique, we need to train them in doing and 
being-done-to, in both developing texts and engaging with them critically, a two-fold 
training like attack and defense, and these two examples illustrate two different ways that 
both kindly attacker and kindly defender (uchite/shite) prevent harm. In critiquing, as in 
karate, students must avoid being overly harmful or unnecessarily cruel, attacking 
obvious openings or addressing explicit issues, but stopping before delivering full 
concussive force. In being critiqued however, preventing harm is not entirely on the 
critic, but like the force of gravity in judo, students need to become accustomed to the 
inherent negation of critique, especially in something as personal as writing, a developed 
skill itself. The writer must let themselves fall and practice falling, leaving themselves 
open to being thrown without being crushed by it. While we must train students to avoid 
striking with deadly force except in the most extreme cases, we also must train them to 
harden their bodies for when force does come upon them.  
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In addition to preventing serious harm, partners have a corresponding 
responsibility to give an appropriate amount of resistance. Writers must provide good 
efforts and welcome responses; critics must be gentle, but not shy away from engaging as 
seriously and intensely as they would with an interlocutor outside the classroom. But 
partners should also allow their partners the opening to practice their techniques, 
allowing themselves to be thrown or open to be struck even as they trust their partner to 
not exploit their vulnerability. Punching too slowly or wildly, going along with the throw, 
tapping out too soon, or not taking the practice seriously are as disrespectful as going too 
hard or purposefully hurting a partner. Indeed, hurting a sparring partner is far more 
grievous than not going hard enough. Kumite is not simply conflictual or cooperative, but 
cooperative conflict and conflictual cooperation.cxxvii 
Admittedly, the wide cultural and historical differences between 17th-century 
Japanese martial arts training and contemporary composition means the pedagogy must 
be modified. However, in addition to cultivating a respectful classroom environment, we 
can and must model the person we want our students to be and respond to problems as 
swiftly and harshly as necessary and possible within whatever degrees of authority and 
freedom we have. For example, if a student were too harsh with one of their partners, an 
instructor might take them aside and correct them, and if they persist, the instructor might 
then practice a bit harshly with them. This is not carried out with joy or vengeance, but a 
deep sadness. If a student has chosen to forgo the self-discipline and compassion that is 
far more important than the proper technique of a punch or throw, it is the greatest 
dishonor an instructor can face. But there is never any guarantee in teaching, and students 
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might take what we teach them and use it for their own destructive, selfish, and self-
destructive ends.  
By emphasizing ethical relationships with and responsibilities to sparring partners 
on whom we practice techniques that can hurt, maim, and kill, and who we allow to 
practice on us, but explicitly prohibiting this in training, kumite develops self-discipline 
and empathy through respectful effort and mutual vulnerability. Rather than simply 
practicing at punching people, throwing them to the ground, and choking them 
unconscious, kumite trains students in techniques (and) in relationships with others; to not 
just be a good fighter, but a good fighter. Likewise, a kumite approach to peer critique 
would train students to be good writers and good critics, and we should therefore make it 
the core of our curriculum, like kumite is in so many ways in so many arts, cultivating 
increased ability with and ethical responsibility to partners without whom we could not 
improve. But furthermore, the control developed by kumite is not simply the ability to 
execute a technique correctly, but the ability to be other to one’s self. This ability is the 
self-discipline and critical thinking we often tout as the main result of training in critique, 
writing, and argumentation.   
 
IV. A Kumite of Peer Critique: Model, Method, and Exercise 
a. The Sparring-Centered Classroom  
In creating a kumite model of peer critique, we need to prepare students for 
writing beyond composition class, so rather than begin with students choosing an essay 
topic and then being sorted into peer groups, we might instead begin with peer groups 
and have students choose their essay topics based on the peers to whom they would be 
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writing and by whom they would be critiqued. This radically shifts the emphasis on 
assignments; rather than performing critique so that students can write a better essay, 
students would be writing the essay to that others can develop skills in critique. Students 
practice this critique so that they might become better self-critics, seeing their writing as 
others might by having others see their writing. Therefore, we need some way of forcing 
students to disagree safely without safely avoiding disagreement. While students do 
become comfortable disagreeing after they have worked together for a while, in 
recentering partner practice and emphasizing conflict, we need a way to promote this 
from the beginning.  
In my recursive essay sequence I outlined in the previous chapter, students 
develop a political opinion into a policy position, and peer critique takes place after 
students have completed the first draft in each cycle, before students conduct research 
and revise again, allowing feedback to direct writer research. To orient the students and 
instructor from the beginning, we can use a sorting metric and assemble groups of 
students with differing perspectives.cxxviii We need to build disagreement into peer 
critique to prevent it from being an “echo chamber,” in which unsubstantiated argument 
is agreed upon from the beginning and disagreement is unlikely—if not impossible or 
unthinkable—because peers overlook obvious problems that might be pointed out by 
someone with a different perspective. Without the distance provided by difference of 
perspective, students might easily resort to back-slapping and self-congratulation by not 
engaging with the problems of their own perspectives that they are unable to see. To 
allow students to be with each other as real people rather than abstracted entities, these 
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groups will need to be established early, and students will need time to get to know each 
other and see each other as sparring partners. 
The tendency toward sharks or teddy-bears is the result of a particular conception 
of conflict and disagreement, seeing it purely as violence and opponents as “evil” that 
must be destroyed or alternatively, “agreeing to disagree,” which is a way of avoiding 
disagreement and discomfort altogether. Just as ideological proximity can produce 
nothing more than echoes of agreement, ideological distance can produce nothing more 
than parties screaming past each other, only seeing the straw-stuffed demons of their own 
imagination, rather than the real people right in front of them. We will therefore need to 
incentivize productive critique so that students would be less likely to engage in 
disagreement brutally or apathetically, like sharks or teddy bears, and in the past, I have 
used peer group evaluation to make students accountable to each other, to me, and to 
themselves.cxxix As with any partner practice, innovative or traditional, the instructor must 
model what to do and who to be, regardless of the method, mode, or manner that the 
partner practice is done. 
Just like our students, we have our own experiences and perspectives, our own 
coordinates on the political compass, and we should be as open and honest with our 
students as we want them to be with us and with each other. We cannot pretend to be 
objective or unbiased, but admit we are rife with biases ourselves, and embody how to 
disagree with differing positions with evidence, reflection, and critical thinking. We must 
be careful because outright advocacy can be alienating to our students with differing 
perspectives, and the inherent power dynamic between student and teacher might easily 
lead to resentment, fear, or calls to the dean.cxxx We should even allow ourselves to be 
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challenged and critiqued by our students in turn, demonstrating not only the ethical way 
to critique, but the compassionate way to undergo it as well.cxxxi In addition to effective 
modeling, we also need a specific sequence for students to work through, a specific series 
of techniques that gives students a method, an explicit set of moves to practice and 
patterns to work through. 
While there is no best way to peer critique nor best move set for kumite, as the 
fittingness for an exigence in either combat or writing cannot be fully accounted for in 
advance, we can take from the preexisting spectrum of “peer review,” but focus our 
critique along it. For now, I will move forward with the basics of Toulmin, as shown in 
Figure 2.1, and as I argued in Chapter 2, that the Warrant connects two levels of 
argument: surface (LoC, Claims and Data) and structure (HoC, Warrant-(Q/R)-Backing), 
and outline a two-fold peer critique exercise that combines these two modalities of 
textual engagement: striking the surface and grappling the structure. That is, I suggest a 
model of critique that is not simply “editing” for surface correctness nor “response” to 
content and coherence, but one that can account for both without being reducible to 
either. We do not need to abandon the traditional categories of surface and structure, but 
Figure 5.1: The Toulmin Model 
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reconceptualize them as two different, intertwined modes of sparring that we can 
combine as aspects of a singular, truly holistic art of textual engagement. 
b. An Example Kumite Exercise  
A kumite model of peer critique is not a unique innovation, a new form or 
method, but rather a different approach or orientation to the practices we already do. I 
have designed this exercise for my recursive essay assignment and centralized peer 
critique, but it can certainly be adapted to other, less radical, curricula.cxxxii However, 
because all partner practice is situationally contingent on the situation in which it is 
performed, I take no responsibility for nor guarantee any results in using this exercise; 
like all martial arts training, it should only be performed by those fully aware of the risks 
involved. Taking place over two days, students will have two different sparring partners, 
and engage with each partner in both surface and structural kumite, taking place in class 
and at home, respectively. Students will therefore need three blank copies of their essay, 
one for each of their partners to read and annotate, and one that they will use for their 
own comments and notes, to use alongside peer comments to direct revision.cxxxiii  
In the class, students would pair up as the critic (uchite) and the writer (shite), 
with the critic reading the writer’s essay to them, striking at the surface of the text, 
making comments and questions, and the writer would remain silent, following along and 
noting on their own draft, allowing themselves to be blocked, directed, and thrown. The 
uchite might make comments and questions on the Claims, countering and challenging 
their attacks directly,cxxxiv or the Data, the force and connections behind them, 
grammatically and logically.cxxxv Just as a punch can be blocked at the fist or evaded 
entirely, it can also be blocked by closing in and attacking the shoulder and elbow, the 
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more immediate source of force behind the attack. However, since no attack nor Claim 
occurs in a vacuum, but instead relies on a whole system of mechanical support, critics 
might also attack the bodily balance of the writer as well, suggesting possible Warrants, 
testing their strength, and using that awareness to engage with Claims later in the essay, 
future attacks in the sequence. At one third-time, the pairs would switch roles, and repeat 
the exercise, and afterwards students would each take time to read through their partner’s 
essay silently to the end, adding and expanding their notes, a form of silent meditation 
perhaps. Finally, students would then discuss the overall impressions of each essay, how 
effective they were and how well they met the terms of the assignment, and record notes 
to direct their partners in a more structural critique, a more throwing-based kumite, to be 
completed for the next class.  
Using these notes, students would attempt to find weakness in their partner’s text, 
explicitly aim to “defeat them,” and get their partner to change their argument, to tap out, 
a kato pankration form of kumite and a judo-style randori. To do this, students outline 
their partner’s essay paragraph-by-paragraph, identifying the Claims and Data, and 
explicitly grappling the Warrants at work, comparing them with each other, seeing how 
they relate, coalesce, or contradict, finding weaknesses and strengths in the center of 
gravity supporting their peer’s texts, throwing them off their feet, their Backing and 
wrestling them to the ground. From these Claim-Data-Warrant outlines, students would 
point to Qualifiers and Rebuttals of the Warrants, gaps and exceptions, and what Backing 
is used or might need to be used to make the Warrants justified. The uchite would 
hardline the logics undergirding the texts, wrenching out the supportive structures from 
the body of the text, and torqueing them to a breaking point, looking for ways the text 
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might be internally inconsistent, implications that might not have been considered, and 
offering future avenues to explore. Finally, students would write an end comment that 
summarizes their main suggestions, structural challenges, and addresses how their 
partner’s essay follows the terms of the assignment as well as larger structural issues.cxxxvi  
Students would then bring their outline the following day, return it to the author, 
and repeat the same kumite sequence with partners outside their group, learning how to 
write for and engage with audiences with whom they are not familiar.cxxxvii With a series 
of annotations and an outline of their argumentative structure, students would have a 
better and more holistic sense of their essay. They would then revise their essay and 
submit it for evaluation, as well as fill out a kumite evaluation and revision reflection, 
which would also be submitted.cxxxviii This additional meta-reflection, meta-critique, and 
evaluation makes peers more active participants in their critique and writers more 
reflective and active in their revision.  
In practicing these two modes of engagements on two different texts and by 
having two different engagements from two different people, students would reflect 
further on the kinds of moves they might use in their own writing, and gain both a surface 
sense of their essay and a deeper structural sense as well, feeling their textual body as 
both a series of ex-pressions, out-ward moving surface forces acting on other forces, and 
an assemblage of in-tensions, connections of force with structural freedom and material 
limits. That is, by engaging with texts using this bodily form, students will encounter and 
engage texts, both theirs and others, as a body itself.  
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V. Conclusion and Transition 
In this chapter, I looked to the Japanese martial arts concept of kumite, or 
sparring, as a model and method for the complex and overwrought practice of peer 
review in composition. Both forms of partner practice hold central and essential places in 
the development of martial arts and writing skills respectively, complex fields of forces 
that require and are designed for engaging with other people. Furthermore, because of the 
inherent, and yet dismissed, critical element of peer review, kumite gives us a different 
and useful model for approaching critique, regardless of how instructors may shy away 
from that term because of the difficulty in dealing with conflict and the risk of potential 
antagonism. Rather than minimize it, as we have done in composition, conceiving of peer 
critique as kumite centralizes this risk, intensifies, and makes it the generative element in 
the exercise, rather a persistently irksome part of it. Through a repeated practice of 
mutually vulnerable enactments of force upon partners, students in kumite practice their 
skills, but also practice self-discipline and self-control by safely experiencing the painful 
effects of their techniques by relying on their partner moving slowly and gently.  
However, in focusing on the problems of peer critique, I necessarily focused on 
one side of a foundational debate of kumite, that concerning formal sparring and free 
sparring; whether techniques should be practiced in strict, controlled repetitive sequences 
or mirror as closely as possible practical application in a fighting match or life-and-death 
combat. However, we can never adequately perform the material motivations for or 
disciplinary expectations writing a proposal for an employer or a lab report for a senior 
level biology class (Chapter 4). So I focused instead on maximizing the self-awareness of 
the students as writers, as bodies and mechanisms of force, rather than give them a 
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collection of various “writings” with which to become competent. Nevertheless, even 
though the form of this practice cannot actually present the consequences and dynamics 
to which students will be subjected and the standards by which they will be judged, we 
should not therefore entirely abandon the impulse toward practical application. While the 
bar of practical application might certainly be different, perhaps thought as lower and 
simpler than that for training purposes, over-preparing students for many eventualities 
and cultivating a deep technical and ethical awareness will make their eventual responses 
to/in practical situations that much more efficient and more effective. 
In martial arts terms, even though we must use formal kumite to teach and 
practice peer review, the way that such engagement happens cannot be similarly formal 
and divorced from practical consequences, teaching ‘fossilized’ and ‘stylized’ techniques. 
But rather, the techniques performed and the way we perform them, even within a rigid 
and repetitive training sequence, must account for what students will face when 
practicing their skills outside the class, a practice that has high stakes, dangerous 
consequences, and less forgiving standards of evaluation. We saw this in relation to the 
prevalence and sudden lack of combat experience by instructors and students at the end 
of the Sengoku Period, the purpose and intensity of formal rules and the resemblance of 
training forms to actual battle is a tense area to negotiate. Some advocated for free 
sparring models resembling warfare as closely as possible and others argued that rigorous 
training, even outside the specifics of practical application, can provide the skills needed 
for successful application in such practical situations.  
But this tense and tenuous relationship between the pedagogy of the dojo and the 
practice of the battlefield is not limited to Japanese martial arts or the 17th century, but is 
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a constitutive part of all martial arts, and indeed all training itself. That is, while the 
space of training and the space of application are very different spaces, necessarily, they 
are also necessarily mutually constitutive. While the space of application—street-fight, 
battlefield, board room, committee meeting, or grant proposal—might determine 
standards of success or failure, preparing students with and for these standards only 
makes for a stagnant or regressive pedagogy, but inattention to these standards, 
neglecting the perhaps-ruthless pragmatism of non-compositionist audiences makes for 
an impotent and ineffectual pedagogy as well.  In sum, even though the space of learning 
and space of application, the dojo and the battlefield are different, they are mutually 
constitutive and deeply intertwined, and any pedagogical activities must be aimed not 
only at giving students skills to respond to practice situations, but also provide 
opportunities for relatively safe ethical reflection that will allow students to engage in 
such practical situations in an ethically beneficial way. As instructors then, we have a 
duty not just to teach students how to do something well—writing, fighting, and fighting-
writing—but also to do it for good.
xcvii See Sperling 55, Beck 419, Berkenkotter 316, Brammer and Rees 72, Ching 307. 
 
xcviii See Ching 314, Dipardo and Freedman 124, Freedman 73, Hamilton-Wieler 19, 
Jacobs 68, Lundstrom and Baker  
31, Roehler and Canton 3, Sperling 55, Woodward 42, Zhu 493 
 
xcix See Byard 2, Gere and Abbott 363, Harris 372, Horgan and Barnett 3. 
 
c See Barnard 125, Beck 420, Berkenkotter 312, Dipardo and Freedman 125, Gere and 
Abbott 363, Graff 81, Harris 372, Herrman 2, Horgan and Barnett 3, Vatalaro 21, Wynn 
et.al. 28, Zhu 494 
 
ci See Barnard 125, Berkenkotter 312, Dipardo and Freedman 125, Gere and Abbott 363, 
Harris 372, Horgan and Barnett 3, Zhu 494 
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cii See Barnard 125, Beck 419, Berkenkotter 312, Freedman 74, Gere and Abbott 363, 
Harris 372, Horgan and Barnett 3, Jacobs 68, Louth et.al. 221 
 
ciii See Barnard 125, Byard 2, Danis 358, Gere and Abbott 363, Harris 372, Horgan & 
Barnett 3, Wynn et.al. 10 
 
civ See Barnard 125, Dipardo and Freedman 132, Gere and Abbott 378, Harris 372-3, 
Lundstrom and Baker 31, NCTE 2, Wynn et.al. 12, 15-16 
 
cv See Ching 314, Dipardo and Freedman 125-127, Holt 390. 
 
cvi See Byard 2, Ching, 308, Gere and Abbott 363, Harris 372. 
 
cvii See Ching for a complication of Gere’s foundational narrative of the origins of 
collaborative writing.  
 
cviii“Jeremy” one of Porter’s students, wrote an essay venting about his coworkers’ 
“corruption and incompetence,” a broad claim he makes about minorities and working 
class people, specifically focusing on his African-American manager: “[Barry] could 
barley read or write and dropped out of school. This was not just the manager of produce, 
but one of the top four managers in whole store, and he was barley literate! I instantly lost 
all my respect for him after all, I was fifteen and smarter” (594). Porter reports that he 
wanted Jeremy to critically engage with these assumptions, and that other students were 
really worried about him. See also Dipardo and Freedman 125. 
 
cix “Styles of collaboration, for instance, are of varying depths, ranging from ‘parallel,’ 
where students share material and comments but fail to otherwise monitor one another’s 
work, to ‘associative,’ where some information is exchanged about various combinations 
selected without any further coordination of the students’ roles, to ‘cooperative,’ where 
students constantly monitor each other’s tasks, carefully coordinating roles” (DiPardo 
and Freedman 133). 
 
See also Harris 369 on “collaborative writing” vs. “co-authorship.”  
 
cx For example, Brammer and Rees studied two courses, Communication Arts I and II, a 
mixed speech/writing class, in a curriculum that also requires two upper-level 
disciplinary specific writing courses (75).  Therefore, their results would be tentative at 
best for pure composition courses without any further writing requirements, and perhaps 
irrelevant for most practitioners of peer review. As I have noted elsewhere, it’s extremely 
problematic for the advancements in scholarship, particularly concerning pedagogy, to 
come out of and be limited to the most ideal institutional situations, ones not mirrored by 
the clear majority of teachers’ experiences. In doing so, composition scholarship sets an 
unreachable standard and sets up most composition instructors to fail, unable to meet best 
practices because of institutional realities that better-off scholars do not have to account 
for.  
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cxi Other factors include nation, region, level of education, university, type of university, 
educational requirements, administrators, past teachers, past students, curriculum, 
classroom, class-time, schedule, season, weather, external temperature, internal 
temperature, dining hall menu, athletic events, bar drink specials and accessibility of fake 
IDs, etc. 
cxii See Bickford 148, Brammer and Rees 72, DiPardo and Freedman 129, Herrman 3, 
Horgan and Barnett 3, Louth et.al. 215, Paulson et.al. 380, Vatalaro 22, Woodward 40. 
Also, these various sources and others range widely in their methodological approach, 
from anecdotal lore to theoretical and philosophical meditations to eye-tracking empirical 
studies and think-aloud protocols, with the different approaches and research site greatly 
affecting how specific methods of peer review function and are evaluated. 
 
cxiii While I use the names here for ease and clarity, any of these names can and have been 
applied to any number of practices, even if they do not match with the spectrum here. 
That is, “peer editing” can be the name for dynamic, interactive full-class discussion or 
the reductive, archaic version of students acting as spell check for their peers. Also, “peer 
evaluation” and “peer response” might be two different names by different instructors for 
a very similar or even the exact same partner practice. One exacerbating factor in the 
complexity of “peer review” is the inability of the discipline to come to consensus or 
disseminate this consensus among all practitioners, especially considering the slow pace 
at which theory trickles down into pedagogy, and the conservative tendency of many 
teachers to continue what they’ve always done, ignoring more recent developments in 
scholarship.  
 
cxiv See Bean 301, Beck 439, Brammer and Rees 78, Freedman 81, Hall 6, Harris 372, 
NCTE 1, Paulson et.al 324, Porter 580, Woodward 44, Wynn et.al. 12 
 
cxv See Dipardo and Freedman 127, Freedman 79, Hall 4, Hamilton-Weiler 17, Newkirk 
301, Woodward 40 
 
cxvi See Barnard 126, Freedman 100, Graff 87, Holt 385, Woodward 42. Also, Vygotsky’s 
“theories were developed through studies of dyadic interaction,” and the ZPD is its most 
productive when limited to two peers, and overcomplicated when applied improperly to 
large group scenarios (DiPardo and Freedman 129). 
 
cxvii See NCTE 2, Beck 417, Berkenkotter 314, Brammer and Rees 71, George 322, 
Newkirk 301, 306, 379, Paulson et.al. 305, 329, Porter 582, 583, Vatalaro 22, Zhu 494. 
 
cxviii See Freedman 90, 102, George 378. 
 
cxix However, the feeling of power and sense of superiority affording by “correcting” 
others, is not only something perpetrated by “bad” students, but also by many teachers 
who don’t provide harsh feedback to help students but to demonstrate their own learned 
superiority. Porter identifies this tendency to “meanness” as the pedagogy of severity.  
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cxx Unarguably, there is a gendered dimension to aggression and conflict. While it plays 
into reductive patriarchal stereotypes to cast all males as aggressive dominators and all 
females as passive submitters, it is an element of hegemonic gender performance for both 
groups, and rampant throughout the scholarship, as well as my own personal experience. 
While we must recognize this tendency, we cannot allow it to be totalizing of either 
gender, i.e. some males are passive and some females are aggressive, but instead promote 
and train students to be adaptable and flexible as context demands. But this is further 
complicated not only by proper attention to the resonance of patriarchal stereotypes with 
the reality they have helped construct, a necessarily part of challenging them, but also 
considering the complex relationships between sex, gender, and sexuality, especially with 
the increased visibility, and in some fortunate cases, acceptance of queer and trans 
students. While such advocacy is integral to pedagogy going forward, proper attention to 
this is beyond the scope of this inquiry.      
 
cxxi See Beck 418, George 321, Graff 82, Hamilton-Wieler 21, Harris 375, NCTE 1, 
Neubert and McNelis 54, Porter 580, Roehler and Canton 2, Schaffer 82, Woodward 41, 
Zhu 502, 515. 
 
cxxii See Beck 413, Brammer and Rees 79, Dipardo and Freedman 127, Freedman 79, Hall 
5, Hamilton-Wieler 5, Harris 376, Holt 589, Paulson et.al. 327, Porter 588, Smith 8, 
Sperling 67, Woodward 40, Zhu 494. 
 
cxxiii Some readers might bristle here at my equation of “audience” with “opponent.” 
Recall Danis above, who argues that language is used “establish, maintain, and reshape 
relationships as much as to share ideas and insights” (356). That is, what the language of 
the user is trying to do to us as readers/audience is an act of the language as well and just 
as important as what they’re “trying to say,” so if someone is trying to persuade, either to 
refute or come to consensus, they are doing something to us, and if we are critical readers 
we are preventing them from doing it easily or letting them do as they will. Certainly, the 
antagonistic attitude in argument can be problematic, leading others to advocate for 
“alternative,” non-persuasive models of argument. However, I would argue that all 
writing is argumentative, with some writing arguing implicitly like explication or 
description arguing “believe me, this is true” and narrative likewise implicitly argues “see 
this story, suspend disbelief, keep reading.” 
 
cxxiv Friday notes that “Westerners usually equate kata with the solo exercises of Chinese, 
Okinawan, and Korean martial arts…[But] kata in both traditional and modern Japanese 
fighting arts nearly always involve the participation of two or more people” (n.1 164). 
The mixed lineage of karate illustrates this, and it is from Shotokan Karate, brought to 
mainland Japan by the Okinawan Grandmaster Gichin Funakoshi, that I draw the terms 
formal and free sparring. 
 
cxxv For the earliest martial arts students, young samurai, their training to ride a horse, 
shoot a bow, and cut with the sword was purely vocational; killing was their profession. 
While hopefully our students will not become professional killers, the “killer attitude” 
often reported or enacted by professionals in variety of fields like business and law means 
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that harsh and ruthless pragmatism is an inextricable element of the “real world” 
especially in our neo-liberal late-capitalist society. While getting fired or getting 
promoted is not directly life-or-death, in an increasingly precarious economy, it can 
certainly lead to it, and economic prosperity and physical wellbeing only differ by a few 
small degrees.   
 
cxxvi One John Dewey himself said was “alone worth the price of admission” when he 
visited the Kodokan, the home of judo, in Letters from Japan and China.  
 
cxxvii See Lynch. Et.al. for the need for “cooperative conflict” or “conflictual 
cooperation.” 
 
cxxviii Early on in teaching first-year writing, I found that often students were not only 
grossly uninformed and misinformed about current events and issues of common 
concern, but ignorant of their own stances, their connections to other thinkers, and their 
resemblance to or difference from well-known political ideologies. To address this, I 
have used Political Compass. Originally developed by Pace News, the questionnaire 
positions respondents at coordinates corresponding to their beliefs concerning 
government control in social life (Authoritarian to Libertarian) and government control in 
economic affairs (Left to Right, which I call “Fair” to “Free”), which produces four 
general quadrants: Authoritarian Left (collectivism), Authoritarian Right (neo-
conservativism), Libertarian Right (neo-liberalism), and Libertarian Left (progressivism). 
However, as with the structure of the partner practice, it doesn’t matter which we use, 
necessarily, only that we use one, and indeed any taxonomy, especially one dealing with 
humans will be inadequate, have exceptions, and fail to totalize everyone Other useful 
resources for this include The Political Spectrum (created in response to perceived UK-
bias in the PC), I Side With (places respondents in relation to contemporary American 
political figures), and The 8 Values (identifying a pre-existing ideology students might 
identify with), but other approaches we might use could be the True Colors, Myers-
Briggs, or the Enneagram tests. It depends.  
 
cxxix Using a variety of different forms, always some combination of Likert-scale 
questions and mandatory comments, students explain how well their peers helped them, 
averaged across multiple sessions, which count for half of students’ peer group grades. 
That is, they are graded on completion and how well their peers felt they were helped. 
These have produced a variety of interesting results. e.g. some extremely poor writers 
being the best peer critics while the better writers were the worst, while singular partners 
got a range of evaluations, and some students who rarely showed up still received high 
marks, and the same struggles at work in peer review, sharks and teddy bears show up in 
peer review evaluation as well. While this practice is useful and worthy of study, it is 
beyond the scope of this project. 
 
cxxx We might therefore need to appeal to honor codes, like the Carolinian Creed as USC, 
which values integrity, dignity, rights and property, anti-bigotry, and concern for others. 
If we have institutional statements like these, we have a basis from which to differentiate 
acceptable and unacceptable views without risking our station as representatives of the 
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university. Certainly, in our current late-capitalist society nothing we do is truly noble, 
but more or less rationalized ways of selling our life and labor, exploiting ourselves for 
both necessity and luxury, but if we still believe that education can be a way of make 
people better and making better people, than we have a responsibility to attempt to do so 
to the fullest of our ability. 
 
cxxxi While I cannot ever truly experience the perspective of another, I am quite aware that 
this willingness to openness and vulnerability is a perspective of my own privileged place 
as a cishet white male of above average height and mass. People of color, women, and 
queer educators face far more challenges to their authority as educators than I have or 
ever will. While I don’t have an answer or suggestion ameliorate this explicit inequality 
in how teachers are viewed by their students, it is my hope that a classroom that is built 
around mutuality and respect, especially one that emphasizes conflict and argument, 
would discourage bigotry based on historical power discrepancies, explicit or implicit, 
that infects every facet of our society, in education most especially. Any push toward 
“equality” will be necessarily vulnerable to exploitation by those already with power and 
historical privilege, that a white supremacist can see censoring of their views as an 
“unfair attack on free speech.”   
 
cxxxii This exercises is based most specifically on the methods of Graff, Neubert and 
McNelis, and Hamilton-Wieler, and the exercises of Elbow, Belanoff, and Bruffee as laid 
out and integrated by Holt, and influenced by many other sources as well. Even though 
partner practice varies widely, the set of common agreements (explicit instructions, 
specific detailed student engagement, and productive instructor modeling, both 
technically and affectively) allow for good peer review to be different in form, but 
essentially the same in spirit, regardless of the attitude used in the approach. That is, even 
though Elbow, for example, moves far away from the antagonism of critique and I move 
into and through it, we both end up in the same place: productive student engagement and 
improved student writers.   
 
cxxxiii The length of the essay will depend on which cycle of the assignment we’re in 
(3/6/10/15) and adjustments for later peer critique periods would be made accordingly. 
 
cxxxiv E.g. “what this means is…” “I’m not sure what this means…” or “This part is good 
because” etc. and dealing with any “errors” as issues of specific and (in)effective Claims 
 
cxxxv E.g. “This is true because…,” “Why do you think that?” or applying questions of 
acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency.  
 
cxxxvi E.g. Does the explication lead to the conclusion? Does the Narratio support the 
argument? How are the moves in confirmation, refutation, and concession laid out and 
how do they relate? Are all the consequences outlined in sufficient detail? Etc. 
 
cxxxvii These partners would also change in each iteration, providing students fresh 
perspectives in each critique for each iteration of the recursive essay sequence. Ideally, 
students would not engage with any peer more than once in formal kumite, although 
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students will have ample time and opportunity to develop rapport with their group 
members, through any number of collaborative minor assignments, in-class group work, 
or any other pedagogical devices deemed necessary.  
 
cxxxviii Along with this graded draft, students would also write a memo to their peers (and 
the instructor) detailing how they used their peers’ comments, what they did and why, as 
well as what they did not and why not, and students would also rate their peers’ 
effectiveness through the evaluation that counts as half their grade, and they would repeat 
at each cycle of the essay sequence.  
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Conclusion 
Ethical Principles for Affirmative Contention
In the preceding pages, I offered a series of theoretical articulations and 
pedagogical applications that seek to change the ways we conceive, practice, and train 
students in writing, particularly focusing on a rhetorical orientation to and practice of 
writing arguments. Furthermore, because of the agonistic origins of our practices of 
argument, these articulations and applications concern themselves with the ways that we 
engage with and in violence. Despite the deep set and well-founded rejection of violence 
in composition and rhetoric, let alone the larger academy, this rejection is built on a 
reductive conception and evaluation of violence, one that demonizes what might 
otherwise be useful and productive modes of inquiry by obscuring or rationalizing the 
violence that we can, do, and must commit.  
If we recall Dionysodorus’s jab about Cleinias’s friends wanting him to be dead 
in being other than he is, we have an interesting insight into the violence of education. If 
we conceive of violence as a violation of the autonomy of the individual subject, leaving 
aside violation of their bodily integrity for the moment, then any work we do in education 
as a form of change is itself a violent act. If a student comes into our class with a 
worldview based on what we in the academy might see as unfounded, problematic, or 
even dangerous beliefs, and we seek to increase their abilities of research, reflection, and 
critical thinking then our goal is to destroy the student-as-they-come-to-us because such 
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abilities would challenge their worldview, perhaps change it, and in producing a “more 
educated” student, we have killed the one that has come to us.  
For example, a frequent occurrence in my teaching career has been students 
offering their views, and I ask from where they have gotten them and on what grounds 
they believe them, only to be met with scorn, offense, and nasty end-of-term evaluations 
about my “shoving liberal views down their throats.” Even though I have my own 
perspectives, I cannot simply presume my own truth as The Truth and expect my students 
to conform without violating their integrity as autonomous subjects. We have reached a 
point, and perhaps we’ve always been here, where disagreement itself is so unfamiliar 
and perceived to be so violent that even the request for evidence is perceived as an 
unethical imposition upon the autonomy of students. However, as an educator, I must 
allow students their beliefs in God (even though he’s dead and we have killed him), 
Justice (even though it’s an illusion produced by hegemony to naturalize oppression), and 
Truth (which exists only through an anthropomorphic and anthropocentric lens), but 
when they use such beliefs as Warrants or backing for arguments that they make to and 
about other people, an individual’s opinion is not simply theirs any more, but part of a 
discourse that is subject to challenge, debate, and even dismissal. 
Put differently, if I am training students to fight with words, there’s nothing 
within that pedagogy that dictates the ethical orientations that students must necessarily 
develop as a result of that training. Indeed, the “promising students who rejects their 
master” is a popular trope in martial arts media, and the individual who uses their skills 
simply for domination and self-aggrandizement is a threat to everyone, whether their 
skills are in rhetorical or physical conflict. However, an agonistic or bushido orientation 
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to conflict does not seek domination, but protection and peace. While such an ideal is 
scarred by the material histories of oppression that mark and characterize the warrior 
caste that became aristocracy, which became plutocracy (something it had always already 
been), this ideal itself is still valuable. It is this ideal of nobility, to be noble not because 
of birth, or class, or access to resources, but because of compassion, passion, diligence, 
and effort to be the best person and do rightly and squarely with others, not simply 
because it’s the easiest way to achieve our goals, but because to do otherwise would be 
dishonorable. In short, I cannot teach students what to fight for, but in teaching them to 
fight well, I might also give them occasion to think about why they fight and what they 
hope to accomplish with their fighting. 
While there is no escape from coercion, there are particular ways of being 
coercive to produce particular effects.cxxxix In martial arts practice, the foundation of 
training is the consent to coercion by becoming a student, by taking on the task and 
responsibilities of training. The use of short, memorable maxims is a common practice 
across many specific martial arts, and many martial arts systems developed using this 
same pedagogical principle.cxl While one could certainly misunderstand these trajectories 
to be ways to minimize violence, within this frame there is no “non-violence.” Instead, 
each conflict is a particular enactment of force on others that can be directed toward 
particular ends, and each style a different collection of techniques, tendencies, and tactics 
for engaging in conflict. I have therefore created the ethics of my project from the 
recommendations of various theorists, scholars, and pedagogues engaging with conflict in 
rhetoric, on and through Greek agonism as a foundational orientation to violence. What 
follows are a series of principles that teachers might meditate on, practice, or articulate to 
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students to promote this affirmative orientation to conflict that I have advocated in this 
project. 
 
I. Fight with Sedimented Inequalities 
By foregrounding the historio-cultural conditions surrounding the developments 
of values, arguments, and positions, as Sharon Crowley recommends in Toward a Civil 
Discourse, a scholar can “demonstrate the contingency of given values or sets of values 
by locating them in space and time, thus destabilizing the system of belief in which these 
same values are taken to be noncontingent” (201). In “Moments of Argument” Dennis 
Lynch, Diana George, and Marilyn Cooper make a similar prescription for teachers to 
have students question their own commonplaces, “to situate the issue historically,…and 
to find analogous problems from the past in order to resist coming to closure too quickly” 
(73). These three moves in questioning, situating, and analogizing serve to illustrate the 
contingency of positions and issues. Furthermore, when students realize that their 
positions are not just “their own opinions but arise from historical, social, and cultural 
conditions—they do not feel they need to argue so fiercely and single-mindedly, and they 
can take the time to listen to other voices and rethink their positions” (Lynch, et. al. 82). 
By making positions arguable, these scholars argue that students are then better able to 
argue positions within context. By ignoring the historio-cultural differences of values, 
arguments, and positions, by erasing the uneven battlefields, the sedimented inequalities 
connected to those differences are left unquestioned as well. 
However, it is not as easy as merely historicizing or simply being nice. “Because 
those structural differences pervade the writing classes most of us teach,” Susan Jarratt 
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argues “our students can't merely accept or reject such responses on an equal basis, 
because of the material realities in our society in which such responses are grounded. 
Such inequities often make the attempt to create a harmonious and nurturing community 
of readers an illusory fiction—a superficial suturing of real social divisions” (“The Case 
for Conflict” 267). Because historio-cultural inequalities are so pervasive, even into the 
supposedly neutral space of the classroom, not everyone can access and engage these 
inequalities in the same way or to the same degree. In fact, a strong aspect of many 
historio-cultural inequalities is the limitation or prevention of the means of those affected 
by these inequalities to question them. Not everyone can contend with difference in the 
same way. It is not simply a matter of pointing out inequalities, but pointing out the 
inequality even at work in their identification.   
 
II. Fight with Multimindedness 
Rather than enacting a position as stable and fixed, one should enact a position 
that is flowing and fluxed. Indeed, such a position would not actually be a position at all, 
but a positionality. Instead of monolithic, as one stone, one should be polyhydrous; like 
many waters. In conflict between two stones, one or both is smashed, like what Deborah 
Tannen identifies in The Argument Culture as the pro/con logic of political debate shows 
like Crossfire (50). Conflicting monoliths are mutually exclusive; either one is right or 
one is wrong. Patricia Roberts-Miller explains that if students enter class discussion in a 
monolithic way, “determined to defend their pre-commitments, if they leave their 
intellect at the door, so to speak, then classes will simply be shouting matches” (“When 
Agonism is Agony” 228). Such a discrete binaristic model prevents conflict from being 
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anything other than a territorial dispute, a line in the sand, a war over scare resources and 
tenable territory. The only result is the destruction of one position or both, through either 
mutual destruction or resolution of their difference.  
In a conflict between waters, the positions blend and mix, and this dynamism 
allows for more than just a reduction to pro/con. Such a reduction erases the differences 
among different positions that may be on one side or the other. Rather than a position, 
which is rarely ever singular and homogenous, one must have a multiminded 
positionality. Like water, Bonnie Honig explains, “the self is not, ever, one. It is itself a 
site of an agonistic struggle” (220). This positionality is that of the ancient Greek agonist 
who is “not an enclosed identity; he is rather a kind of open field of forces” (Hawhee 21). 
This understanding of identity as multiple can also be seen in the third of Nietzsche’s 
propositions of Kriegs-Praxis, or “fighting-writing” from Ecce Homo. He states that one 
must “never attack persons” as discrete entities, but rather use them to “make visible a 
general but creeping and elusive calamity” (232). In Contesting Nietzsche, Christa Davis 
Acampora expands on his thesis, “as the contestants are increasingly defined in terms of 
diametric opposition and absolute difference, they are increasingly less tolerant and 
receptive to actual engagement” (53).  
An individual is a site for diagnosis of particular forces, as the individual is a 
nominalized intersection of multiple flows of difference: a positionality, not a position. 
However, listening with multimindedness also involves “a risk in that one might lose,” as 
Roberts-Miller argues because “advancing an argument means that one must be open to 
the criticisms others will make of it” (“Fighting without Hatred” 589). This positionality 
also requires that one “not only listen carefully to the perspectives of others but try to 
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think from those perspectives,” as Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin recommend for 
“invitational rhetoric” (12). This multimindedness “demands that one simultaneously 
trust and doubt one's own perceptions, rely on one’s own judgment and consider the 
judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think” ( Roberts-Miller, 
“Fighting” 597). As Bruce Lee says, one must be “shapeless, formless, like water. When 
you pour water in a cup, it becomes the cup. When you pour water in a bottle, it becomes 
the bottle. When you pour water in a teapot, it becomes the teapot. Water can flow or it 
can crash. Be water” (Lee). 
 
III. Fight without Hatred 
Nietzsche’s fourth proposition of Kreigs-Praxis states that one should “only 
attack things when every personal quarrel is excluded, when any background of bad 
experiences is lacking” (232). Personal quarrel and bad conscience make opponents “less 
tolerant and receptive” as Acampora argues (53). Tannen identifies this process also as 
Gregory Bateson’s “complementary schismogenesis” in which each parties’ aggression 
enervates the other, leading to “more exaggerated forms of an opposing behavior in a 
mutually aggravating spiral” (The Argument Culture 53). Hatred breeds hatred, each 
bigger and stronger. This mutual aggravation produces not only hatred, but as Foss and 
Griffin argue “feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, pain, humiliation, guilt, embarrassment, 
or angry submission on the part of the audience as rhetors communicate the superiority of 
their positions and the deficiencies of those of the audience” (6). Such negative feelings 
come from the particular orientation to conflict as it is enacted, not conflict itself.  
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As Roberts-Miller explains “conflict is a necessary consequence of difference,” 
but such conflict need not necessarily lead to enmity (“Fighting” 589). The potentiality of 
enmity is a result of the pervasiveness of domination as the only mode of conflict and the 
difficulty in thinking beyond ones perspective and granting our opponents the same 
legitimacy as us. Borrowing from Mouffe’s Agonistics, fighting without hatred “requires 
that the other are not seen as enemies to be destroyed, but as adversaries whose ideas 
might be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be 
questioned” (7). Mouffe’s language is illustrative here; enemies are destroyed, but 
adversaries are fought. Conversely, Mouffe writes, “adversaries fight against each other 
because they want their interpretation of the principles to become hegemonic, but they do 
not put into question the legitimacy” of their opponent (7). Unlike the enemy, who has no 
place within a collective “us,” a structure built on his exclusion, the adversary is part of a 
collective of all participants, even if a position may be mutually exclusive with my own. 
With adversaries, eradication cannot be the goal, but only impersonal combat with their 
ideas, their attacks.  
Put another way, fighting to kill is not the first response as with enemies, but a 
last possible resort and a failure in adversarial relations. Rather than “a willingness to 
triumph at all costs,” Roberts-Miller argues that fighting without hatred means “that one 
is willing to take risks” (“Fighting” 589). Alongside risk, I place Foss and Griffin’s 
recommendation for safety by rejecting cruelty, making “no attempt to hurt, degrade, or 
belittle” interlocutors or their beliefs (10-11). I would take their argument in the strongest 
sense, having to include in their structure of safety even the patriarchal misogynist of 
traditional rhetoric, against whom they situate their entire project of invitational rhetoric. 
 212 
As Maxine Hairston outlines in “Carl Roger’s Alternative to Traditional Rhetoric,” 
“implications of trying to be this fair-minded with one's opponent are staggering,” and 
the balance of risk and safety is quite precarious, but necessary to fighting without hatred 
(375). 
Using the ethics of the adversary means that there is no longer inherent love or 
hatred based on the logic of a given relationship; no simply “good” and “bad” opponents. 
Instead, each adversary must be encountered on his/her own nuanced grounds as 
legitimate interlocutors in the agonistic assemblage, fought fiercely without personal 
quarrel or contempt because even the most violent lover of destruction is a human being, 
as complex, nuanced, and multiple as anyone else. We must affirm the particularities of 
their difference, fight them honestly, and only exclude those that threaten the possibility 
of future contention, defeating that which is no longer productive, tentative, or 
questionable.  
 
IV. Fight against Total Victory 
Both the eristic “victory at all costs” and the irenic drive to consensus both have 
as their goal the erasure of difference and the negation of argument. The eristic seeks to 
negate the opponent in a particular fight, but the irenic seeks consensus, negating fighting 
altogether. In the eristic model, each argument ends when it is “won” by someone 
defeating someone else. That is, as John Poulakos writes, “declaring winners and losers 
coincides with saying that the contest is over” (175). The eristic drive for victory, as Foss 
and Griffin argue, enacts “a desire for control and domination, for the act of changing 
another establishes the power of the change agent over that other” (3). Conversely, the 
 213 
irenic rejection of argument altogether has its own risks. As Lynch, George, and Cooper 
warn, to see victory “as the whole of argumentative writing is to risk seeing all decisions 
as final, all positions as absolute or even natural” (77). In response to the risk of finality, 
we must understand “winning an argument is not a permanent achievement,” but 
tentative and itself a move in the fight, a knockout strike (Crowley 33). A tentative 
victory is never totalizing or undisputed, but nor is such disputation a risk to the process 
of arriving at or to that victory itself. Greg Myers writes that a victory “can never 
foreclose the possibility that an opposing argument will open new lines of rhetorical 
force” (56). Each victory is admittedly an erasure, but one that is neither permanent nor 
unquestionable. 
If consensus is the goal, then arguing itself can be counterproductive. In the irenic 
model, Sharon Crowley explains that consensus “begins with the knowledge that the 
positions taken by some or all must be eroded or forgotten if deliberation is to succeed” 
(22). Myers also explains that consensus “must mean that some interest have been 
suppressed or excluded” (156). Consensus, the point at which disagreement is 
neutralized, functions for Myers as a necessary end to conflict, and for Crowley, a 
necessary beginning. Just like eristic final victory, the irenic final victory of consensus is 
itself a move in the fight, a submission hold. In this case, the opponent “taps out,” 
conceding or accepting the resolution of the conflict. Not only does the move of 
consensus have particular risks, but also even aiming for that move is always risky.  
While consensus might seem neutral, natural, and necessary, Mouffe explains that 
a consensus “is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices. It is never the 
manifestation of a deeper objectivity that is exterior to the practices that brought it into 
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being” (Agonistics 2). If understood as natural, Mouffe argues that “too much emphasis 
on consensus” coupled with conflict-aversion eliminates the drive for argument 
altogether, evacuating politics and social change (12). This risk aligns with Nietzsche’s 
second proposition of Kriegs-Praxis: “only attack causes against which [one] would not 
find allies,” as such causes would oppose hegemonic consensus (232). Myers and 
Crowley point out the particular risks of consensus, and Mouffe illustrates the risks of 
aiming for it in the first place. A move that finishes a fight is itself a fighting move; every 
closure is also an opening and each opening a closure as well. Victory and consensus are 
always risky.  
 
V. Fight against Invincibility  
One of the biggest threats to fighting well is the invincible opponent, the 
uncontestable adversary like the Good. In service to the entire assemblage, the 
incontestable must be excluded from the contest, as it is a threat to further contention. As 
Mouffe writes, “there will always be a struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects 
aiming at presenting their views of the common good as the ‘true’ incarnation of the 
universal” (Agonistics 79). That is, if positions base their struggle for hegemony on 
universal premises like the Good, Truth, or divine revelation, a common backing for 
many, then there can never be any actual argument. If someone is arguing from the Good, 
or any inarguable premise, then any disagreement cannot be justified. One cannot argue 
with the Good or any other universal claim, built as they are through coercive and often 
circular logic. While one can certainly argue for or against a universal claim, the claims’ 
universality means “no rational resolution of that conflict will ever be available” 
 215 
(Mouffe, Agonistics 79). The logic at work here only fosters violence toward difference, 
because difference from what is Good can only be Bad (or Evil), universally and 
absolutely, which returns us to the dualism of Athena and Ares, as any Good is bound to 
its particular historio-cultural context and ideological community, an “us” who it is good 
for. 
This could also be understood as The Miltiades Principle from Nietzsche’s 
“Homer’s Contest” and Acampora’s reading of it. After winning the battle of Marathon, 
lacking both limitations on and “proper understanding of the limits and conditions of his 
excellence, Miltiades became reckless and destructive” and Acampora relates that both he 
and Athens “suffered gravely as a result” (34). For Nietzsche, “this proves that without 
envy, jealousy, and ambition in the contest, the Hellenic state, like Hellenic man, 
deteriorates. It becomes evil and cruel, it becomes vengeful and godless…it then only 
takes a panicky fright to make it fall and shatter” (179-180). When the human has no 
rival among mortals, he becomes a threat to everyone. Indeed, the invincible opponent 
threatens the entire assemblage as well as each individual competitor. Nietzsche notes 
that ostracism is very important here: the most powerful person is removed from 
contention so that contention might continue for both individual and assemblage. This 
exclusion is very important “because productive agonism is dependent on the actual 
capabilities of participants who must manifest them in order for them to be meaningful 
indicators of value” (Acampora 37). Contest can only be productive if it is an actual 
contest. While not every opponent might be contested, his or her moves, foundations, and 
practices must remain contestable. 
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IV. Fight from Sedimented Inequalities 
In the 1869 Harvard Address, University President Charles William Eliot 
“presented the Harvard experience as one that converted poor and rich, or anyway those 
who had endured and demonstrated their ‘capacity and character,’ their open-mindedness 
and ‘sense of public duty,’ into one body, ‘the sons of Harvard” (Douglas 93). Education 
could benefit students from all conditions of life, provided they assimilated into 
Harvard’s elite, seemingly agonistic culture. As Lisa Reid Ricker explains, the university 
utilized a supposedly agonistic pedagogy, having students “engage in rigorous oral drill 
and debate” (241). However, in the 1872-73 Harvard annual report, Eliot bewailed 
students’ writing, marking them as unprepared for the “real work” of debate, causing 
composition to be created as a grammar-based, remedial, and subaltern training class 
(Santa 14). A logic of exclusion like that of Aristotle and Corbett is evident here, as Eliot 
was clear that not all students deserved education, only those who had demonstrated their 
merit and the values of/to Harvard. Only those who accepted and embodied the coercive 
foundations could participate in the contest built on them; however, since these students 
could not embody a “son of Harvard,” the contest itself was closed. 
In addition to non-elite men, women entering the university contributed to the 
pedagogical shift, as Robert Connors posits in Composition-Rhetoric. After 1870, there 
were elements of “confession, of intimate personalism, and of anti-agonistic admission of 
weakness in the new topics that could not have existed prior to women’s entrance into 
higher education” (65). Connors argues that students write personal narrative, a 
“feminine” genre, because they lack the skills for argumentation, a “masculine genre.” 
This generic, gendered hierarchy reifies the notion of women as passive and men as 
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active, based on the assumption that women lacked the innate ability to contend required 
by the masculine spheres of Harvard or the public at large. Ricker, Connors, Douglas, and 
Santa all agree that there was a shift from agonistic pedagogy to irenic pedagogy 
resulting from entrance of non-elite men and women.  
This supposed agonistic pedagogy of 19th century Harvard has “a patriarchal 
bias,” as Foss and Griffin point out (1). Women and other others were either barred at the 
gates or (forced or thought to be) unprepared to enter them. This is not a problem of 
contenders, but a structural problem of the agonistic assemblage as it was built through 
historically sedimented inequalities. As Myers explains, these inequalities are “whole 
systems of ideas that people take for granted and use to make sense of the world. One 
cannot escape from one’s economic interests and ethnic background, but one can try to 
understand how they shape one’s thinking and social actions” (168). One must fight from 
the position into which he is thrown, but one must fight through those structures that 
striate the collective into hegemonic hierarchies.  
As Roberts-Miller explains, this “requires a particular kind of education, one that 
is increasingly under attack from political groups for whom diversity, multiculturalism, 
and critical thinking are devil terms, for whom education should be a process of 
inculcating a noncritical deference to existing institutions, and for whom dissent is 
treason” (“Agonism, Wrangling…” 158). In opposing contemporary hegemonies, I 
follow another on of Nietzsche’s propositions of Kriegs-Praxis: “only attack causes that 
are victorious…even wait until they become victorious” (232). Furthermore, in attacking 
the Victorious, I cannot either rely on “brute strength,” the unequal positions of any given 
person, but use suppleness and technique. A martial arts technique that requires immense 
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physical strength, agility, and endurance from the outset, not after training, is of no use to 
anyone except the strong. While one must fight against the invincible opponent, one must 
fight against the conditions that make one invincible as well. 
KATZU
cxxxix That is, while excluding someone on the bases of gender and on the bases of 
misogyny are both practices of exclusion, but they differ in the overall structural effects. 
The former reduces those who can participate by roughly half at the outset, while the 
latter limits manners of participation by a smaller amount and degree. Furthermore, 
exclusion of the latter prevents exclusion of the former, which is part of the goal of a 
misogynistic exclusion of women. What is important is that the ground rules for such 
exclusions are explicit and transparent. That is, if gender inclusivity is stated, then those 
who disagree cannot participate, and their exclusion allows for the inclusion of more and 
different participants. 
 
cxl For example, Tae Kwon Do, the Korean martial art most famous for its kicking-
centered style has five tenets: Courtesy, Integrity, Perseverance, Self-Control, and 
Indomitable Spirit. Gichin Funakoshi, who imported Karate from Okinawa to Japan, 
developing Shotokan-ryu and modern Karate, had twenty principles. Shaolin Gong Fu 
was developed and practiced by monks, who acted along eight principles. Other “soft” 
Chinese martial arts like bagua and tai chi also have eight principles. These principles 
include both what might be called “ethics,” as well as “tactics,” ways of interacting with 
others in the world.  
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